A Study of the Role of Managerial Meta-Knowledge in the Management of Distributed Knowledge by Jensen, Henrik
Henrik Jensen
The PhD School of Economics and Management PhD Series 40.2016
PhD Series 40-2016
ECON
OM
IC ORGAN
IZATION
 AN
D IM
PERFECT M
AN
AGERIAL KN
OW
LEDGE:  
A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF M
AN
AGERIAL M
ETA-KN
OW
LEDGE IN
 THE M
AN
AGEM
EN
T OF DISTRIBUTED KN
OW
LEDGE
COPENHAGEN BUSINESS SCHOOL
SOLBJERG PLADS 3
DK-2000 FREDERIKSBERG
DANMARK
WWW.CBS.DK
ISSN 0906-6934
Print ISBN:  978-87-93483-44-6  
Online ISBN: 978-87-93483-45-3
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 
AND IMPERFECT  
MANAGERIAL KNOWLEDGE: 
A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF MANAGERIAL  
META-KNOWLEDGE IN THE MANAGEMENT 
OF DISTRIBUTED KNOWLEDGE
Economic Organization and Imperfect Managerial Knowledge: 
A Study of the Role of Managerial Meta-Knowledge in the 
Management of Distributed Knowledge 
A PhD dissertation by: 
Henrik Jensen 
2016 
Supervisor: Nicolai J. Foss 
Secondary supervisor: Jacob Lyngsie 
Department of Strategic Management and Globalization. 
PhD School in Economics and Management, 
Copenhagen Business School 
Henrik Jensen
Economic Organization and Imperfect Managerial Knowledge: 
A Study of the Role of Managerial Meta-Knowledge 
in the Management of Distributed Knowledge
1st edition 2016
PhD Series 40.2016
© Henrik Jensen
ISSN 0906-6934
Print ISBN:   978-87-93483-44-6
Online ISBN:  978-87-93483-45-3  
“The Doctoral School of Economics and Management is an active national 
and international research environment at CBS for research degree students
who deal with economics and management at business, industry and country
level in a theoretical and empirical manner”.
All rights reserved.
No parts of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information
storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
3 
4 
Summary 
When companies depend on knowledge distributed among employees, managers play a key role in 
establishing cooperation and coordination systems. This dissertation investigates the implications of 
managers’ knowledge about the knowledge and skills of employees for economic organization. The 
research question guiding this effort is: What managerial challenges arise from having distributed 
knowledge within a firm and how does the manager’s knowledge of this knowledge matter for 
economic organization? 
The dissertation consists of three research papers, each exploring a dimension of the research 
question. The first paper investigates antecedents of coordination break-down and how teams differ 
in their ability to coordinate specialized knowledge and skills. The second paper provides a theoretical 
framework for theorizing about the role of managers’ knowledge about employees’ knowledge for 
economic organization and introduces the term managerial meta-knowledge. The third paper 
investigates the effect of managerial meta-knowledge on the successfulness of inter-organizational 
relations. Empirically, the dissertation is based on a dataset on public procurement projects, 
comprised of archival data, a survey of buyers and a survey of suppliers.  
Together, the three papers argue that managers’ knowledge about employees’ knowledge is 
an important factor when managing the challenges of distributed knowledge. Such managerial 
knowledge allows managers to assess the capabilities available, make sure they fit contractual 
obligations, and rearrange tasks and employees when adapting to changes.  
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Resumé 
Når virksomheder er afhængige af viden distribueret mellem medarbejdere, så spiller ledere en vigtig 
rolle i forbindelse med at etablere samarbejds- og koordineringssystemer. Denne afhandling 
undersøger hvorledes lederes viden om medarbejderes kompetencer og viden påvirker økonomisk 
organisering. Forskningsspørgsmålet der leder undersøgelsen er: Hvilke ledelsesmæssige 
udfordringer opstår i forbindelse med at have distribueret viden i virksomheder og hvilken betydning 
har lederes viden om den distribuerede viden for økonomisk organisering? 
Afhandlingen består af tre forskningsartikler, der hver undersøger en dimension af 
forskningsspørgsmålet. Den første artikel undersøger en række betingelser på gruppeniveau der leder 
til koordinationsproblemer, samt hvorledes grupper er forskellige i deres evne til at koordinere 
specialiseret viden og kompetencer. Den anden artikel udvikler et teoretisk apparat til at forstå hvilken 
rolle lederes viden om medarbejderes kompetencer og viden spiller for økonomisk organisering. I 
den forbindelse introduceres begrebet managerial meta-knowledge. Den tredje artikel undersøger 
effekten af managerial meta-knowledge for succesfulde inter-organisatoriske relationer. Empirisk 
bygger afhandlingen på et datasæt over offentlige indkøbsprojekter, indeholdende arkiv-data samt 
spørgeskemaundersøgelse af både købere og leverandører.  
Tilsammen udgør de tre artikler et argument for at lederes viden om medarbejderes 
kompetencer og viden er en vigtig faktor når distribueret viden skal koordineres og ledes. Denne form 
for leder-viden tillader bedre vurdering af de tilgængelige kompetencer, at sikre disse kompetencer 
matcher de kontrakter der indgås, samt at koordinere medarbejdere når organisationen skal tilpasse 
sig ændringer.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
There is something fundamentally wrong with an approach which 
habitually disregards an essential part of the phenomena with which 
we have to deal: the unavoidable imperfection of man’s knowledge and 
the consequent need for a process by which knowledge is constantly 
communicated and acquired. Any approach (…) which in effect starts 
from the assumption that people’s knowledge corresponds with the 
objective facts of the situation, systematically leaves out what is our 
main task to explain. Hayek, 1945: 530 
In this dissertation, I investigate the implications of managers’ knowledge about the knowledge and 
skills of the employees they manage for economic organization and procurement relations. 
Specifically, I analyze the lack of such knowledge as an endogenous driver of unforeseen 
contingencies in project teams. The thesis consists of a theoretical paper as well as two empirical 
papers based on a unique dataset comprised of archival data on public procurement project matched 
with a two-sided survey of the public and private parties involved in those projects. The three papers 
constitute a coherent attempt to understand endogenous drivers of organizational uncertainty, how 
those drivers can be managed, and when such drivers matter for inter-organizational relations. 
When a firm produces a good or service, it does so by undertaking and solving a myriad of 
major and minor tasks, and by addressing a number of challenges. Many of these tasks require 
interpersonal interactions, creating potential coordination problems. Such problems are routinely 
dealt with by employees who have faced similar tasks in the past or by following standard operating 
procedures, but others require more elaborate coordination mechanisms designed to establish 
solutions, such as committees or cross-functional task forces. Another way of dealing with 
coordination needs is by managerial fiat in which managers decide who does what, when and by 
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which specifications. This allows many coordination problems to be avoided. The quality of such 
managerial decisions depends on the knowledge of the given manager. Managers can hold more or 
less complete (or true) knowledge about the tasks at hand and the employees available to handle those 
tasks. Managers who know more about an employee’s specific knowledge and skills is better able to 
direct and use those knowledge and skills in a productive setting, and to combine them with those of 
other employees. In this dissertation, this kind of managerial knowledge is termed “managerial meta-
knowledge.”  
Managerial meta-knowledge also matters in inter-organizational relations. In the public 
procurement setting, it has an impact at several different points in time: 1) when a supplier submits 
an offer, as the offer is based on an assessment of employees’ capabilities, 2) at the moment of 
contracting, when the specifics of a deal are settled, and 3) when managing a project, as planning and 
adapting to new information requires knowledge about the employees involved. Much extant research 
documents the positive effect of developing good inter-organizational relations, which allow for 
easier information sharing and better coordination, and thereby enable minor disputes to be resolved 
cheaply (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Elfenbein & Zenger, 2013; Lavie, Haunschild, & Khanna, 2012). 
However, the extant research has failed to explore how this effect is influenced by dealing with 
suppliers with various levels of managerial meta-knowledge.  
The overall purpose of this dissertation is to examine the effect of endogenous drivers of 
unforeseen contingencies and coordination failures, and the role played by managerial meta-
knowledge in mitigating these problems. To do so, I identify and empirically investigate important 
endogenous, team-level drivers of unforeseen contingencies in procurement projects (Chapter 2). My 
co-author Nicolai Foss and I then discuss the assumptions about manager’s knowledge that underlie 
much of the extant research on economic organization, and we explore the implication of looser 
assumptions for organizational and transactional factors (Chapter 3). Moreover, I empirically study 
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the effect of managerial meta-knowledge and competitive pressure on the positive effect of relational 
capital (Chapter 4). The overarching research question guiding this dissertation are the following: 
What managerial challenges arise from having distributed knowledge within a firm and how does the 
manager’s knowledge of this knowledge matter for economic organization?  
The remainder of this introduction serves several purposes. First, it provides some additional 
context to the theorizing behind the thesis. Second, it introduces the reader to the important world of 
public procurement by giving an overview of the tender process as well as the most significant 
research on this topic. Finally, it provides an overview of the three papers constituting the dissertation 
and how they comprise a coherent investigation of the research question. 
 
THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
In order to understand the manager’s role, we must understand how organizations deal with 
unforeseen contingencies, regardless of whether those contingencies arise from outside events or from 
internal coordination and cooperation problems. Organizations are entities that are naturally prone to 
coordination and cooperation failures. In fact, all theories of the firm propose that the defining 
characteristic of firms is their ability to solve cooperation and coordination problems that otherwise 
would be difficult to address (Foss, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004; 
Williamson, 1985). This does not mean that simply organizing a project or a transaction within the 
boundaries of a firm resolves potential cooperation or coordination problems. Instead, it means that 
such projects are governed in a comparatively better organizational form.  
With regard to mitigating problems emerging due to interdependent tasks, many challenges 
are dealt with through robust organizational routines. Such routines are best at reducing the risk of 
coordination failure when dealing with tasks similar to those done in the past, as routines are 
developed through the resolution of previous coordination problems (Hodgson, 2008; Nelson & 
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Winter, 1982). This is also in line with evolutionary analyses of firm routines, as evolutionary 
retention mechanisms maintain the characteristics of the firm that have helped it survive thus far 
(Alchian, 1950). Another way of dealing with coordination and cooperation problems is to rely on 
intentional planning and adaptation. One of the managers’ tasks is to provide this intentional planning 
and adaptation. They do so based on their knowledge of the specific tasks at hand and their knowledge 
of employees’ skill sets. Without knowledge of the specific tasks, a manager cannot know about the 
skills necessary to complete them or foresee potential problems of interdependence with other tasks. 
Without knowledge of the employees’ skill sets, a manager cannot know which capabilities are 
available to complete the task or foresee potential problems of interdependence among employees. 
“Knowledge” is a term that takes on numerous meanings in management research, but this 
dissertation does not aim to clear up the conceptual confusion. The starting point here is a mainstream, 
justified true belief, propositional approach (see, e.g., Hendricks, 2007). In this approach, agent i 
knows something if he is able to assign it a truth-value that is true, justified, and held as a belief. For 
example, an IT professional specialized in developing security systems for the healthcare sector can 
tell whether the specifications of a project violate the rules and regulations of the area. From a 
managerial perspective, a manager might know that this IT professional is able to detect such 
violations. Such a manager knows something about the other person’s knowledge without having the 
necessary knowledge to make a judgment about IT-security standards himself.  
In analyses of the management of knowledge, one important factor is how the knowledge is 
distributed among employees and managers. It is generally recognized that coordination requires 
some level of mutual knowledge. In terms of how knowledge is distributed among members of a 
group, the two (archetypal) extremes are common knowledge and completely distributed knowledge. 
“Common knowledge” is a strong assumption regarding how members of a group hold knowledge. 
Whereas mutual knowledge of A means that all members of a group know A, common knowledge of 
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A means that each member of the group knows A, that each member of the group knows that all the 
other members of the group know A, and that they each know that the other parties know that they 
know, ad infinitum (Lewis, 1969). An example of common knowledge is a statement made to a group 
in the presence of every member of the group. The need for managerial coordination in (theoretical) 
situations of common knowledge appears rather limited.  
On the other hand, completely distributed knowledge is a situation in which something is only 
known in the combination (or union) of all of the individual group members’ knowledge. In other 
words, one person would hold the distributed knowledge if that person knew what all of the individual 
group members know about the subject matter. This kind of knowledge distribution poses certain 
managerial problems. First, distributed knowledge creates situations of interdependence, which 
influence the classical organizational challenge of creating cooperation and coordination. Second, 
attempts to manage distributed knowledge require some knowledge about that knowledge and where 
it resides. This is not the same as saying that the manager must hold the knowledge that is distributed. 
Rather, the manager must know of it and of the individuals’ knowledge that constitutes it. More 
formally, if the distributed knowledge of A (DA) is the combination of a group of individuals’ 
knowledge about a particular fact (𝐾𝑖𝐴𝑓)
1 (𝐾1𝐴1 ∧ 𝐾2𝐴2 ∧ 𝐾3𝐴3  ⇒ 𝐷 𝐴 ), then the manager (𝑀1) 
knows of this knowledge (𝑀1𝐾1𝐴1 ∧ 𝑀1𝐾2𝐴2 ∧ 𝑀1𝐾3𝐴3) and of the distributed knowledge (𝑀1𝐷 𝐴 ). 
However, the manager does not necessarily have the same knowledge as the individual team members 
(𝑀1𝐾1𝐴1 ⇏ 𝑀1𝐴1) (Hendricks, 2007). In this dissertation, I refer to this concept as “managerial meta-
knowledge.” The concept and its implications for economic organization are developed in Chapter 3.  
I use the distinction between common knowledge and completely distributed knowledge as 
archetypes. In most organizations, the reality involves a mix of some common knowledge and some 
                                               
1 𝐾𝑖𝐴𝑓means that individual i knows fact f. 
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distributed knowledge. Similarly, as managers economize on scarce cognitive resources, managerial 
meta-knowledge is neither complete nor completely absent.  
The focus on the manager’s knowledge of the manager or, to put it differently, on the 
epistemic conditions of the decision-making situation has implications for how we theorize about 
firms and strategic decision-making. First, it serves as a reminder of Buchanan's (1969) arguments 
that choices are always made by a specific person, whose knowledge and preferences influence the 
decision. Moreover, Buchanan (1969) argues that (opportunity) cost estimates are always subjective 
in nature. This is an important point when arguing that the knowledge the manager holds about 
employees’ knowledge matters, as it matters only to the extent that the manager makes the relevant 
decisions (i.e., they are not delegated to employees). Second, arguing that the decision maker has 
imperfect knowledge about the decision space—the range of possible choices (e.g., possible 
combinations of different sets of employee skills)—represents a departure from much of the classical 
foundation of organizational economics. As the foundation of organizational economics lies in 
decision theory,2 the axioms of positive and negative introspection from this tradition (i.e., that 
decision makers know what they know and what they do not know) also carries over (Binmore, 2009). 
These axioms state that if a decision maker knows something, he will also know that he knows it 
(positive introspection), and that if a decision maker does not know something, he will know that he 
does not know it. In the small world of a single decision maker, this axiom makes sense. However, 
whether this axiom will hold in the context of managerial decision making that draws on knowledge 
distributed among a group of individuals is unclear. One could say that Savage’s  (1954) small world 
of possible choices and outcomes to be considered (i.e., the decision space) is defined by the 
knowledge of the decision maker.  
                                               
2 Other traditions include the behavioral tradition stemming from Simon (e.g., 1959, 1979) and the tradition 
concerned with the implications of information asymmetries. See Chapter 3. 
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When considering managerial meta-knowledge as a foundation for coordinative efforts, we 
should also consider how it compares to one of the most common way of dealing with coordination 
problems—through the establishment of routines. An understanding of routines is central to 
understanding firms and the coordination process (Hodgson, 2008; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Routines 
serve to maintain previous successful coordination and allow for formation of expectations about the 
behavior of other actors:  "[t]he capability of routines to enable coordination builds on the basis of a 
balance between interests of the participants in the routines" (Becker, 2004: 662). In other words, 
routines are stable because they allow for an actor to hold accurate expectations about the behavior 
of others when performing a routine (Feldman & Pentland, 2003). By recalling past interactions, 
members of an organization can solve coordination problems when they face them again. In this way, 
routines act as the organization’s “memory” and can store knowledge of successful coordination 
efforts (Becker, 2004; Hodgson, 2008). Contrary to managerial meta-knowledge, routines do not 
depend on the knowledge or experience of a single individual. One limitation of routine-based 
coordination is that it depends on previous experiences and is, therefore, less useful in highly volatile 
environments and when dealing with strategic, non-repeated actions (Teece, 2012). Where routine-
based coordination involves solving previously experienced coordination problems, managerial meta-
knowledge is used to imagine alternative configurations of existing resources and to align 
interdependent tasks. This is a conscious, forward-looking effort.  
 
Operationalization of Managerial Meta-Knowledge 
The operationalization of the concept of managerial meta-knowledge for use in an empirical setting 
using survey measures poses a number of challenges. First, to measure managerial meta-knowledge, 
we must ask people about the boundaries of their knowledge; an area that is per definition difficult to 
give clear answers about. Second, and more problematically, I wish to measure managerial meta-
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knowledge in relation to projects that have run over a period of time. One key question in this regard 
is the following: Are we trying to capture initial managerial meta-knowledge or are we trying to 
capture managerial meta-knowledge after the project, which is likely to be influenced by the project 
itself? The former would capture the effect of managerial meta-knowledge on bidding behavior and 
contracting, while the latter would help us understand the manager’s ability to plan for and adapt to 
unforeseen contingencies. The data collected for this dissertation relate to the latter. However, it is 
argued that there is also an effect on bidding and contracting behavior (Chapter 3).  
In some ways, the challenges associated with operationalizing the concept of managerial 
meta-knowledge are like those associated with operationalizing the concept of asset specificity. They 
are both concerned with the boundaries of the respondent’s knowledge. In a purely theoretical sense, 
the concept of asset specificity is clear—it is the ability of an asset to generate higher (composite 
quasi) rents in a specific relationship than in any other use. In terms of operationalization, asset 
specificity is less clear. Shelanski and Klein (1995: 338) argue that of the main constructs of 
transaction-cost economics, “asset specificity is the most difficult to measure.” The common 
approach is to use a number of items asking about the value of an asset in alternative setups or to 
directly ask whether a transaction is specific. The challenge in this approach is that it involves asking 
the respondent about knowledge he or she probably does not have. In other words, respondents are 
asked about the alternative uses of the focal asset, about what alternative partners or buyers would be 
willing to pay, and about the value that would be created in such relationship. Moreover, the temporal 
problem described above still exists. Are we talking about the current alternative uses of the asset or 
the alternative uses at moment of contracting?  
The operationalization of managerial meta-knowledge is based on social-psychologists’ work 
on transactive memory systems (Lewis & Herndon, 2011; Ren & Argote, 2011; Wegner, 1995). The 
transactive memory system concept describes the phenomenon of a dyad or a group developing a 
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cognitive division of labor in which different group members specialize in specific areas, know about 
the others’ specializations, draw on that knowledge, and direct new information to those best able to 
process it. The approach to measuring the degree to which a group has developed a transactive 
memory system uses a second-order latent variable model with three latent first-order variables. The 
construct is reflective, meaning that it uses indicators of different phenomena that are expected to be 
present when the main, unobserved construct is present. The three first-order constructs used by 
Lewis (2003) to measure transactive memory systems are the team members’ assessments of their 
coordination ability, the credibility each member assigns to the knowledge held by other team 
members, and the level of specialization among team members. If any one of these factors is absent, 
a well-developed transactive memory system is unlikely to exist (Lewis & Herndon, 2011).  
In this dissertation, I attempt to capture the level of managerial meta-knowledge by following 
a similar approach. I measure the presence of managerial knowledge about team members’ 
specializations, managers’ trust in their team members’ knowledge, and the ability to coordinate the 
use of that knowledge. The presence of all of these dimensions indicates that a manager has a high 
level of knowledge about the team members’ knowledge.  
 
THE EMPIRICAL SETTING—PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
I test the hypotheses developed in this dissertation using a dataset covering Danish public 
procurement projects that I collected as part of the PhD process. The dataset is comprised of three 
data sources: 1) information from the EU TED3 database on calls for tenders and reports on which 
companies had won a given tender, 2) a survey of public buyers, and 3) a survey of private suppliers. 
In the following, I provide an overview of the public procurement process, an outline of the data 
                                               
3 Tenders Electronic Daily, http://ted.europa.eu/.  
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collection behind this dissertation, and a short summary of relevant scholarly work on the field of 
public procurement.  
The public procurement area has a number of advantages as a setting for testing hypotheses 
about managerial meta-knowledge and inter-organizational relations. First, the regulatory framework 
governing the area makes the setting transparent and removes a number of confounding factors. 
Second, it is a setting in which multiple organizations’ efforts are governed by the same overall set 
of rules, which allows for exploration of cross-organizational differences while holding regulation 
constant. Third, due to the non-discrimination principle and the repeated exposure to competition for 
public procurement projects, the incentive for suppliers to be less opportunistic is somewhat weaker 
than in the private sector. This creates a setting in which suppliers’ behavior is determined more by 
the current project than by potential future contracts. This is also called the “shadow of the future.”  
The Public Procurement Process 
The main regulations governing Danish public procurement are Udbudsloven, Tilbudsloven, Lov om 
håndshævelse af udbud, Forsyningsvirksomhedsdirektivet, Koncessionsdirektivet, and 
Bekendtgørelse om annoncering af offentlige indkøb under tærskelværdierne med klar 
grænseoverskridende interesse og om anvendelsen af elektroniske kommunikationsmidler i udbud 
efter udbudslovens afsnit II og III. Much of this legislation is the national implementation of EU 
directives, especially 2004/18/EC4 on public procurement and 2004/17/EC on procurement in the 
utilities sector. I provide an idealized overview of the process related to a standard project of a size 
that it is covered by the EU regulation (approximately DKK 1 million/EUR 135,000 for the most 
common goods and services, but much higher for, e.g., construction projects), with emphasis on parts 
relevant to this dissertation. The procedure described is primarily the common open procedure, 
although I include some description of the most important alternative procedures. 
                                               
4 Since January 1, 2016, Denmark has implemented new procurement directives: 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU.  
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When an organization covered by public procurement regulation decides to procure a good or 
service, it must send out a call for tenders. Before doing so, it can—and often does—gather market 
information through a dialogue with potential suppliers. This communication, as with all other 
communication between the buyer and potential suppliers, must be based on principles of non-
discrimination and transparency. The goal is to ensure that all necessary information is available to 
everyone and that no potential supplier has a competitive advantage due to information obtained 
through this dialogue. If such an advantage is gained, the supplier can be excluded from the process 
or, if discovered at a later stage, the contract can be annulled or economic compensation can be 
awarded to a rejected supplier.  
The next step for the public organization is to specify the call for tenders. This includes 
describing the object to be procured in detail, usually including cost and time estimates, as well as 
deadlines, procurement procedures, and selection criteria. The procurement regulation allows for a 
variety of different procurement procedures from the “standard” open procedure to other, more 
restricted procedures that can only be used in certain circumstances. For example, pre-qualification 
and competitive dialogue can be used for more complex procurement projects. Before sending out a 
call for tenders, the buyer also needs to define the selection criteria that will be used to choose among 
the bidders. The selection criterion can be solely a matter of the lowest price, or the buyer can specify 
a number of additional criteria and give the relative weight of each of those criteria.  
When the call for tenders is specified, it must be communicated to the market. This is done 
using the EU database, TED (Tenders Electronic Daily), and other channels (if so desired). The call 
for tenders includes the above-mentioned information, as well as information about the buyer, and a 
procurement code used to identify the type of good or service to be procured (called a CPV code; 
hierarchically structured, like an SIC industry code). The TED database (should) comprise 
information on all public procurement projects in the EU that exceed the above-mentioned threshold, 
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and it is freely accessible, searchable, and redistributable. After the TED notice is sent out, it is 
possible to have another round of dialogue with the market, although that dialogue must also take 
place under the same principles of non-discrimination and transparency.  
When the deadline has passed, the buyer selects the winning bid based on the pre-specified 
criteria. If other criteria are used, suppliers that did not win the bid can petition the relevant authorities 
(or, ultimately, go to court) to have the tender cancelled or to be economically compensated. After 
the final contract has been agreed, the public buyer sends another notice to the TED database with 
information on the winner of the tender, the relevant dates, and the number of offers received.  
This procurement procedure allows for the most open and unrestricted bidding. Other 
procurement procedures restrict the bidding by requiring bidders to meet pre-specified standards, 
while others involve invitation-only negotiations. The use of such procedures depends on the 
complexity of the procurement project and the competition in the market. 
For this dissertation, I used the TED database to extract valuable pieces of information. More 
specifically, I used it to identify the population of buyer-supplier relations in public procurement in 
Denmark, and to gather relevant information on the procurement procedures, the selection criteria, 
the value of the tender, and the type of project (CPV code), as well as contact information for both 
the buyer and the supplier. This contact information was used to collect survey data from both buyers 
and suppliers. As the database consists of the entire population of public procurement projects that 
exceed the threshold value, it also makes it possible to calculate the number of repeat interactions and 
market characteristics, such as market size and concentration. 
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Extant Research on Public Procurement  
The growing stream of empirical research on public procurement emphasizes similarities and 
differences between public and private procurement.5 At the organizational level, the public 
ownership of assets removes the incentive generated by having a residual claimant. Moreover, public 
organizations generally have weaker incentive systems than private organizations, and it can be 
argued that public organizations often pursue goals other than economic efficiency (Boycko, Shleifer, 
and Vishny, 1996). At the transactional level, regulations governing public procurement create some 
important differences from the private setting. The repeated competitive bidding in combination with 
the non-discrimination principle mean that suppliers might have more incentive to behave 
opportunistically than in a private setting due to weaker incentives to build a good reputation.  
In addition, contracting with a public organization, with its many stakeholders and its ability 
to (to some degree) set the rules governing the transaction, also entails its own kind of risk. Spiller 
(2008) argues that there are two kinds of opportunism that are specific to public-private interactions: 
governmental opportunism and third-party opportunism. By governmental opportunism, he refers to 
the risk faced by a private supplier that the government will change the “rules of the game” after 
investments are made on the supplier’s side. By third-party opportunism, Spiller (2008) means the 
pressure coming from third-party stakeholders. In terms of the transparency of the transaction and the 
(legitimate) interest from third parties, contracting with public authorities is different than contracting 
with private parties. Public organizations routinely experience pressure from interest groups, 
politicians, or suppliers whose bids were turned down to change contracts (third-party opportunism).  
Spiller (2013) suggests that transaction cost economics offers a good starting point for 
analyzing public-private interactions, such as procurement projects. Even though regulations might 
                                               
5 The present text is only concerned with studies that focus on questions with direct economic implications. 
However, it should be noted that a legally oriented stream as well as a stream driven by political scientists with different 
concerns (e.g., legitimacy, representation, transparency, good public governance) exist.  
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set different procedures and incentives for public and private organizations, the fundamental 
transaction and contract characteristics still matter (i.e., asset specificity, frequency, uncertainty, 
contract incompleteness, complexity). The empirical evidence regarding whether public 
organizations strictly economize on transaction costs is mixed. In a study of French public 
procurement, Chong, Saussier, and Silverman (2015) fail to find any effect of contract value and 
length (as proxies for complexity) on the choice of procurement awarding procedures. Saussier (2000) 
studies the procurement of coal in a French, publicly owned energy company and finds that the level 
of contractual incompleteness is as proposed by transaction cost economics. Similarly, Levin and 
Tadelis (2010) find that contracting difficulties related to monitoring performance and the need for 
flexibility play an important role in governmental decisions regarding whether to privatize a service.  
The question becomes more complicated in the face of cross-organizational and cross-country 
differences. The effect of economic incentives (i.e., economizing on transaction costs) depends on 
the institutional environment of the transaction. One goal of public procurement regulations is to keep 
private interests from corrupting the public decision-making process. Baldi, Bottasso, Conti, and 
Piccardo (2016) provide a great example of how expected governance choices are altered by the 
presence of corruption. In a study of procurement in Italian municipalities, they find, as expected, 
that procurement of more complex projects often involves negotiation-based procedures, but that this 
link is much stronger in provinces with low levels of corruption.  
An important decision in any procurement project relates to the choice of procedural form. A 
number of studies map the main differences between auction-based and negotiation-based 
procurement procedures. Procurement through the use of auctions, especially using fixed prices, 
creates strong incentives for cost reductions, while negotiation-based procedures and cost-plus 
contracts make ex-post adaptions smoother (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001). In a cross-country study of 
auctions in public transport procurement, Amaral, Saussier, and Yvrande-Billon (2009) find that the 
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ability of auctions to foster competition and reduce anti-competitive behavior depends on their 
specific design. The value of auctions declines when bidding for complex contracts (Bajari, 
McMillan, & Tadelis, 2009). Nevertheless, Chong, Saussier, and Silverman (2015) find that French 
public authorities heavily favor auction-based procurement procedures, even though they are 
associated with costly renegotiations. Negotiation-based procedures, which offer the buyer greater 
discretionary power, are more susceptible to individuals using public funds for private gain (Baldi, 
Bottasso, Conti, and Piccardo, 2016) or to being used to further political agendas in non-transparent 
ways ((Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1996). 
An inherent tension in public procurement is between for public buyers to have discretionary 
power to rule out suppliers with a bad reputation while still maintaining transparency and non-
discrimination. One could say that “limiting discretion to ensure public buyers’ accountability comes 
at the possibly large cost of not allowing reputational forces to complement incomplete procurement 
contracts” (Spagnolo, 2012: 292). By limiting the effect of a supplier’s reputation, the partner-
selection process is derived of a quality indicator. Moreover, an incentive is removed for the supplier 
to behave non-opportunistically in order to build the value of its reputation as a reliable partner that 
provides quality goods or services, and thereby increase its likelihood of wining future contracts. The 
conundrum in this regard is whether assigning greater weight to reputational effects would hinder the 
entry of new suppliers and cross-border procurement, and whether it is possible to design a system 
that can mitigate the negative effect of the increased discretionary power of the public buyer 
(Spagnolo, 2012). 
The bargaining position of the procuring public organization matters for the quality of the 
procured good. In an examination of municipalities’ water provision that compares publicly provided 
water with franchisee-provided water, Chong, Saussier, and Silverman (2015) find that the size of the 
municipality alters its bargaining power and its ability to discipline franchisees. Smaller 
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municipalities pay a premium for water relative to larger municipalities. For larger municipalities, 
such premiums make them less likely to renew a contract. This is not the case for small municipalities, 
suggesting that they have a weak bargaining position. Desrieux, Chong, and Saussier (2013) show 
that public organizations can strengthen their bargaining position by using the same supplier for 
multiple services, as such a strategy may allow for tougher punishment of opportunistic behavior.  
With regard to the literature focused on the challenges and conundrums of public procurement 
regulations, we should recall Williamson’s (1976:72) dictum: “Merely to show that regulation is 
flawed, however, does not establish that regulation is an inferior mode of organizing economic 
activity”. 
 
THESIS OUTLINE  
While the three papers included in this dissertation engage in different scholarly discussions, together 
they form a coherent exploration of endogenous drivers of unforeseen contingencies in project teams, 
how the manager’s meta-knowledge affects the ability to efficiently manage groups of employees, 
and when such managerial knowledge matters for inter-organizational relations.  
The first paper offers an empirical investigation of team-level antecedents of unforeseen 
contingencies in project teams. In much of the extant management literature, the source of uncertainty 
is often assumed to exogenous in nature or due to opportunistic actors. This paper argues that an 
important source of unforeseen contingencies lies in coordination failures, which arise due to the 
challenge of coordinating specialized employees and developing new solutions. Empirically, the 
paper tests the hypotheses using a dataset consisting of survey information gathered from 188 
suppliers to public organizations. Overall, the paper finds that the level of unforeseen contingencies 
experienced by a team is influenced by the team’s coordination ability, the level of specialization 
among team members, and whether the use of trust-based governance fits with the task at hand. Even 
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though the paper identifies a number of coordination challenges, it does not provide an answer as to 
how to mitigate them.  
The second paper looks at the epistemic conditions for managerial intervention in 
coordination problems. The paper develops a general theory of the impact of managerial meta-
knowledge—the knowledge managers hold about their employees’ knowledge— on economic 
organization. The argument is that much of the extant research in the management and economic 
organization field builds on the assumption that managers know the productive capabilities of the 
firm or team they are managing. We challenge this assumption and show that looser assumptions 
about the level of managerial meta-knowledge leads to important insights for economic organization. 
We argue that imperfect managerial meta-knowledge reduces the manager’s ability to write fitting 
contracts and coordinate the capabilities of the team. In addition, we argue that imperfect managerial 
meta-knowledge is an opportunism-independent driver of ex-post transaction costs. While the first 
paper focuses on important endogenous drivers of unforeseen contingencies, the second paper 
develops a theoretical framework that identifies the roles of managers and managers’ knowledge in 
mitigating the challenges arising from such contingencies. 
The third paper investigates the effect of managerial meta-knowledge in and on inter-
organizational relations. The paper shows that having a supplier with high-quality managerial meta-
knowledge is a necessary condition for strong inter-organizational relations to be linked with buyer 
satisfaction. Competitive pressure from alternative suppliers is a similar necessary condition. I argue 
that these two conditions define the decision space of the supplier’s manager and the incentives to 
ensure customer satisfaction. The paper tests the hypotheses on a dataset comprised of public 
procurement archival data and survey data covering both buyers and suppliers in 89 procurement 
dyads.  
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Together, the three papers establish the presence of endogenous, team-level antecedents of 
unforeseen contingencies. By identifying a number of endogenous antecedents of coordination 
failures, the first paper highlights the need to manage interdependent employees and their tasks. The 
second paper develops a general theory about the role of managerial meta-knowledge in economic 
organization. Managerial meta-knowledge is a necessary epistemic condition for managing 
interdependent employees. The third paper empirically investigates the effect of managerial meta-
knowledge on inter-organizational procurement relations and provides evidence that strong inter-
organizational relations are only advantageous for the buyer in situations with competitive pressure 
and when the supplier has good managerial meta-knowledge.  
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COORDINATION AND CONTINGENCIES:  
TEAM-LEVEL ANTECEDENTS OF UNCERTAINTY 
 
Abstract 
The ability to solve the coordination and cooperation problems associated with 
interdependent tasks are two of the most important characteristics of the firm. In the 
management literature, the analysis of cooperation problems has overshadowed the 
analysis of coordination problems. The main challenges for efficient coordination are 
endogenous processes leading to miscommunication and the failure to integrate 
interdependent tasks. This paper explores important endogenous drivers of coordination 
failures and their implications in the form of an increase of unforeseen contingencies in 
project teams. The specific antecedents explored are a team’s coordination capability, the 
degree of specialization among team members, the extent to which project development 
is required, and the use of trust-based governance. The hypotheses are tested using a 
unique dataset comprised of archival data and survey data on 188 project teams from 
private suppliers and organizations governed by public sector procurement regulations.  
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 Organization theories describe the deliberate the delicate conversion of 
conflict into cooperation, the mobilization of resources, and the 
coordination of effort that facilitate the joint survival of an organization and 
its members.  
March and Simon, 1958/1993: 2 
INTRODUCTION 
The act of organizing is a process that aims to ensure cooperation between parties, the marshalling 
and distribution of resources, and the coordination of interdependent tasks (March & Simon, 
1958/1993). In the field of management, the challenges of coordinating interdependent tasks are often 
not given enough attention, leading to coordination neglect (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000). When 
organizing projects—big or small—there is always a risk of miscommunication or miscoordination, 
and deadlines may not be met. Cooperative actions in general and projects that are divided into 
specialized tasks in particular are vulnerable to these challenges of dependence.  
Even though uncertainty is often conceptualized as exogenous factors disturbing the internal 
workings of an organization or as an inherent condition of managerial decision making, one can also 
argue that organizations themselves create uncertainty (Power, 2008) and that we ought to theorize 
about multiple kinds of uncertainty (Koopmans, 1957; Williamson, 1985). Fundamentally, 
organizations are a way of managing the dependency problems arising from having multiple people 
working together. In this perspective, we can understand organizations as flows of information among 
more or less interdependent parties (March & Simon, 1958/1993). As Jarzabkowski, Lê, and Feldman 
(2011) remind us, coordinating this flow of information requires constantly breaking down old 
systems of coordination and developing new ones in order to adapt to new circumstances.  
Individual- and group-level research has established that groups vary in their ability to 
coordinate. This is true in normal situations and in situations characterized by significant stress. For 
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example, studies of transactive memory systems make it clear that there are performance advantages 
to being part of a group in which the members know each other’s abilities (Kozlowski & Bell, 2003; 
Lewis & Herndon, 2011; Ren & Argote, 2011). This makes it easier to coordinate problem-solving 
activities and ensure that the right skill sets are present. The effect of a strong transactive memory 
system is even stronger in highly uncertain external environments (Heavey & Simsek, 2015; Rau, 
2005). Coordination can be carried out in numerous ways and be supported by many factors—a strong 
transactive memory system is only one of them. In project teams, coordination efforts are often 
undertaken by key individuals who take on the role of coordinator (Dahlander & O’Mahony, 2011), 
regardless of whether they formally hold this position. The coordination process can also take less 
explicit forms and be handled implicitly by members who are able to anticipate the actions of others 
within the group and dynamically adjust their actions (Rico et al., 2008). It can also be handled 
through well-established organizational routines (Becker, 2004; Feldman & Pentland, 2003). 
The management literature mainly focuses on the team’s ability to coordinate in two specific 
settings. The first relates to organizations’ abilities to continuously adapt to volatile and changing 
environments. This research in dynamic capabilities studies both organizational phenomena and their 
micro-foundations (Argote & Ren, 2012; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). 
Second, a stream of research focuses on organizations’ abilities to integrate employees’ specialized 
knowledge. This research is particularly interested in the integration of knowledge-based skills 
(Gardner, Gino, & Staats, 2012; Kogut & Zander, 1992). 
One implication of organizational heterogeneity with regard to coordination capabilities is 
that organizations differ with regards to how often coordination breaks down. Regardless of whether 
the source of this coordination failure is miscommunication, a lack of planning, misunderstandings, 
a lack of clear responsibilities, or an unwillingness to adapt existing plans, it produces uncertainties 
regarding the outcome of actions and it stems from the internal workings of the organization. This 
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perspective stands in contrast to prevalent ways of conceptualizing uncertainty in management theory, 
where uncertainty is understood as a change in the external environment with implications for the 
organization’s performance. This paper puts forth arguments for conceptualizing unforeseen 
contingencies as an outcome of intra-organizational processes. I offer empirical evidence in this 
regard and argue that these kinds of coordination failures should be an important outcome variable in 
management research on organizations, as the breakdown of coordination is, in essence, the 
breakdown of an organization. The research question guiding this paper is the following: Do team-
level characteristics (i.e., coordination capabilities, level of specialization, and the use of trust-based 
governance) affect the level of problems experienced due to unforeseen contingencies?  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Conceptualizing Endogenous Uncertainty  
Not all aspects of organizing receive equal attention in today’s management research. As Simon and 
March (1958/1993) argue,6 organizing is fundamentally a matter of ensuring cooperation, marshalling 
resources, and coordinating interdependent tasks. Much of the literature focuses on ensuring 
cooperation—making independent parties work towards a common goal. This problem is often 
analyzed using an agency framework.7  
In contrast, coordination is a concept that does not lend easily itself to a thorough analysis by 
a single theoretical framework. In this paper, coordination is defined as the bringing together of 
interdependent actions in such a way that they are performed without specification, temporal, or 
spatial problems. In other words, the right tasks are performed at the right time at the right location.  
The difficulty of analyzing the coordination problem stems from what March and Simon (1958/1993: 
44) see as a theoretical exclusion of the real-world problems of coordinating: “One peculiar 
                                               
6 See the paper’s opening quote. 
7 This is in not meant as a critique of agency theory or its boundary condition. 
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characteristic of the assignment problem [allocating a given set of assignments among a given set of 
employees], and all of the formalizations of the departmentalization problem in classical organization 
theory, is that, if taken literally, problems of coordination are eliminated.” As Heath and 
Staudenmayer (2000) argue, this has meant that the problem of coordination has been studied less 
than its importance warrants. Other disciplines have more established research streams on 
coordination problems. Operation researchers often deal with coordination problems by analyzing 
optimization problems, while social psychologists address them by studying biases and group 
behavior. Heath and Staudenmayer (2000) argue that both agency problems and coordination 
problems are important issues for everyone studying organizations, but the latter have been 
overlooked: 
“Although the agency problem has become increasingly popular, the coordination 
problem has not seen an equivalent rise in popularity, despite the fact that it is equally 
central for organizations. In fact, in economics, the coordination problem predates the 
interest in agency (e.g. Marschak & Radner, 1972), yet it has fallen out of favor while the 
agency problem has become increasingly popular (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992)” (Heath & 
Staudenmayer, 2000: 154-155).  
When interdependent tasks are not performed and coordination problems arise, the 
performance of an organization becomes more uncertain. The dominant approach to analyzing 
uncertainty is to consider it as an exogenous event in a dynamic environment that an organization can 
be more or less able to handle (e.g., Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). This approach is the same 
whether the antecedent of uncertainty is event of nature or, as often in the transaction cost economics 
literature, as the outcome of opportunistic agents.  
In order to analyze the impact of uncertainty on the governance of transactions, Williamson 
(1985: 57-58) draws on Koopmans' (1957) distinctions among three kinds of uncertainty: behavioral, 
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primary, and secondary. Behavioral uncertainty is the focus of a great deal of management research. 
This type of uncertainty is produced by strategic and opportunistic actors, who use all available means 
to gain competitive advantages by. Primary uncertainty is often associated with financial and 
economic analyses of risk, where risk is an outcome variable with a value that is unknown, although 
its probability distribution is known. This approach is often used when dealing with risky states of 
nature. Secondary uncertainty refers to the coordination problems arising when multiple individuals 
work together and do not know what the other parties are doing. In other words, it stems “from lack 
of communication, that is, from one decision maker having no way of finding out the concurrent 
decisions and plans made by others” (Koopmans, 1957: 143). In contrast to behavioral uncertainty, 
secondary uncertainty is an opportunism-independent driver of unforeseen contingencies. In other 
words, while behavioral uncertainty leads to cooperation problems, secondary uncertainty leads to 
coordination problems. 
The transaction cost economics tradition has focused on behavioral uncertainty with its link 
to strategic, opportunistic behavior, and on the role of primary (especially environmental) uncertainty. 
Few articles in this stream of literature mention the concept of secondary uncertainty, although the 
theme appears from time to time. For example, even though Sutcliffe and Zaheer (1998: 3-4) discuss 
the concept of secondary uncertainty with the goal of "distinguishing between different forms of 
uncertainty which arise from the different sources that are relevant to decisions about firm scope," 
they do not include the construct in their empirical analysis. 
A focus on secondary uncertainty provides a somewhat different perspective than the focus 
on predicting performance that is common in management research. While performance depends on 
the specific contractual setup, secondary uncertainty does not. Performance is a composite construct 
dependent on a contractual agreement that gives the time and cost frames, as well as the project’s 
specifications. A coordination failure might lead to a decline in performance if it has serious 
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implications in terms of time or cost overruns, or if it means that the project specifications are not 
met. Performance and coordination are both managerial issues, although they are different in nature—
one is a goal and the other is a task. Furthermore, an event can have different performance 
implications for different parties depending on the governance and contractual setup (e.g., internal or 
external, fixed price or variable pay). If an external firm is used as a supplier for a project and it 
experiences unforeseen contingencies, then the performance implications for the buyer depend on the 
contractual setup. Therefore, performance is dependent on a clear contractual relationship, but the 
occurrence of contingencies is not. Instead, such contingencies depend on the expectations and plans 
of those performing the relevant tasks.  
Theorizing about uncertainty and coordination failure as endogenous outcomes of organizing 
emphasizes the importance of managers’ and employees’ abilities to cooperate and coordinate. One 
implication is that we should theorize about the firm as a social and communication group with tasks 
and abilities that need to be coordinated. In other words, we should not adopt the production function 
view (see critique by Williamson, 1985). Another implication is that we need to think about the act 
of coordination and the manager’s role in that activity. When employees with diverse skill sets need 
to cooperate and their tasks need to be coordinated, the manager must have a good mental model not 
only of the environment, but also of the group he or she is managing. Employees and team members 
also vary in their coordination abilities, and these variations can be the result of individual-level 
factors (e.g., experience, skills, formal roles) and group-level factors (e.g., diversity, member 
turnover, degree of specialization). These theoretical considerations in combination with the 
empirical research discussed below suggest that we should more thoroughly consider the antecedents 
of coordination failures. 
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Coordination Capabilities  
One antecedent of unforeseen contingencies lies in team members’ abilities to communicate and 
coordinate actions. A team’s coordination capability is its ability to ensure that interdependent actions 
are performed without unforeseen events causing problems. This ability has a static aspect and a 
dynamic aspect. The static aspect is the ability to make plans, communicate them to the affected 
parties, and carry them out. The dynamic aspect is the ability to adopt plans and actions to changing 
circumstances. Empirical research on group behavior shows that both static and dynamic aspects of 
a team’s ability to coordinate are affected by team characteristics, such as team experience, individual 
experience, team composition, team turnover, and the social and communicative networks within the 
group. A meta-review of research on the link between team composition and performance (Stewart, 
2006) finds that there are important antecedents at multiple levels, including the task, individual, and 
group levels. With regard to avoiding coordination failures, Brandts and Cooper (2007) use 
experiments to argue that the financial incentives of employees and managers do not matter as much 
the manager’s communication. Both management research on team behavior and social psychological 
research on teams and transaction memory systems find that teams differ in their ability to coordinate 
in high-stress situations and in regular, everyday situations. Two important empirical streams of 
literature provide insights into the mechanisms underlying differences in coordination capabilities. 
One stream of literature focuses on individual biases and how they make efficient coordination more 
challenging. The second stream is social-psychology-based literature on team behavior, which covers 
a wide range of different empirical approaches.  
As with any action requiring cognitive processes, the act of coordination is prone to biases. 
When an individual must coordinate his actions with another’s, problems can be created not only by 
his or her own biases but also by those of the other person. Heath and Staudenmayer (2000) suggest 
that a main driver of coordination neglect is cognitive biases—an excessive focus on one aspect of a 
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project at the expense of other aspects—which harm the ability to coordinate. They suggest that two 
mechanisms are particularly important in this regard: an overly strong “partition focus” and an overly 
strong “component focus.” The partition focus refers to the tendency of people to neglect coordination 
needs because they are dividing and delegating tasks to other people. The component focus reflects 
the tendency to put too much emphasis on a single component in a project and then neglect how it 
interacts with other components. Taken together, these two biases can create an environment in which 
the owner of each component focuses on his or her own task, and leaves the responsibility for its 
interaction with other components to other people. The most important way to mitigate these types 
of problems is through ongoing communication and consistent efforts to translate knowledge across 
areas of expertise (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000; Ketokivi & Castañer, 2004; March & Simon, 
1958/1993). Ketokivi and Castañer (2004) suggest that one way to mitigate the problems of 
employees exclusively focus on their immediate, local goals is by having explicit and integrative 
strategic-planning processes.  
Studies of group behavior point to a number of mechanisms that help groups coordinate 
efficiently. The simplest form of coordination is the use of routines, where individuals act in a fashion 
that has worked in the past and depend on others doing the same. Routines enable coordination by 
allowing group members to form expectations about the behavior of others (Becker, 2004; Feldman 
& Pentland, 2003). One limitation to the types of coordination problems that can be efficiently solved 
through routines lies in the fact that routines are experience-based. This implies that they are less 
useful in new situations or when dealing with non-repeated actions (Teece, 2012). Other coordination 
mechanisms depend on the conscious choices and knowledge of individuals, managers, or employees. 
They include those mechanisms proposed in studies on knowledge of group members’ knowledge, 
such as transactive memory systems. Overall, groups differ in how they plan, structure, adapt, and 
learn (Ilgen, Hollenbeck, Johnson, & Jundt, 2005), which in turn affects their performance. Work 
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teams are affected by countless mechanisms, which have been explored in a line of research too 
extensive to be described in this paper (for a review, see Kozlowski & Bell, 2003).  
The transactive memory system literature argues that teams develop a system of knowledge 
in which each member holds some knowledge about the other members. This is a way of economizing 
on scarce cognitive resources, as it allows each team member to specialize and helps minimize 
redundancies. A group with a strong transactive memory system has a cognitive division of labor, as 
each member knows who holds what knowledge. This enables team members to direct new 
information to the relevant people, and they know who to ask when in need of expertise. Such a 
system has a positive effect on team performance (Lewis, 2004; Lewis & Herndon, 2011; Moreland 
& Myaskovsky, 2000; Ren & Argote, 2011; Rulke & Galaskiewicz, 2000). With regard to the 
dynamic element of coordination, a team can be more or less able to adapt to small changes and 
requests. Notably, a group that has worked together before is better to use the capabilities present in 
the team (Entin & Serfaty, 1999; Lewis, Belliveau, Herndon, & Keller, 2007; Moreland & 
Myaskovsky, 2000; Rulke, Zaheer, & Anderson, 2000). The positive effects of strong transactive 
memory systems on performance are even stronger in highly uncertain environments (Heavey & 
Simsek, 2015; Rau, 2005). They are not contingent on a given project. Instead, these positive effects 
follow the team to new projects (Lewis, Lange, & Gillis, 2005). 
The above arguments and empirical evidence suggest that teams are heterogeneous in their 
abilities to solve internal coordination problems. Serious coordination problems may lead to 
unforeseen contingencies severe enough to affect the project at hand. This reasoning motivates the 
following hypothesis:  
H1: A team’s coordination capability is negatively related to the severity of unforeseen 
contingencies. 
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Specialization and Integration Challenges  
When projects require team members with diverse, specialized skill sets, one major challenge is to 
make sure that unity of effort is achieved among various subsystems (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967: 4). 
At the same time, the specialization of employees’ skills is a necessity for solving problems and for 
ensuring a well-performing organization. In that sense, managers “are constantly struggling with the 
difficulty of reconciling the need for specialization with the need for coordination of effort” 
(Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967: 47).  
The benefits of specialization are many. Specialization allows individuals and groups to 
concentrate on tasks that match their skills and abilities, and focuses their learning on this area. In 
this way, it mitigates some problems of bounded rationality (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000: 157). The 
drawback of specialization lies in the lack of an overview of the entire project. Dahlander and 
O’Mahony (2010) empirically show a tendency for larger projects to develop more specialized groups 
and that these specialized groups tend to communicate less with each other. Formal models in 
economics also imply that increased specialization increases the cost of coordination because it 
creates cooperation challenges, such as principal-agent problems and hold-up problems. Moreover, 
specialization gives rise to coordination challenges, such as communication problems across 
specialized fields and a lack of common knowledge (Becker & Murphy, 1992; Bolton & Dewatripont, 
1994).  
The challenge of achieving unity of effort among specialized individuals and groups is 
discussed in management research as the problem of integration. In the knowledge-based view, the 
ability to coordinate specialized knowledge is the one of the defining characteristics of firms (Foss, 
1996; Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992). This integration of distributed knowledge and skills 
occurs through both formal and informal mechanisms involving group identity, ongoing 
communication, coordinated learning, and a supportive team (Orlikowski, 2002). The ability to 
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consciously integrate specialists’ knowledge also requires knowledge of the focal area, although not 
at a detailed level. One of a manager’s main roles is to ensure cooperation between parties that do not 
know each other’s skills and to create interfaces for interdependent tasks (Brusoni, Prencipe, & Pavitt, 
2001; Postrel, 2002). The literature suggests that a number of different mechanisms affect knowledge 
integration. Drawing on Kogut and Zander (1992), Gardner, Gino, and Staats (2012) distinguish 
among three kinds of antecedents to knowledge-integration capabilities: 1) those based on strong 
relational ties, 2) those based on collective experiences, and 3) those based on the structural 
characteristics of the team. They find that building strong integrative capabilities leads to better 
performance. This effect depends on the team being in an environment that is conducive to the 
integrative process. Moreover, Gardner (2012) finds that as performance pressure on teams rises, the 
ability to use specialized knowledge deteriorates.  
The problems of integration can take many forms, such as redundancies in work and 
disappointing performance, unforeseen problems of incorporating disparate tasks, and the need to 
redo work. The above leads us to the following hypothesis:  
H2: The team members’ level of specialization is positively related to the severity of unforeseen 
contingencies. 
Trust-based Governance and Risk Taking 
Trust is predominantly seen as a desirable phenomenon with a positive effect on the functioning of 
organizations. A number of benefits have been suggested: less conflict, easier conflict resolution, and 
forbearance for minor transgressions. Other benefits usually develop over time, including better 
knowledge of each other and experience with cooperation. In much of the empirical research on trust 
in organizational settings, trust is viewed as a moderating factor that changes the strength of other 
effects, usually in such a way that more trust is better (see the review of Dirks and Ferrin, 2001). In 
addition to the beneficial effects of trust in teams, some research points to the more ambiguous 
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dimensions of trust and the costs involved in developing it: "To advance our understanding our 
understanding of trust as an organizing principle, attention to both its beneficial and detrimental 
effects is required. Moreover, quite apart from the downside of trust are the costs involved in creating, 
upholding, and maintaining trust" (McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003: 100). I recognize that the costs 
of developing and maintaining trust are important for understanding the boundaries of trust-based 
governance and for understanding why some research finds a substitution effect between trust- and 
monitoring-based governance (Langfred, 2004), even though others argue that monitoring on the 
contrary can enhance the effect trust (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Schoorman, Mayer, & 
Davis, 2007). However, in this paper, I focus on a specific uncertainty-producing outcome of trust—
its relationship with risk-taking behavior. 
Some economists analyze trust as a matter of showing forgiveness for a transgression in order 
to gain a future advantage (Williamson, 1993). As such, they view trust as an investment. However, 
there is a general trend of defining trust as the accepting of vulnerabilities (Mayer, Davis, & 
Schoorman, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). A highly cited introduction to an 
Academy of Management special issue on trust gives the following cross-disciplinary meaning to the 
term: “Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau et al., 1998: 395).  
In a managerial context, trust-based governance is governance that accept vulnerabilities 
based on expectations that those governed intend to work towards the organization’s goals. This is 
often seen as an alternative to more rigid monitoring and safeguarding regimes (McEvily et al., 2003). 
A willingness to accept vulnerabilities means that the outcome cannot be controlled as well. The 
expectations can either be met, such that members of a team apply their skills and knowledge to solve 
the task at hand in the best possible way, or the expectations and trust can be misplaced, meaning that 
team members might shirk or avoid doing tasks in the best possible way. An example of trust-based 
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governance is a manager assigning a team to a task, such as developing a software solution, without 
introducing any requirements other than the functions required of the final product. In such a case, 
the specific development approach and the tasks undertaken are up to the development team—the 
manager trusts the team to develop the software to the best of its members’ abilities. In other words, 
the willingness to accept vulnerabilities has a double effect. It gives team members the freedom to 
come up with new, efficient solutions to problems, but it also creates a risk that team members will 
not develop any such solutions, and that they will instead spend their time either on barren efforts or 
shirking.  
In terms of causality, the relationship between trust and risk taking is not such that a manager 
takes a risk by showing trust. Rather, the argument is that “risk is inherent in the behavioral 
manifestation of the willingness to be vulnerable. One does not need to risk anything in order to trust; 
however, one must take a risk in order to engage in trusting action” (Mayer et al., 1995: 724). In other 
words, in environments in which team members and managers engage in trusting actions, they also 
take more risks. This relationship has been found in a number of studies. A recent meta-analysis also 
uncovered a “moderately strong relationship between trust and risk taking” (Colquitt, Scott, & 
LePine, 2007: 918)  
Risk-taking behavior comes with potential upsides and downsides. The outcome is uncertain 
and it will only become evident over time. Given this line of argument, I present the following 
hypothesis on the relationship between trust-based governance and unforeseen contingencies: 
H3: The team’s reliance on trust-based governance is positively related to the severity of 
unforeseen contingencies. 
Development Projects 
The empirical setting of this paper is public procurement projects in Denmark. These procurement 
projects are governed by rules put in place to ensure as much competition as possible as well as good 
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use of public budgets. These rules apply some limitations to the buyer-supplier dialogue prior to 
supplier selection. Some have argued that these limitations can lead to an underuse of the supplier’s 
knowledge and expertise. In order to mitigate these problems, the central Danish authority 
overlooking this area (Konkurrencestyrelsen) recommends more widespread use of “functional 
specifications” of projects. This means that when a public call to tender is released, it does not give 
detailed specifications of the good or service, but instead specifies the functions, properties, and 
interfaces of the good or service. The argument is that this enables the suppliers’ knowledge to better 
utilized, as their bids should include the best possible solutions.  
One source of risk for the buyer in this type of process is that the winning project may be 
underspecified, such that significant development work is needed after signing the contract. When 
trying to win a tender that involves a new solution, a number of challenges can arise. For several 
reasons, developing new solutions is riskier than undertaking a project based on standardized routines 
and prior experience. First, the exact costs are more difficult to estimate, as the project might 
encounter unforeseen challenges that will take time or money to resolve. Second, when new projects 
or products are developed, there is often a learning process with regard to the required skills and 
knowledge. This is not only a question of employees learning or hiring new labor with the required 
skills, but also the fact that it is more difficult for managers to assess the costs and time of 
development-related projects ex ante. From a management perspective, projects with a significant 
development phase entail a different, more significant coordination challenge than projects similar to 
those handled in the past. In the latter case, potential coordination problems are more likely to be 
known, and it is easier to watch for cooperation problems and to create efficient incentive systems. 
These arguments lead to the fourth hypothesis: 
H4: The amount of development needed for a project is positively related to the severity of 
unforeseen contingencies. 
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Trust-based Governance when Developing Projects  
The relationship between trust-based governance and risk-taking behavior is affected by the increased 
likelihood of unforeseen contingencies when engaging in new development projects. In other words, 
the characteristics of the focal problem drive the effectiveness of different governance choices (for 
similar arguments, see Baldwin, 2008; Hsieh, Nickerson, & Zenger, 2007; Macher, 2006; Nickerson 
& Zenger, 2004). Three factors affect this relationship. First, development projects differ with regard 
to their risk profiles. As discussed above, the outcome is more difficult to anticipate. Moreover, as 
the employees are asked to developing something new, they are more likely to take risks. In terms of 
the severity of unforeseen contingencies, the baseline is different—risk-taking behavior is embedded 
in the project. Second, it is more difficult to monitor employees when developing new projects, which 
leads to more reliance on other governance mechanisms, such as trust-based governance. This implies 
a greater emphasis on the team-selection phase. Furthermore, the greater the amount of knowledge 
needed from outside the manager’s domain of expertise, the more “the manager must trust that a 
culture of widespread knowledge sharing and consensus decision making is the organizational 
approach most likely to yield a valuable solution" (Nickerson & Zenger, 2004: 630). Third, as shown 
in the trust literature (Colquitt et al., 2007; Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 
1998; Schoorman et al., 2007), trusted employees are less likely to shirk and more likely to 
communicate and share knowledge among colleagues. The reduced shirking means that employees 
are less likely to take advantage of the manager’s struggle to monitor development projects. The 
increased communication and knowledge sharing mean that the project team is more likely to take 
full advantage of all available knowledge assets and come up with better solutions.  
Taken together, the decreased ability to monitor and control development projects, the 
reduction in shirking among trusted employees, the increased knowledge sharing, and the explicit 
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desire for new and riskier solutions imply that the effect of trust-based governance is negatively 
moderated. I therefore propose the following hypothesis: 
H5: The effect of trust-based governance on the severity of unforeseen contingencies is 
negatively moderated by the degree of development needed in the project. 
 [ - FIGURE 1 - ] 
METHOD 
The hypotheses are tested on a dataset comprised of surveys of suppliers to public organizations and 
archival data on project characteristics. The dataset covers a broad range of project types and is, 
therefore, suitable for wider generalizability than studies of a single type of project (e.g., studies of 
IT projects). The advantages of studying public procurement include not only data availability and 
natural public interest, but also the ability to study a set of suppliers that are governed by uniform, 
transparent rules with regard to their relationships with buyers. The unit of analysis is the supplier’s 
organization of a specific project procured by a public authority. The outcome variable of interest is 
the severity of unforeseen contingencies in all of the estimated models.  
All surveyed projects were made public in the pan-European public procurement tender 
database, TED. The procurement projects were initiated in the period from 2010-2014 and the surveys 
were distributed during the winter of 2014-2015. The survey was distributed by email, and was 
offered in both English and Danish (most respondents answered the Danish version). The email 
contained a short presentation of the research project, the name of the focal procurement project, a 
link to the focal project in the TED database, and a link to the survey. The survey was sent to the 
person responsible for the project at the supplier, as indicated in the TED database. The email’s 
opening also stated that it should be forwarded to the person responsible for the project if the recipient 
was not that person. Furthermore, in the survey, respondents were asked about their job role to ensure 
that the responses were provided by the most relevant person. In cases where no contact information 
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was available, contact information on the supplier gathered from a separate survey of the buyers was 
used.  
From the TED database, I collected 525 unique emails. These emails, together with those 
provided by the buyers, led to a total of 817 functional supplier email addresses. Two weeks after 
distributing the survey, I sent a reminder email to those who had not responded and had not opted out 
already. Two sets of reminders were sent. A total of 268 suppliers replied, giving an effective response 
rate of 33%. However, the analyzed sample is smaller due to missing data and the exclusion of 
projects involving less than three team members. Therefore, the final sample covered 188 projects. 
Non-Response Bias 
On the basis of information about the underlying population gathered from the TED database, I 
explored the degree to which the sample was representative of the population using a t-test, a Chi-
squared test, and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, depending on the variable type and distribution. In 
terms of project types, there was an underrepresentation of procurement of supplies, and an 
overrepresentation of construction work and service projects. Furthermore, the process used to choose 
the winner of the tender (the respondent) was more likely to be restricted (criteria for participation) 
than completely open. Similarly, projects in which the supplier was chosen on the basis of more than 
just price criteria were overrepresented.  
Overall, the non-response analysis suggests that the respondents were more likely to answer 
when the project was not a supply project, when participation criteria were included in the tender, 
and when price was not the only important factor for the buyer. In addition, a comparison of the 
buyers’ performance suggests that the suppliers’ willingness to answer the survey was higher when 
the project was successful. Nevertheless, the non-response problem does not appear to be a significant 
issue, although it should be kept in mind when thinking about the generalizability of the study.   
 49 
 
Measures  
Unless otherwise specified, the survey variables were measured using five-point Likert scales (the 
scales and individual items are found in the Appendix). The consistency of the measures is explored 
using alpha coefficients as well as a factor analysis of the three main constructs: coordination 
capability, division of labor, and trust in employees.  
Dependent variable: Measuring the severity of unforeseen contingencies is inherently 
difficult, as the variable relates to the difference between an outcome and expectations (if any 
expectations were formed). The extant measures of unforeseen contingencies are almost entirely 
devoted to changes in the external environment. Therefore, I constructed four new items, which I 
tested on a small pilot group of randomly selected procurement projects with follow-up phone 
conversations in order to ensure that the items captured the intended phenomenon. The approach 
taken in this survey is to ask questions related to deviations from the original plan. The questions 
were about changes to the project plan, projects being more complex than expected, the need for 
additional competences, and whether there were no notable surprises (reverse coded). The alpha 
coefficient of 0.88 suggests that the measure is consistent and reliable.  
As the items rely on the difference between ex ante expectations and ex post realities in order 
to capture the severity of unforeseen contingencies, this measure is unlikely to capture unforeseen 
contingencies that did not cause deviations from the plan. One could argue that the most interesting 
unforeseen contingencies are those that do result in such deviations. Nevertheless, the unforeseen 
contingencies are probably underreported. The measure reflects the level of problems arising due to 
unforeseen contingencies. 
Independent variables: The three team characteristics—specialization, coordination 
capability, and trust-based governance—are measured using items developed by Lewis (2003) as 
part of her research on transactive memory systems (TMS). In TMS research, the TMS construct is a 
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second-order, formative latent variable composed of the three constructs. Each construct is covered 
by five items. The formative, latent character of TMS implies that the individual constructs cannot be 
interpreted as individually related to TMS. Instead, this relationship is only present when all three 
indicators are available: “We can meaningfully interpret coordination scores as indicative of a TMS 
(as opposed to indicative of other causes of coordination) if and only if coordination is observed in 
the presence of the other manifest variables, specialization and credibility" (Lewis & Herndon, 2011: 
1257).  
In this study, the three constructs are used separately as indicators of three distinct team 
characteristics. The three specialization questions focused on the specialization of knowledge and 
capabilities within the team, and the degree to which that knowledge needed to be combined in order 
to complete the project. In other words, the questions captured team members’ specialization with 
regard to the project rather than the team’s general level of specialization. Lewis’s original scale 
includes two additional items related to the respondent’s (in this case, the project manager’s) 
knowledge of the team members’ knowledge. Those items were not used in this study, which focuses 
on the team’s specialization rather than the meta-knowledge of the manager. The alpha coefficient is 
0.72, suggesting an internally consistent measure.  
The coordination capability of the team was also measured using five items, two of which 
were reverse coded. The questions covered the smoothness, confusion, and misunderstandings 
regarding to how the project was to be completed. The alpha coefficient is 0.78, suggesting a reliable 
and consistent measure.  
Trust-based governance was also captured using five items, two of which were reverse coded. 
The questions were about the trust the responding project manager had in the knowledge, information, 
and expertise of his team members, and the likelihood that he or she would double-check information 
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provided by them. By including the question on double-checking information, the scale moves from 
feelings of trust to include behavioral indicators. At 0.71, the alpha value is still acceptable.  
In order to ensure that the 13 items empirically capture distinct phenomena, I used a factor 
analysis to explore underlying factors. The exploratory factor analysis (principal component with 
varimax rotation) suggests four underlying factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1. Each factor 
loads nicely on each of the three constructs. The fourth factor primarily captures cross-loadings on 
the reverse-scored items. The finding of a fourth factor is not surprising, as some cross-loading is to 
be expected from questionnaire-based constructs due to common method variance. The cross-loading 
on the reverse scored items is a relatively common form of reversed-item bias (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012; Swain, Weathers, & Niedrich, 2008; Weijters, Geuens, & 
Schillewaert, 2009). The upside of using reversed items is that they force the respondent to reconsider 
their answers and not use the baseline set in previous answers, thereby leading to greater reliability 
of the final construct. In order to ensure that the problem is not serious, I repeated the factor analysis 
using a set amount of three factors. The loadings are distributed along the three construct, as expected. 
This factor analysis, together with the methodological arguments (Herndon & Lewis, 2011), suggests 
that the three constructs from the TMS research can be validly used as distinct constructs.  
The degree to which the supplier was working on a project with a significant development 
phase (development project) was captured using a single item that has previously been used by the 
Danish public authority overseeing the public procurement and tender processes. The use of 
unidimensional constructs entails a number of problems, such as concerns about the reliability and 
validity of the construct, as well as more limited variance when using Likert scales. Therefore, the 
question needs to be worded carefully and should be easily understood by the respondent. As I used 
a scale already in use by the public authorities, the wording of the question matched the language 
used in the public procurement community. Furthermore, as a robustness check, three other questions 
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were added in order to form a new, related construct. The question asked on the single-item scale was 
about whether the tender material allowed for new, more efficient solutions to be submitted by the 
bidders, or whether bidders were asked to stick to the detailed specifications and plans found in the 
tender material.8 This question captures the degree to which the good or service delivered is described 
in great detail in the tender material, and the degree to which the tender describes a problem that the 
supplier needs to solve in the manner it feels is best.9 Five response options were provided with 
increasing degrees of freedom in terms of the supplier developing its own solutions. A number of 
robustness checks related to this variable are analyzed and reported. All of the robustness checks 
produced results qualitatively similar to those in the main model. 
Controls: Team size was captured by asking the respondent about the number of employees 
involved in the project (using the official project name). If the answer was more than three, then the 
questions about team characteristics were also asked. The threshold of three is in line with research 
on transactive memory systems and other group research. The argument is that two is a dyad and that 
new group dynamics start to develop beyond this level. 
To capture the effect on unforeseen contingencies of the buyer applying ex post pressure and 
trying to take advantage of the supplier, a measure of buyer opportunism was adapted from Carson, 
Madhok, and Wu (2006). The measures consist of six questions about the degree to which the buyer 
tried to get more value out of the cooperation by distorting information, being less cooperative, and 
trying to renegotiate to their own advantage. The scale was highly consistent with an alpha coefficient 
of 0.90.  
                                               
8 The tenders can be very detailed, as the case of the development of a new electronic travel-payment card illustrates. The 
public tender for this system included 2,100 functional specifications, which were later broken down into 17,000 technical 
specifications.  
 
9 This follows a general trend towards using more functional descriptions in tender material instead of describing in detail 
the characteristics of what is to be delivered. An example is specifying the functional characteristics of highway asphalt, 
such as the noise level and how slippery the asphalt should be when wet, instead of specifying the material to be used. 
This change attempts to take advantage of the suppliers’ knowledge. As one publicly employed interviewee said about IT 
projects: “We often end up specifying the systems we already have, including their old setups and technologies.” 
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The value of the contract is used as a control to capture the effect of larger, often more 
complex projects. The value of the contract was drawn from the TED database. As this source lacked 
much of the necessary data on this dimension, the value of the contract was also included as a question 
in the survey. The variable is constructed as the logged value in million DKK. As there are significant 
differences depending on whether a service, a good, or a construction work is being supplied, this is 
captured in a control variable based on the TED data.  
Long projects may be more likely to experience unforeseen contingencies because there is 
more time for events to occur and because there is a longer period between the point of planning and 
the point of execution. In order to capture this effect, a project length variable was constructed based 
on the start date given in the TED database and the end date indicated in the survey responses. In 
order to capture the effect of being at a certain stage of the project, a variable taking values between 
0 and 1 was constructed to capture the completion percentage of the project in terms of time. 
ANALYSIS  
In order to test the hypotheses, a number of OLS models are used to estimate unforeseen 
contingencies. First, the independent variables (IVs) and the interaction are introduced step-wise. 
Later, as robustness checks, a number of changes to the moderating variable are introduced. The 
descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. 
[ - TABLE 1 - ] 
Table 2 presents three estimated models: 1) only controls, 2) controls and independent 
variables, and 3) controls, independent variables, and moderation effect. All are statistically 
significant and each new model fits the data significantly better than the previous model. The variance 
inflation (VIF) of the third model gives rise to some concern. The mean VIF is low (2.09), but the 
VIF of the direct effect of trust-based governance is high (7.13). Given the model, this is not 
surprising—the moderation effect is introduced as an ordinal variable, meaning that the trust-based 
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governance variable, in effect, is multiplied with the four different levels of project development. 
Therefore, the variance of this variable is present five times in the estimated model. As a high VIF 
may bias the parameter estimates due to multicollinearity, a number of robustness tests are applied 
(see robustness check section).  
The residuals are approximately normally distributed. A quantile plot of the residuals against 
a normal distribution suggests some outliers at high and low values. This is confirmed by the Shapiro-
Wilk (p = 0.08) and the Shapiro-Francia (p = 0.03) tests for normality, which suggest that the 
normality is not clear. Hamilton’s IQR test highlights two mild outliers at low values and three mild 
outliers at high values. In order to accommodate these minor normality issues, robust standard errors 
are applied to all models.  
[ - TABLE 2 - ] 
The regression model (3) supports the baseline hypothesis (H1) that the coordination 
capability of the team is negatively correlated with unforeseen contingencies. The relationship is 
highly statistically significant (P < 0.000). Given the parameter estimate of -0.88, a one standard 
deviation rise in coordination capability will mean half of a standard deviation fall in unforeseen 
contingencies. This is in accordance with the hypothesis, and the parameter estimate is high enough 
to have operational significance. Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected using this dataset. 
The second hypothesis (H2) suggests that team members’ level of specialization is positively 
correlated with unforeseen contingencies. This is explored by looking at the direct effect of 
specialization on unforeseen contingencies. Statistically, the relationship is highly significant (P = 
0.003), and the parameter estimate of 0.24 means that a one standard deviation change in 
specialization will mean one-sixth of a standard deviation change in unforeseen contingencies. 
Whether this effect size is of economic significance is a subject covered in the discussion section. 
The data lend support to Hypothesis 2. 
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Hypothesis 3 (H3) suggests that heavy reliance on trust-based governance is related to higher 
levels of unforeseen contingencies. This direct effect is highly significant (P = 0.001) and has a 
parameter estimate of 0.66. This means that a one standard deviation rise in trust-based governance 
will lead to one-third of a standard deviation rise in unforeseen contingencies. This is at the baseline 
level of the interacted variable (development project). When the average marginal effect of trust-
based governance is calculated instead, then the parameter estimate is 0.38 (P = 0.002). Therefore, a 
one standard deviation rise in trust-based governance will mean a two-fifths standard deviation rises 
in unforeseen contingencies. When interpreting Model 2 (without the interaction effect), the same 
pattern emerges. The parameter estimate of 0.36 is highly significant. Even though the estimate is 
statistically significant, the low parameter value could give rise to some concern regarding the 
operational/economic significance of the variable, but as this variable is part of an interaction effect, 
the question of operational significance should be considered at different values of the interactor. The 
estimated models lend support to Hypothesis 3. 
The fourth hypothesis (H4) suggests that projects involving higher degrees of development 
are more likely to experience high levels of unforeseen contingencies. The variable of interest is an 
ordinal variable. This implies that, just like with a continuous variable, incremental changes of the 
IVs are not necessarily statistically significant. However, larger changes in the IV might still be 
statistically significant. Given the use of an ordinal variable, there is no assumption of a linear effect 
as with continuous variables. An analysis of the degree of development with a baseline of 1 reveals 
that statistical significance rises as we move away from the baseline. It also reveals a positive 
parameter estimate that that rises at an increasing rate. The predicted level of unforeseen 
contingencies depending on the development phase is plotted in Figure 2. We would expect similar 
behavior from a continuous variable, and we use this fact in our robustness checks. Regardless of the 
baseline, a two-step difference on the development-project scale is statistically significant. A move 
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from 2 to 4 on the scale entails an average difference of two-fifths of a standard deviation in 
unforeseen contingencies. Hypothesis 4 is supported by the data. 
[ - FIGURE 2 - ] 
 
The moderating effect of development projects on the relation between trust-based 
governance and unforeseen contingencies is the subject of Hypothesis 5 (H5). In order to test this 
relationship, the effect of the interaction effect between trust-based governance and development 
project is explored. As this is an interaction between a continuous variable and an ordinal variable, 
we should take the effect of both the direct effect and the interactor into account. In order to obtain 
an overview, the marginal effects of trust-based governance are calculated at all levels of development 
projects. The results are reported in Figure 3 and Table 3. First, in terms of the interaction effect of 
the model (3), the significance of the interaction effect depends on the baseline level. This is similar 
to the discussion above regarding the direct effect from the ordinal variables Moreover, looking at 
the interaction effects, smaller differences on the ordinal scale are not significant, while larger 
differences are. Second, when looking at the calculated average marginal effects of trust-based 
governance (Table 3), we see a flat line from level 1 to level 2 on the project-development scale with 
highly significant (p = 0.001) parameter estimates around 0.66-0.69. Thereafter, there is an almost 
constant drop in marginal effect. The decrease in the marginal effect of trust-based governance is 
such that it becomes negative at the highest level of project development, with a highly significant (p 
= 0.013) parameter estimate of -0.68. In other words, for projects involving high levels of 
development, governance that relies on trust-based mechanisms will generally lead to fewer 
unforeseen contingencies. Overall, the interaction effect behaves like a continuous variable. This 
finding is used in the robustness check. The data analysis supports Hypothesis 5. 
 [ - FIGURE 3 - ] 
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[ - TABLE 3 - ] 
 
Robustness Checks 
Two additional models are estimated as robustness checks for two reasons: 1) to ensure that the 
findings are not a product of the high (7.13) variance inflation of the main model, and 2) to ensure 
that the results are not driven by a potentially unreliable single-item measure (i.e., the degree of 
development in a project). The first model uses the single-item measure as a continuous variable. This 
assumes a linear effect, which is generally in line with prior empirical findings. This allows us to 
assess the model without high variance inflation. The downside of this approach lies in the fact that I 
am using a single item from a Likert-like scale as a continuous variable, which raises questions of 
validity and potential measurement error. To overcome these challenges, an additional model is 
estimated that includes a number of additional items that were originally part of a scale developed to 
capture asset specificity (Lunnan & Haugland, 2008; Reuer & Ariño, 2002). These items are 
combined with the original development-project item in order to create a new development-project 
construct. This introduces more variance and allows us to treat the construct as a continuous variable, 
just as with normal Likert-scale-based constructs. Furthermore, the newly added items refer to the 
actions taken by the supplier during the development phase. Therefore, the new composite measure 
is more oriented toward behavior than the single-item measure, which is focused on whether the 
tender material allow for development of new solutions. As such, the new variable is a behavioral 
indicator of the amount of development work done in a project. The variable is treated as continuous, 
as is the tradition with constructs based on Likert-type scales.  
I carried out three analyses: a set of construct-fit statistics and two new OLS models. All 
regression models are reported in Table 4. 
[ - TABLE 4 - ] 
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Model 1 in Table 4 uses the original single-item development-project scale (development1) 
as a continuous variable. The results seem to be in alignment with the main model, but as this model 
suffers from high variance inflation on two central dependent variables (highest value: 7.9), we do 
not spend more time interpreting it.  
Whether adding three extra items to the development-project scale in order to form a construct 
constitutes a robust research approach depends on construct-fit statistics and on a careful reading of 
the items in order to ensure that the construct makes theoretical sense. One question related to the 
time and resources used for development. Another covered how much the supplier had to learn about 
the customer’s business in order to complete the project. The final question was about the adjustments 
the supplier had to make in its production equipment or work plan. The exact wording of the items 
can be found in the Appendix. The three items capture different dimensions expected to be present at 
varying degrees in projects with a significant development phase. The four items have relatively low 
internal consistency (alpha: 0.57). This may be a problem when using multidimensional constructs in 
which the items capture very different dimensions. To explore the severity of this potential problem 
of item inconsistency, I looked at the item correlations and ran an exploratory factor analysis. The six 
correlations between the four items are all significant (all at 1% except one at 7.6%), suggesting some 
common source of variance. A principal component analysis finds only a single factor with an 
eigenvalue of more than 1. If we adopt the common cutoff, this points towards retaining only one 
factor from the four items. This suggests that despite the low alpha coefficient, the new set of items 
is relatively consistent (development2 in the regression table).  
[ - FIGURE 4 - ] 
The new regression model is highly significant and explains roughly the same amount of 
variance as the main model (Table 2, Model 3). This model does not suffer from variance inflation 
problems (average VIF = 1.46; maximum of 2.26). Qualitatively, there is little difference between 
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this model and the main model besides the fact that this linear interaction of continuous variables 
cannot capture the lack of difference between having no development or almost no development. This 
marginal effect of trust-based governance, which depends on development, is graphed in Figure 4. 
Furthermore, I do not find a positive marginal effect of trust-based governance at high levels of 
development in a project. Overall, this model suggests that the main model is robust, and not a product 
of variance inflation or a weak single-item measure. In addition, it provides similar results regardless 
of whether the measure of project development focuses on the planned (ex ante) development work 
or includes the actual (ex post) development work. In the first full model (Table 2, Model 3), there 
was no statistically significant difference between the effect of trust-based governance at the two 
lowest levels of project development. This is interesting as a reminder of a possible non-continuous 
relationship, even though I am unable to detect this relationship in the final model using an interaction 
between two continuous variables.  
In terms of the estimated marginal effect of trust-based governance that is dependent on 
project development, we see a strong effect when little development work is done. In other words, 
when project development is at -1 standard deviation, a one standard deviation increase in trust-based 
governance equals a 1 standard deviation increase in unforeseen contingencies. On the other hand, at 
higher levels of project development (+1 standard deviation), there is no statistically significant 
relation. This suggests that relation between trust and unforeseen contingencies only exist in projects 
with limited development work. 
An examination of the marginal effect of the development phase as contingent on trust-based 
governance is also interesting. The marginal effect is plotted in Figure 5. The positive relation 
between the development phase and unforeseen contingencies is moderated by the level of trust-based 
governance. Even though extensive development work is always associated with unforeseen 
contingencies, high degrees of trust-based governance help to mitigate this problem. This might 
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suggest that teams with high levels of trust-based governance are less likely to misuse the 
measurement problems or to take advantage of the management challenges associated with 
developing new projects. 
[ - FIGURE 5 - ] 
Discussion 
The estimated main model and the robustness-check model are consistent. This demonstrates some 
robustness of the results, and suggest that the multicollinearity and the weak single-item measure in 
the first model do not introduce serious biases. The final model (Table 4) has statistically significant 
results in the directions hypothesized for all variables of interest. Nevertheless, the parameter estimate 
of the level of specialization is so small that it is unlikely to have any economic or operational 
significance (a one standard deviation change in specialization means a one-sixth of a standard 
deviation change in unforeseen contingencies). There are three potential explanations for this finding. 
The theory may be wrong, such that there is no relationship between specialization and unforeseen 
contingencies. The measurement of specialization may not capture the full extent of specialization 
and the corresponding level of the integration problem. Alternatively, the effect of specialization may 
not be uniformly distributed across all project types. In other words, the model may lack a variable 
interacting with specialization that can capture this.  
The non-response tests suggest that some types of projects are under-represented in the 
surveyed sample of public procurement projects. This limits the generalizability of the study. 
Therefore, caution is warranted when generalizing based on this study about procurement of supplies, 
projects in which price is the only deciding factor for the choice of supplier, and projects in which 
suppliers report poor performance. However, there is no apparent reason why the proposed 
mechanisms should not be the same for projects not included the sample. Furthermore, based on this 
study, the proposed mechanisms and relations are expected to hold across a broad selection of 
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projects. The sample covers a highly diverse set of projects including construction work and 
procurement of supplies and services, as well as projects of different sizes and in different areas.  
Another factor defining the boundary conditions for generalizability is that the suppliers 
studied are all contracting with organizations governed by public procurement regulations. This has 
two main effects. First, the incentive system within the buyer organization is generally weaker than 
it would be in a private firm. This implies that the behavior of private firms with regard to managing 
suppliers, especially in terms of dealing with supplier misbehavior, might be different. Second, the 
procurement process is more formalized in public organizations than it is in some private firms both 
with regard to the call for tender and with regard to choosing the supplier based strictly on the criteria 
set out in that call. If this process is not managed correctly, anecdotal evidence suggests that public 
organizations may contract with suppliers they know do not deliver the best, most cost-efficient 
solutions. Despite these concerns regarding this study’s generalizability to more incentive-driven and 
less rule-driven environments, I suggest that the mechanisms discussed in this paper are likely to also 
be present in private-private relations.  
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
This paper identifies a number of endogenous, team-level drivers of unforeseen contingencies. In 
contrast to the widespread approach of construing uncertainty and unforeseen contingencies as 
exogenous in origin, or as stemming from strategic and opportunistic actions, this paper finds that an 
important source of unforeseen contingencies is found in organization-internal coordination failures 
and miscommunication. I use Koopmans’ and Williamson’s distinction among behavioral, primary, 
and secondary uncertainty, where secondary uncertainty is an important source of unforeseen 
contingencies. This is in line with Koopmans’ (1957: 162-163) proposition that it is “quantitatively 
at least as important as the primary uncertainty” (cited from Williamson, 1985: 57).   
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Empirically, this paper shows that a number of factors make unforeseen contingencies more 
likely, such as lacking coordination capabilities, working with highly specialized teams, developing 
new projects, and using trust-based governance in the wrong kind of setting. The team’s coordination 
capability is an important driver of unforeseen contingencies during a project. This underscores the 
necessity of construing coordination problems and cooperation problems as equally important, and 
suggests that coordination capability is a source of inter-team heterogeneity. As emphasized in 
research on knowledge integration, having specialized employees creates some potential for 
miscommunication and coordination failures. Effort is required to bridge the gap between knowledge 
fields—when this effort is not made, coordination can break down. Moreover, assembling a team in 
which a manager has a high degree of trust has both upsides and downsides. Such teams are associated 
with a higher degree of risk taking, which means more unforeseen outcomes. These kinds of risks are 
a natural part of developing new projects, but they might not be beneficial in other kinds of projects.  
Overall, the paper presents evidence suggesting that secondary uncertainty is an important 
factor when trying to understand how organizations coordinate and why they sometimes fail to do so. 
We must remember that unforeseen contingencies not only stem from exogenous events and strategic, 
opportunistic behavior, but also from attempts to coordinate mutually dependent tasks. Teams and 
organizations differ in their abilities to coordinate tasks and actions. Some of these differences relate 
to differences in organizational routines that have been developed through previous interactions or 
through working on similar tasks. Others are due to differences in more conscious, forward-looking 
efforts to resolve coordination problems, such as employees’ or managers’ attempts to plan and 
organize.  
Future research: This study has some limitations that might be addressed in future research. 
First, the notion of the team’s coordination capability needs to be analyzed in more detail. Most 
prominently, we should consider whether it is valuable to distinguish between static and dynamic 
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coordination capabilities. Static coordination capabilities refer to the team’s ability to make high-
quality plans for the future and follow through on them, while dynamic coordination capabilities are 
the ability to change those plans in response to unforeseen events and to successfully adapt to 
changing circumstances. 
Second, future studies should look into the differences between contracting with public and 
private organizations. This study focuses on projects delivered by suppliers to the public sector. In 
such projects, the buyer might have little incentive to ensure good project performance or to change 
the supplier’s incentives to avoid opportunistic behavior.  
Third, more knowledge is needed on the contingencies of the proposed mechanisms. 
Questions in this regard might include: When is the effect of team’s coordination capability the 
strongest? Are there other moderators of trust-based governance? How is specialized knowledge best 
managed? 
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APPENDIX 
Measures 
More detailed descriptions and discussions are found in the paper’s method section. All questions were 
answered using a five-point Likert-scale. 
Construct Adapted from Items 
Unforeseen 
contingencies 
 Evaluate the following statements about surprises during the 
project.  
 The task was more complex than we thought when 
we started. 
 During the project, we had to get additional 
competences from other employees. 
 During the project, we had to change our project plan. 
 The project progressed without mentionable 
surprises. (reversed) 
 
Specialization of 
team members 
Lewis (2003) Evaluate the following statements about the specialization of 
the employees involved in [PROJECT NAME].  
 Each team member had specialized knowledge of 
some aspect of our project. 
 Different team members were responsible for 
expertise in different areas. 
 The specialized knowledge of several team members 
was needed to complete the project deliverables. 
 
 
 
Trust-based 
governance 
Lewis (2003) Evaluate the following statements about the competences of 
the employees involved in [PROJECT NAME].  
 I was comfortable accepting procedural suggestions 
from other team members. 
 I trusted other team members’ knowledge about the 
project was credible. 
 I was confident relying on the information that other 
team members brought to the discussion. 
 When other members gave information, I wanted to 
double-check it for myself. (reversed) 
 I did not have much faith in other members’ 
“expertise.” (reversed) 
 
Team-coordination 
capability 
Lewis (2003) Evaluate the following statements about the ability to 
coordinate of the employees involved in [PROJECT NAME].  
 Our team worked together in a well-coordinated 
fashion. 
 Our team had very few misunderstandings about 
what to do. 
 Our team needed to backtrack and start over a lot. 
(reversed) 
 We accomplished the task smoothly and efficiently. 
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 There was much confusion about how we would 
accomplish the task. (reversed) 
 
Development-
project—used as 
dummy with 
different cutoffs 
as well as 
continuous for 
robustness check 
(Rådet for Offentlig-
Privat Samarbejde, 
2014)   
 
Additional items:  
Lunnan & Haugland 
(2008); Reuer & 
Ariño (2002) 
To what degree did the tender material allow for new, more 
efficient solutions? 
1. Not at all – the task should be carried exactly as 
described in the tender material. 
2. Almost not – only minor technical changes were 
possible. 
3. To a limited degree – only on part of the task was it 
possible to suggest new, smarter solutions. 
4. To a high degree – the end goal was set, but not how 
to get there (task was described with functional 
specifications). 
5. To a very high degree – the tender were designed as 
a collaboration on the development of new, 
innovative solutions. 
 
Additional items for the robustness check 
 We have used much time and resources in order to 
develop this project. 
 We had to learn extensively about our customer’s 
business in order to complete the project. 
 We have adjusted our production equipment or work 
plan in order to establish this project. 
 
Buyer opportunism (Carson, Madhok, 
& Wu, 2006) 
Evaluate the following statements about cooperating with the 
buyer.  
 The buyer sometimes exaggerated the necessity of 
the changes it wanted to the development plan or 
budget. 
 The buyer sometimes altered facts to get what it 
wanted. 
 The buyer would try to renegotiate to its own 
advantage. 
 The buyer became less cooperative as the project 
progressed. 
 The buyer would do anything within its means to get 
a larger share of the gains from our relationship. 
 It was hard to get the buyer to accept changes without 
us making certain concessions and compromises. 
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MANAGERIAL META-KNOWLEDGE AND ADAPTATION:  
GOVERNANCE CHOICES WHEN FIRMS DO NOT KNOW THEIR 
CAPABILITIES 
 
 
Abstract 
Dominant theories of the firm, especially transaction cost economics and the 
knowledge-based view, assume that managers know the capabilities of the firms they 
manage in the sense that they know their basis and how to apply them well. However, 
micro research streams on resource cognition, transactive memory, and organizational 
self-knowledge suggest that this assumption often is not warranted as managers’ 
knowledge of firm capabilities, which we refer to as managerial meta-knowledge, is 
imperfect. Building on these research streams, we examine the implications of imperfect 
managerial meta-knowledge for economic organization (i.e., governance choice). 
Specifically, we show that imperfect managerial meta-knowledge leads to surprises in 
contractual relationships, negatively influences the ability to engage in coordinated 
adaptation, and is an opportunism-independent driver of ex post transaction costs. For 
these reasons, managerial meta-knowledge holds implications for governance choices.   
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Scholars increasingly build bridges between the knowledge-based view (KBV) and 
transaction cost economics (TCE) (Argyres, Felin, Foss & Zenger, 2012). Early research explored 
the effects of capability differences among firms in a vertical chain on firm boundaries (e.g., Jacobides 
& Winter, 2005; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Langlois, 1992). More recent work highlights the importance 
of learning how to efficiently govern contractual relations with other firms (e.g., Argyres, Bercovitz, 
& Mayer, 2007; Argyres & Mayer, 2007; Mayer & Argyres, 2004). Other recent studies show how 
the characteristics of technological and commercial problems (e.g., Baldwin, 2008; Hsieh, Nickerson, 
& Zenger, 2007; Macher, 2006; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004) drive governance choice. However, such 
work generally assumes that managers have accurate knowledge of the capabilities of the firms they 
manage and, sometimes, even of the capabilities of partner firms. This assumption also characterizes 
the KBV and TCE themselves. However, we argue that this assumption is generally incorrect, and 
that problematizing it (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011) produces new insights into economic 
organization.  Fundamentally, the assumption is not tenable for reasons of bounded rationality, that 
is, imperfect information interpretation and processing ability, leading to knowledge that is 
incomplete, fragmentary and biased (Simon, 1955; Weber & Mayer, 2011). 
 To illustrate, consider the recent development of a new national, electronic ticketing 
system for the Danish public-transportation network. In 2003, a consortium was formed by the Danish 
public transportation providers, Rejsekort A/S, charged with developing and running the electronic 
ticketing system. After deciding on project specifications, a public tender was announced, which was 
won East-West Denmark ApS, a consortium of two companies—Thale (80%) and Accenture 
(20%)—with prior experience from similar projects. In June 2005, a contract worth USD 180 million 
was signed. This contract assigned full responsibility for the project to East-West Denmark 
(Rigsrevisionen, 2011). East-West Denmark believed that some of its existing resources (i.e., 
software) could be utilized for the project. However, this was an overly optimistic assumption. Five 
supplementary contracts were needed, with each pushing the project milestones further into the future, 
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and with each enhancing the need for cooperation and joint project management with the supplier. In 
the end, the project’s time overrun was approximately 230%. The development of the system was 
marred by problems stemming from deficient knowledge on at least two levels. First, East-West 
Denmark lacked accurate knowledge about its own capabilities in the context of the project. Second, 
Rejsekort’s hands-off approach to the supplier relationship meant that it failed to undertake the due 
diligence necessary to understand the supplier’s abilities to actually fulfill its intended role. Many 
frictions ensued in the contractual relationship between the parties.  
 While this and many other examples suggest that deficient knowledge of capabilities 
can create friction in contractual relations, this issue has not been conceptualized in the literature and 
its implications for economic organization (e.g., contracting, firm boundaries) have not been 
theorized. We therefore require a conceptualization of “managerial meta-knowledge”—the extent to 
which managers know the capabilities of the firms they manage, and, secondarily, the capabilities of 
other firms. Given such a conceptualization, the implications of managerial meta-knowledge can then 
be examined.  
 We argue that managers do not have, and in fact cannot have, direct knowledge of 
much of the knowledge held by organizational members, or of the knowledge stored in organizational 
relations, routines, procedures, or databases (Foss, 1999; Grant, 1996; Hayek, 1945; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1995). However, managers can hold knowledge (or, at least awareness) about such 
knowledge without necessarily possessing it, akin to what Rulke, Zaheer, and Anderson (2000) call 
“organizational self-knowledge.” Work on transactive memory (Wegner, 1987) suggests that group 
members hold knowledge about the expertise of others without possessing the same expertise 
themselves. Partly inspired by this idea, we argue that managers form beliefs about employees’ 
knowledge and how employee knowledge underlie productive activities. These beliefs form the basis 
for managers’ assessments of the capabilities of the firms they manage, that is, their managerial meta-
knowledge.  
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 Managers’ incomplete, incorrect, and biased views of their firms’ capabilities may 
result in severe frictions in relations with partner firms when those capabilit ies are, unexpectedly, 
found to be lacking, such that an adaptation of the activities of one or both of the partners is required. 
We argue that such surprises give rise to transaction costs in the ex post contracting phase (Gibbons, 
2005; Wernerfelt, 1997; Williamson, 2000). Although these surprises may be conceptualized as 
contractual hazards (Williamson, 1985), they are not rooted in opportunism but rather in imperfect 
knowledge. Often, these hazards can be reduced and contractual difficulties can often be sorted out, 
particularly in cases where the parties have a high level of mutual trust (Dyer & Chu, 2003; Gulati, 
1995; Macaulay, 1963; Williamson, 1985). However, in some cases, surprises and subsequent 
learning reveal major obstacles to a cooperative relationship, which may prompt costly contractual 
renegotiations or even a termination of the partnership. Although no opportunistic intentions may 
have been present at the contract-drafting stage or even in later stages, the consequences of such 
surprises may still be highly negative for the other partner (Alchian & Woodward, 1988).  Firms wish 
to avoid partnering with partners that may learn unfavorable things about their own capabilities. 
Therefore, when searching for potential partners, managers should also seek to assess the managerial 
meta-knowledge of the potential partner. 
In sum, we add a new set of arguments to the discussion of the relation between knowledge-
based perspectives and TCE (and other organizational economics views), and we develop insight into 
the knowledge-based determinants of contracting outcomes. The extant work on the link between 
knowledge-based arguments and TCE has typically addressed the ex ante contracting phase and 
suggests that ex ante capability differences among firms influence economic organization (e.g., 
Jacobides & Winter, 2005; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Langlois, 1992). In contrast, we also examine 
knowledge-based mechanisms that influence behaviors in the ex post phase—which have 
implications for ex ante contracting. Our argument is related to the emerging stream of research on 
inter-organizational relations, which posits that transaction costs and contracts are responsive to 
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learning in relationships. In particular, such learning influences the ability to set up frameworks in a 
way that ensures smooth cooperation (Argyres & Mayer, 2007; Lumineau, Fréchet, & Puthod, 2011; 
Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Vanneste & Puranam, 2010). However, our key argument is that that parties 
may also learn about the knowledge they hold themselves, and that this may have implications for 
contractual dynamics in both the ex post stage (i.e., when the relationship unfolds) and the ex ante 
stage (i.e., in the context of partner selection).  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND:  
MANAGERIAL META-KNOWLEDGE IN THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
Managerial Knowledge of Firm Capabilities 
Economics and management research on the links among capabilities, learning, and economic 
organization (contractual and governance choice) has evolved significantly over the past four decades  
(see Argyres, Felin, Foss, & Zenger, 2012, for an overview). Nevertheless, there are still significant 
gaps in our understanding of the mechanisms that link capabilities and learning to governance choices 
because of strong assumptions in the dominant theories regarding managers’ knowledge of firm 
capabilities, which we refer to as managerial meta-knowledge.  
 Specifically, although the KBV and TCE differ in many ways, they share one 
important assumption: Managers know the capabilities of the firms they manage. Thus, TCE models, 
such as the model developed by Riordan and Williamson (1985), superimpose costly transacting on 
the production-function view of textbook economics with its attendant assumptions that production 
knowledge is free and wholly explicit (Demsetz, 1988; Langlois & Foss, 1999). These assumptions 
imply that there are no real differences among the knowledge held at the employee, managerial, or 
firm levels, or even in the knowledge held between firms.10 As has often been pointed out (e.g., 
Langlois & Foss, 1999), capability differences therefore do not play a part in the standard TCE 
                                               
10 For example, in the TCE analysis of the organization of labor (Williamson, 1985, chapter 10), knowledge 
differences between managers and employees are disregarded, and the analysis focuses on uncertainty, human-asset 
specificity, and the separability of work tasks. 
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explanation of the boundaries of the firm (Williamson, 1985, 1996).   Such differences are key in the 
KBV which  conceptualizes firms as entities dedicated to producing, storing, maintaining, and 
deploying specialized, experientially produced, tacit knowledge in productive tasks (Bingham, 
Eisenhardt, & Furr, 2007; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Differential firm-level 
capabilities are the key antecedents of heterogeneity in competitive outcomes and in firm boundaries 
(Jacobides & Winter, 2005; Langlois, 1992). Therefore, unlike the TCE, the KBV is predicated on a 
notion of differential knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1992). However, the knowledge differences 
highlighted by the KBV are those that may exist between firms on the capability level. Internal 
knowledge differences—those that exist between employees or between management and 
employees—have thus far captured less interest (but see Conner & Prahalad, 1996). Therefore, firms 
may not know the capabilities of other firms (Kogut & Zander, 1992), even though they are assumed 
to know their own capabilities at any given point in time.  
 In sum, the KBV and TCE share the assumption that firms are high in “organizational 
self-knowledge” (Rulke, Zaheer, & Anderson, 2000). In the following, we discuss and problematize 
this assumption by examining its microfoundations. In other words, we ask what it means for “firms 
to know their own capabilities.”   
Organizational Knowledge  
The knowledge residing in an organization (i.e., organizational knowledge) can be held in 
many different forms. Moreover, it is allocated across organizational members (Argote & Ingram, 
2000; Marengo, 1995).11 A key dimension in this respect is the extent to which such knowledge 
overlaps. In some theories, such as in basic theory of production of economics (Demsetz, 1988; 
Langlois & Foss, 1999), all organizational members are assumed to hold exactly the same knowledge. 
Thus, not only the manager(s) but also all employees know which inputs (resources) are available, 
                                               
11 Not all such knowledge is relevant (e.g., employees’ hobby-related knowledge). In this study, we only consider 
knowledge that is decision-relevant in the context of the goals of the organization and its managers. Moreover, we do not 
consider knowledge embodied in, for example, databases or blueprints. 
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the ways in which they can be combined and deployed in production, and the consequences of those 
different combinations for output (Nelson, 1980; Foss & Stea, 2014). In economics parlance, the 
relevant knowledge is “symmetrical.” In management theory, this assumption characterizes what 
Nickerson and Zenger (2004) call “consensus-based hierarchy.”  
 An even stronger assumption about knowledge is often held. Not only may knowledge 
be assumed to be shared among organizational members, but each member may also be assumed to 
know that the other members have that knowledge and vice versa ad infinitum (i.e., the assumption 
of “common knowledge,” Lewis, 1969). Under such conditions, managers do not have a knowledge 
advantage and the managerial function cannot be explained in terms of such an advantage (Demsetz, 
1988).12  
 At the other extreme, knowledge may be assumed to be completely distributed, so that 
organizational members only hold knowledge that is relevant to the specific decision that they control 
and there is no knowledge overlap beyond this point (Gerbrandy, 1998; Marengo, 1992). Therefore, 
no single actor holds distributed knowledge.  The market system exemplifies that coordination can 
still be achieved in social systems characterized by distributed knowledge (Hayek, 1945; Nickerson 
& Zenger, 2004).  Relatedly, some contributions to the KBV research stream (Grant, 1996; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1995; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004; Tsoukas, 1996) highlight that much of the knowledge 
in firms is distributed across multiple organizational members and cannot possibly be concentrated 
in any “single mind” (Hayek, 1945). However, routines and capabilities may be viewed as the 
repositories of such distributed knowledge, and they enable its use for productive purposes (Grant, 
1996; Nelson & Winter, 1982).  
 The middle-ground position—that is, knowledge is neither completely held in 
common, nor completely distributed—is the common position.  In this situation, managers can 
                                               
12 However, there may still be a need for managers, for example, for handling incentive problems (see Milgrom 
& Roberts, 1992, for this view).  
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perform a coordination function within an “authority-based hierarchy” (Nickerson & Zenger, 2004) 
based on a managerial knowledge advantage (Demsetz, 1988; Conner & Prahalad, 1996). This 
advantage is often based on a superior understanding of how the knowledge of employees can be 
combined in and deployed to productive activities—which in turn presupposes knowledge about the 
knowledge of employees (Demsetz, 1988). For example, the delegation of tasks to specific employees 
requires some degree of understanding of the abilities of those employees to make the right decisions. 
In other words, task delegation requires managerial meta-knowledge.  Relatedly, establishing well-
functioning project teams is highly dependent on team composition. Efficient team composition does 
not usually occur spontaneously. Instead, managers with an adequate understanding of individual 
capabilities and how those capabilities fit together staff teams in a way that matches internal 
capabilities with external opportunities (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013).  
Managerial Meta-Knowledge 
Meaning. The meaningfulness and rigor of the managerial meta-knowledge construct 
depends on a clear definition, good scope conditions, and logically coherent semantic relationships 
with related constructs (Suddaby, 2010). We define managerial meta-knowledge as the manager’s 
knowledge of the knowledge held by organizational members that she manages and how that 
knowledge may be combined (for the sake of simplicity, we abstract from resources other than 
employee knowledge).  
Whereas such constructs as shared or common knowledge refer to epistemic ideal states in 
which all individuals hold exactly the same knowledge about something (some decision-relevant fact) 
(Halpern & Moses, 1990; Lewis, 1969), managerial meta-knowledge does not require the full 
congruency of decision-relevant knowledge. In fact, managerial meta-knowledge is a relevant 
construct because lack of such congruency is the normal condition (Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000; 
Ren & Argote, 2011; Wegner, 1987). 
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Function.  Managers must have two kinds of knowledge in order to coordinate employee 
activities. First, they need to know whether an employee possesses the skills that will enable her to 
carry out a specific activity in a certain context. Second, the manager needs knowledge of how the 
exercise of the skill fits into a set of activities that involves other employees. Managerial meta-
knowledge allows for organizational coordination (Heath & Staudenmeyer, 2000), which is the 
integration of specialized employees and functions (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). It also makes 
managers capable of judging the abilities of employees, assists in the formation of cross-functional 
teams, and allows managers to find substitutes for employees in specific roles, projects, and functions. 
As such, managerial meta-knowledge is a response to the coordination need introduced by distributed 
knowledge in organizations (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000; Postrel, 2002), and its presence reduces 
coordination costs (Becker & Murphy, 1993). However, because managerial meta-knowledge is a 
scarce resource (Lucas, 1978) that is subject to economizing, it is highly unlikely to be perfect. 
Scope conditions. The above definition is most obviously applicable in the context of “simple 
hierarchies,” which are typically small organizations with very few hierarchical layers (Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1975: 49).  It may be thought of as applying to business units or 
departments within firms, such as purchasing or procurement departments.  In larger and more 
complex organizations, delegation is possible, which makes managerial meta-knowledge layered or 
vertically distributed. In this perspective, hierarchical layers are a way of organizing a cognitive 
division of labor to allow for efficient management (Garicano, 2000).13 However, for reasons of 
simplicity, we here assume that firms can be described as “simple hierarchies.”  
 Related constructs. The managerial meta-knowledge construct is part of a family of 
knowledge-based constructs in management that relate to the idea that the organizations are complex, 
social, knowledge systems in which managers do not always know the abilities of organizational 
members or the connections among them. This family of constructs encompasses notions of 
                                               
13 Thus, in TCE, this affects adaptive, sequential decision making and measurement (Williamson, 1985). 
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“transactive memory systems,” “cross-understanding,” “resource cognition,” and “organizational 
self-knowledge” (see Table 1). 
------- Insert Table 1 Here ------- 
Research in transactive memory systems explores how intragroup divisions of cognitive labor 
are established and function. A transactive memory system is the well-developed use of memory and 
the knowledge of other members of a group.  The group’s information flow is conceptualized as a 
process in which information “is entered into memory at the encoding stage, it resides in memory 
during a storage stage, and it is brought back during the retrieval stage” (Wegner, 1987). When 
observed by group members, this system facilitates the creation of meta-knowledge—that is, 
knowledge about the encoding, storage, and retrieval processes—, thereby allowing for the placement 
of memory, and the subsequent recall and use of that memory. This “produces a knowledge-holding 
system that is larger and more complex than either of the individuals’ own memory systems” 
(Wegner, 1987: 189).14 Whereas research on transactive memory systems focuses on the creation of 
and gradual increase in the cognitive division of labor among a group of employees, managerial meta-
knowledge is concerned with the implications of a particularly important actor’s, the manager’s, 
knowledge.  
 A group’s ability to engage with the dispersed knowledge is also influenced by “cross-
understanding” (Huber & Lewis, 2010), which is the ability to understand other team members’ 
mental representations. Managerial meta-knowledge and cross-understanding are similar in their 
focus on understanding other individuals’ cognitions. However, whereas cross-understanding is a 
group-level construct, managerial meta-knowledge is an individual-level construct. This difference, 
together with the focus on productive knowledge, allows for a connection with management theories 
in which the decision maker matters. Together with transactive memory systems, cross-understanding 
is an important antecedent of meta-knowledge and the efficient cognitive division of labor.  
                                               
14 A number of studies link the strength of transactive memory systems to group problem-solving performance 
(Lewis 2004; Lewis, Lange, & Gillis, 2005; Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000). 
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Managerial meta-knowledge is closely related to the more rarely used concept of 
“organizational self-knowledge,” which reflects the “managers’ assessments of the capabilities and 
shortcomings of their units” (Rulke, Zaheer, & Anderson, 2000). It is also related to the notion of 
“resource cognition,” that is, the “identification of resources and the understanding of their 
fungibility” (Danneels, 2011: 21). Other streams of literature deal with phenomena similar to 
managerial meta-knowledge, but without subsuming them under a single construct. For example, 
Denrell, Arvidsson, and Zander (2004) find that the interrater reliability of capability evaluations in 
large MNCs is determined by the general knowledge of subsidiaries, their ages, and their perceived 
importance. The reported heterogeneity in managerial capability evaluations is an important factor 
informing the managerial meta-knowledge construct. An emerging research stream examines the 
cognitive mechanisms related to the cognitive dimensions of capability construction, assembling, and 
application (summarized in Eggers & Kaplan, 2013). While these research streams focus on the 
different cognitive and social psychological mechanisms that are active in strategic decision making 
and in the process of creating and exploiting capabilities, the managerial meta-knowledge construct 
as developed and used in this paper refers to a specific and particularly important knowledge state—
the knowledge underlying the intentional managerial coordination of in-house resources.  
Antecedents of Managerial Meta-knowledge 
Knowledge about other peoples’ knowledge, skill, and expertise is gained through social 
interactions (Ren & Argote, 2011; Wegner, 1987); hence, the managerial meta-knowledge construct 
is an individual-level construct that has antecedents at the social level. As Coleman (1988, 1994: 
chapter 12) argues, human capital and social capital are intrinsically intertwined. The ways in which 
individuals interact in the organization result in intricate flows of information and knowledge that 
form the social capital of the organization and establish the human-capital context (Denrell et al., 
2004; Hansen, 1999; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Ren & Argote, 2011; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998; 
Wegner, 1987). Similarly, managerial meta-knowledge can be understood as a type of specific human 
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capital held by the manager that is formed through the interactions between employees and the 
manager.15 Thus, managerial meta-knowledge is influenced by both the relational and the structural 
characteristics of the manager’s intra-firm network. That network is particularly important when 
dealing with administrative tasks revolving around the resolution of new problems (rather than routine 
tasks) (Ibarra, 1993): It allows for the creation of new contacts and serves as a set of conduits of 
knowledge. As such, it forms the repertoire of heterogeneous knowledge with which the manager can 
engage (Rodan & Galunic, 2004), for example, when directing employees with certain expertise to 
carry out tasks for which their expertise is adequate.  
Employee turnover introduces shocks to this network, as the contents of nodes may be harmed 
(although ties to positions may remain) and, hence, conduits of knowledge may be eliminated from 
the network. From the perspective of managerial meta-knowledge, high employee turnover requires 
the manager to constantly update her knowledge about the organizational members.  Knowledge of 
employees’ capabilities takes time to acquire, and high employee turnover limits the ability to form 
deep and stable managerial meta-knowledge. At the same time, the knowledge flow among 
employees also decreases due to the introduction and socialization of new members, which may help 
explain why group longevity has a positive influence on group performance (Katz, 1982). It may also 
help explain why turnover is negatively associated with organizational performance (see Park and 
Shaw, 2013, for a meta-analysis of the empirical research). For these reasons, transactive memory is 
a likely moderating variable of the links between longevity/turnover and performance.  
A number of factors influencing the creation of knowledge about fellow group members’ 
knowledge have been identified in empirical research on the formation of transactive memory 
systems. In particular, transactive memory systems develop as a consequence of the frequency of 
face-to-face communication (Hollingshead, 1998; Lewis, 2004), written and verbal communication 
(Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000), and non-verbal communication (Hollingshead, 1998). 
                                               
15 In non-simple hierarchies, this depends on organizational structure and the knowledge that is funneled to the 
manager. 
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Furthermore, the meta-knowledge gained in one task environment is transferred to new assignments, 
which demonstrates that non-task specific learning takes place (Lewis, Lange, & Gillis, 2005). 
Generally, this research stresses the importance of physical presence and communication for the 
creation of managerial meta-knowledge.  
Evolving Meta-Knowledge  
Managerial meta-knowledge changes over time (Lachmann, 1986; Orlikowski, 2002). 
Employee turnover, the reordering of processes and routines, new work assignments, and the need 
for new kinds of knowledge prompted by such events all have the potential to change managerial 
meta-knowledge. The knowledge held by organizational members also changes as a result of 
experience, training, and social interaction (Lewis & Herndon, 2011; Lewis et al., 2005; Wilson, 
Goodman, & Cronin, 2007). Accordingly, coordination needs and the ability of managerial meta-
knowledge to cope with these needs change over time (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000).  
 Eggers and Kaplan (2013) argue that in order to understand firm-level capabilities, it 
is necessary to understand how routine building blocks of capabilities are constructed and assembled 
into capabilities that can be matched with external opportunities. In their account, capabilities change 
when routines change (see also Nelson & Winter, 1982). However, in contrast to the 
routines/capabilities distinction, the knowledge held by employees can change without a 
corresponding change in managerial meta-knowledge (i.e., the manager does not notice that employee 
knowledge has changed). Conversely, managerial meta-knowledge may change (i.e., managers learn 
about employee knowledge) without employee knowledge changing. Thus, managerial meta-
knowledge and the knowledge held by organizational members may evolve in an asynchronous 
manner. This means that the analysis of managerial meta-knowledge is inherently an analysis of a 
dynamic phenomenon. Research suggests that this matters in terms of the opportunities that the 
organization can recognize and seize. Felin and Foss (2005) argue that managers cannot build 
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capabilities for seizing perceived opportunities if they do not have a reasonably clear understanding 
of how the skills and actions of organizational members aggregate into firm-level capabilities.  
 In the following, we deploy the managerial-knowledge construct in the context of 
contracting and, more broadly, in the context of economic organization. Managers enter into various 
contractual relations in, for example, their roles as suppliers based on their views of their firms’ 
capabilities in terms of product specifications, price, quality, delivery time, and so on—views that are 
based on their managerial meta-knowledge. We argue that the nature of managerial meta-knowledge 
(i.e., the extent to which it is imperfect) influences contractual hazards and, hence, incidents of 
conflict. 
 
MANAGERIAL META-KNOWLEDGE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 
I: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNANCE CHOICE  
We start by considering a relation between a legally independent firm and its legally 
independent supplier—the “paradigm case” of TCE (Williamson, 1989). TCE analyzes this situation 
in contexts defined by varying degrees of asset specificity, transaction frequency, and uncertainty. 
Recent work has added substantially to the contextualization of this situation. Scholars have examined 
the implications of various aspects of trust for contracting and performance in a vertical dyad (Chiles 
& McMackin, 1996; Gulati, 1995; Parkhe, 1993; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995), repeated dealings 
(Gulati, 1995), and (mutual) learning about contracting (Argyres & Mayer, 2007; Mayer & Argyres, 
2004). However, the implications of the firms’ managerial meta-knowledge for performance and 
contracting have not yet been discussed. We introduce managerial meta-knowledge to the TCE on 
the basis of the basic research model depicted in Figure 1. As the figure suggests, managerial meta-
knowledge relates to TCE through two mechanisms: it serves as a source of unforeseen contingencies 
and it influences a firm’s ability to engage in coordinated adaptation.  
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------- Insert Figure 1 Here ------- 
Contracting, Surprises, and Uncertainties in Transaction Cost Economics 
TCE starts from an assumption of incomplete contracting. Williamson notes that the “primary 
ramification of bounded rationality for the study of economic organization is that all complex 
contracts are unavoidably incomplete” (2000: 8; italics in original). Contractual incompleteness is a 
core tenet of TCE. Without this assumption, there can be no ex post bargaining, including 
opportunistic hold-up. In turn, bargaining and hold-up in the presence of specific assets are key to the 
discriminating alignment logic of the theory (Williamson, 1996a). In the presence of contractual 
incompleteness, unforeseen contingencies may emerge that affect the contractual relation 
(Williamson, 1985; Dekel, Lipman, & Rustichini, 1998; Kreps, 1992, 1996). This gives rise to 
bargaining between the parties concerning how they should adapt to the contingency. TCE predicts 
that under conditions of high asset specificity, this results in opportunistic behavior on the part of one 
(or both) of the parties to the contract. In other words, unforeseen contingencies are potential 
antecedents of ex post haggling. As such, they are of interest for theory development in TCE (Kreps, 
1990, 1996; Williamson, 1985, 1996b).16 
 Unforeseen contingencies include both genuinely unexpected contingencies (i.e., events about 
which there is no knowledge at the time of contracting) and contingencies that can be characterized 
along the lines of: “We have little idea what exactly may happen, but we can anticipate that something 
may happen that can upset our relationship” (Kreps, 1992). While contractual parties cannot construct 
dedicated safeguards against the former, they can take precautions against the latter (Hart, 1990; 
Kreps, 1996). Thus, research into the economics of the firm highlights that the allocation of ownership 
rights (Grossman & Hart, 1986) and the existence of relational contracting (Williamson, 1985) can 
                                               
16 Property rights theory adds that when the parties anticipate that they may not get their investments covered in 
the presence of opportunistic hold-up (i.e., they believe that the other party may partly appropriate their quasi-rents), their 
incentives to invest in the relation are reduced (Hart, 1995).  
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be conceptualized and explained in terms of making ex post adaptations to unforeseen contingencies 
possible at a low cost.  
Unforeseen contingencies are related to the TCE’s analysis of uncertainty. The occurrence of 
opportunism is a source of uncertainty, which Williamson refers to as “behavioral uncertainty” (e.g., 
Williamson, 1985, 56-59; 1989, 143-144). He states that such uncertainty is of “special importance 
to an understanding of transaction cost economics issues” (1985: 57) because it is driven by the 
“strategic nondisclosure, disguise, or distortion of information”(Williamson, 1989: 144), or 
opportunism. Opportunism leads “parties [to] make strategic plans in relation to each other that are 
the source of … ex post surprise” (Williamson, 1985: 57-8). 
 Drawing on the work of Tjalling Koopmans, Williamson (1985: 57-58) distinguishes between 
such opportunism-based behavioral uncertainty and “primary” and “secondary uncertainty.” Primary 
uncertainty is state-contingent uncertainty that can be represented by a probability distribution over 
exogenous contingencies. While primary uncertainty is the standard way of representing uncertainty 
(in, for example, decision theory, economics, and finance),17 secondary uncertainty is often 
overlooked. It arises “from lack of communication, that is, from one decision maker having no way 
of finding out the concurrent decisions and plans made by others” (Koopmans, 1957: 143). While 
secondary uncertainty may arise between firms, it may also arise within firms, especially when 
managers are uninformed about others’ decisions and plans made because they do not know or 
understand the knowledge, skills, and other characteristics that influence those decisions and plans 
(see Malmgren, 1961). In other words, imperfect managerial meta-knowledge is an antecedent of 
secondary uncertainty (Weber & Mayer, 2011).  
Williamson mainly focuses on the behavioral uncertainty arising from opportunism, and argues 
that secondary uncertainty refers to a “rather innocent or nonstrategic kind” of uncertainty that has 
no distinct implications for economic organization because it does not involve opportunism. In 
                                               
17 This is the interpretation of uncertainty as “risk.”  
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contrast, Koopmans (1957: 162) proposes that this kind of uncertainty is “quantitatively at least as 
important as the primary uncertainty,” and Malmgren (1961) suggests that it may explain key aspects 
of firms’ internal organization, especially shared beliefs and corporate culture. We concur and argue 
that the secondary uncertainty caused by imperfect managerial meta-knowledge matters for economic 
organization. Specifically, secondary uncertainty can lead to coordination problems and the 
suboptimal use of resources, which may have important ramifications for contractual relations. 
Imperfect Managerial Meta-Knowledge as a Source of Secondary Uncertainty 
Managerial meta-knowledge matters for contractual relations and economic organization to 
the extent that it is imperfect. If managerial meta-knowledge were perfect, we could eliminate it from 
the equation because it would not give rise to hazards and frictions in contractual relations. In 
actuality, managerial meta-knowledge is always imperfect because local employee knowledge is 
fleeting and tacit (Hayek, 1945), managers are boundedly rational, and managers need to economize 
their scarce attention. Managerial meta-knowledge is particularly challenged in dynamic contexts in 
which organizational memberships and employee knowledge change, patterns of cooperation and 
communication shift, and new skills are learned and old skills are forgotten. As a result, the manager’s 
understanding of the organization’s capabilities is always incomplete. Such incompleteness is the 
source of secondary uncertainty in a contractual relation. 
While secondary uncertainty is dependent on the internal workings of the organization, it may 
spill over into the exchange relations in which the manager’s firm is engaged. For example, secondary 
uncertainty may prompt ex post contractual renegotiations because it may give rise to unexpected 
contingencies. This can occur when, for example, the supplier’s initial cost estimates were 
significantly off the mark. In general, unexpected contingencies are central to literature on the 
relationship between incomplete contracting and economic organization (Hart, 1995; Hart & Moore, 
1988, 1990; Williamson, 1985, 1996). TCE proffers the argument that, given the inability to specify 
all relevant future states of the world (or the costs of doing so), some unexpected contingencies that 
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are relevant to the relation are likely to occur (Kreps, 1996). In turn, such unexpected contingencies 
can be used as levers for opportunistic behaviors (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Williamson, 1985). 
However, in spite of their importance in the theory, these contingencies are usually seen as 
exogenously produced by some unspecified mechanism. Thus, their nature and antecedents are not 
made explicit in TCE.  
Imperfect managerial meta-knowledge is one mechanism that may endogenously produce 
unexpected contingencies. Changes in managerial meta-knowledge may lead the manager holding 
the relevant knowledge to revise her estimates of the relation’s outcomes. This can create a situation 
in which the contractual obligations of the firm(s) must be reconsidered. The ex ante managerial 
meta-knowledge held at the moment of contracting changes ex post. If this knowledge has relevant 
implications for the possible states of the world considered at the moment of contracting and reflected 
in contractual clauses—such as the firm’s ability to deliver a given good or service at, for example, 
an agreed price, quality, or location—then the contract may have to be reconsidered.  
Imperfect Managerial Meta-Knowledge as a Driver of Transaction Costs 
TCE focuses on a small number of antecedents of transaction costs and governance choices, 
mainly the frequency, uncertainty, and asset-specificity dimensions of transactions. These 
antecedents influence the costs of conducting a transaction within a given governance structure. 
However, while TCE primarily focuses on these three antecedents of transaction costs, it 
acknowledges the presence of parameters that can influence governance costs and, hence, governance 
choices. These are the “shift parameters” (Williamson, 1991). A pivotal shift parameter in TCE is the 
institutional environment, which refers to the contract-law and property-right regimes governing the 
transaction (North, 1990; Oxley, 1999; Williamson, 1991). The effects of shift parameters on 
transaction costs and governance choices are mediated through asset specificity, frequency, and 
uncertainty. Although managerial meta-knowledge is not exogenous to a relation, it too can “shift” 
the comparative costs of governance in two ways. First, managerial meta-knowledge influences the 
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ability of various governance forms to efficiently organize different kinds of transactions. Second, it 
directly influences the uncertainty characterizing transactions (see Williamson, 1991, 1999). Both are 
relevant to the full understanding of what Williamson calls “discriminating alignment”—the 
fundamental idea that different kinds of transactions (i.e., transactions that differ in terms of 
uncertainty, frequency, and asset specificity) are best governed by different governance structures 
that have different capacities for regulating transactions with different characteristics.  
Building on Hayek (1945) and Barnard (1938), Williamson (1991: 278) highlights that 
“adaptability is the central problem of economic organization and that both Hayek and Barnard are 
correct, because they are referring to adaptations of different kinds, both of which are needed in a 
high-performance system.” Governance structures differ with respect to the kinds of adaptation they 
facilitate. Thus, the market facilitates the spontaneous adaptations of autonomous economic actors to 
changes in the market, especially changes in prices (Williamson, 1991). The “marvel” of the market, 
Hayek explains, resides in “how little the individual participants need to know to be able to take the 
right action” (1945: 526-527). As stressed by TCE, the market is an efficient governance structure 
for transactions with a low degree of asset specificity. As asset specificity increases, the efficient 
choice becomes hybrids, followed by hierarchies. When unforeseen contingencies affect the 
transaction, both parties must reconsider whether they want to continue the current relationship, 
renegotiate the contract, or abandon future transactions. The form of the adaptation is determined by 
the relationship’s governance structure.  
TCE posits that while markets handle autonomous adaptation well, they face difficulties when 
adaptation needs to be “coordinated” (Malmgren, 1961; Williamson, 1996), as in the case of 
interdependent changes in (complementary) activities, assets, investments, or actions. Depending on 
the degree of specificity in the relation, such coordination can be undertaken by hybrids or hierarchies. 
Coordinated, intentional adaptation works through different mechanisms (see Williamson, 1991). To 
successfully adapt to changes, managers must know—in the sense of managerial meta-knowledge—
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which activities, assets, investments, and actions should be deployed to address the change, and how 
such adaptation should be carried out. Often, managers of legally independent entities can jointly 
accomplish such adaptation. However, fiat allows for adaptation without renegotiation and, along 
with internally more convergent expectations (Malmgren, 1961), can ease adaptation in a system with 
mutually dependent activities (Williamson, 1991), especially activities that are reciprocally 
interdependent (Thompson, 1967) or complementary (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995). Disputes arising 
in the context of the employment relationship can be solved by fiat (Williamson, 1985). Therefore, 
TCE argues that when exogenous “disturbances” are many or severe, a hierarchy may offer 
advantages relative to coordination by independent parties (Williamson, 1991). Thus, from a TCE 
perspective managerial meta-knowledge can be seen as a coordination device that is generally more 
effective within, rather than across, the boundaries of the firm, as managers tend to know more about 
their own employees than about employees in other firms.  
However, managerial meta-knowledge primarily matters for our understanding of transaction 
costs because it influences secondary uncertainty. Indeed, secondary uncertainty may be largely 
caused by imperfect managerial meta-knowledge rather than by strategic (opportunistic) actions. In 
recurring market transactions characterized by a nontrivial level of asset specificity, secondary 
uncertainty is a potential source of contractual friction. When the secondary uncertainty is partly 
resolved—that is, when the manager learns something new about the knowledge of the employees he 
manages—frictions may arise because, for example, the contract was based on an overly optimistic 
projection of production costs. In this case, problems may be resolved, or frictions may rise to such 
an extent that the firm will engage a new supplier. TCE reasoning suggests that the outcome will 
depend on the size of the quasi-surplus in the relation. In turn, changing managerial meta-knowledge 
can change the amount and distribution of appropriable quasi-rents in the relation, creating incentives 
to reevaluate, renegotiate, and potentially cancel existing contracts, with implications for governance 
choice.  
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Managerial Meta-Knowledge and Governance Choice 
Managerial meta-knowledge and secondary uncertainty provide additional insight into the 
well-established explanatory mechanisms in TCE. Specifically, these factors add to our 
understanding of how uncertainty and unexpected contingencies give rise to a need for adaptability 
that can be met, to varying degrees, by alternative governance structures (Williamson, 1985, 1996).  
Managerial meta-knowledge and the likelihood of contractual renegotiation. In the 
following, we assume that (primary) uncertainty and frequency as well as managerial meta-
knowledge are all at “intermediate” levels (see Williamson, 1985); however, asset specificity varies. 
Moreover, we assume that the imperfect managerial meta-knowledge exists only on the side of the 
supplier (we later relax this assumption). TCE predicts that as asset specificity increases in the 
relation, the risks of costly haggling and hold-ups also increase (Reuer & Ariño, 2002; Williamson, 
1985, 1996). Governance outcomes are also influenced by the level of secondary uncertainty and by 
the two firms’ abilities to adapt to unforeseen contingencies. We argue that these abilities are 
influenced, in part, by managerial meta-knowledge. 
Consider the “fundamental transformation” of TCE from an initial “large numbers” situation to 
a subsequent “small numbers” situation in the context of a vertical relation. The focal firm approaches 
a number of potential suppliers regarding a contract for the repeated delivery of an intermediate 
product. The supplier winning the bid installs “dedicated assets” to supply the firm (Williamson, 
1985). The supplier’s bid is partly based on its estimates for a number of cost components, many of 
which require managerial meta-knowledge at a certain level. Assume that the manager of the supplier 
holds highly imperfect managerial meta-knowledge, such that she has little knowledge of the skills 
and knowledge of the employees in the firm she manages, and she has little knowledge of how those 
skills and knowledge relate to the firm’s production activities. In this case, three situations can arise. 
The manager of the supplier may (by chance) have had correct expectations about the actual costs of 
meeting the contractual obligations, which is the situation assumed in TCE. Alternatively, as a result 
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of imperfect managerial meta-knowledge, the manager may have under- or overestimated the actual 
costs.  
If the manager has overestimated the capabilities of her organization, the costs of meeting the 
obligations are higher than projected. This means that the quasi-rents are lower than expected, 
potentially leading to a situation in which the assets could be put to better use. The implication is that 
the supplier will wish to renegotiate the contract (or, ultimately, opt out of the relation). If the manager 
has underestimated the capabilities of her organization, the costs of meeting the obligations are lower 
than projected, such that the rents generated are higher than expected. From the supplier’s perspective, 
this may seem to be a pure windfall. However, if word gets out about the additional rents, trouble 
may ensue because the quasi-rents are more vulnerable to opportunistic appropriation by the 
downstream firm. As the rents are higher than expected, the incentives for the downstream firm to 
engage in opportunistic hold-up increase. Thus, in either case, the supplier’s imperfect managerial 
meta-knowledge negatively affects the stability of the contractual relationship involving asset-
specific transactions. This reasoning motivates our first proposition:  
Proposition 1: The higher the imperfection of managerial meta-knowledge, the higher 
the likelihood of contractual renegotiation in a relation between two firms.  
Imperfect managerial meta-knowledge and comparative governance costs. Now consider the 
three archetypical governance structures identified in TCE research: markets, hybrids, and 
hierarchies. For transactions with low levels of asset specificity, the most efficient governance 
structure is the market. The quasi-rents are low, and the need for coordinated adaptation is low due 
to both low asset specificity and the related ability to easily change partners. In the context of our 
simple supplier-firm dyad, either party, or both, can have incomplete managerial meta-knowledge. In 
any case, the outcome may be that the transaction is either more or less costly to carry out than 
expected. If it is less costly than expected, then rents are created. If it is more costly, then the 
transaction has to be reevaluated, possibly leading to a search for another transacting partner. 
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Managerial meta-knowledge affects market-based transactions only slightly, namely through higher 
search and negotiation costs.  
For transactions with medium levels of asset specificity, TCE predicts that governance forms 
characterized by higher levels of commitment will be most efficient. In the hybrid form of 
governance, which includes “various forms of long-term contracting, reciprocal trading, regulation, 
franchising, and the like” (Williamson, 1991: 280), quasi-rents arise from the moderately specialized 
assets on one or both sides of the relation. As stressed by TCE (Williamson, 1991), transactions 
governed by hybrid governance are more difficult to adapt to unforeseen contingencies than other 
governance forms due to the need for coordination of and mutual agreement on adaptive measures.  
While the parties can easily find another party with which to trade in market-based transactions, 
this is less of an option in hybrids. As it is more difficult to find good alternative uses of the firm’s 
resources (specificity is higher) and because adaptation cannot be accomplished by fiat, governing a 
transaction with a hybrid form is challenged by incomplete managerial meta-knowledge. This is true 
even if only the supplier is characterized by imperfect managerial meta-knowledge. If both firms in 
the vertical dyad have imperfect managerial meta-knowledge (which is the assumption in the 
following), the hybrid form is disadvantaged further. To the extent that transactions that are high in 
asset specificity create a need for coordinated adaptation, the imperfect managerial meta-knowledge 
of both the supplier and the downstream firm may give rise to secondary uncertainty and unexpected 
contingencies, leading to ex post haggling and, possibly, opportunistic hold-up. As reaching mutual 
agreements in hybrids about how to adapt to unforeseen contingencies depends on the ability to adapt 
to the partner, the fact that both sides have imperfect managerial meta-knowledge enhances the 
resulting inefficiency. The managerial meta-knowledge of either party affects hybrid-based 
transactions through higher adaptation and negotiation costs, and through the increased risk of ex post 
haggling and hold-up.  
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Hierarchical governance is affected by imperfect managerial meta-knowledge in different ways. 
As the manager in a hierarchy can make decisions by fiat, negotiations aimed at mutual agreement 
are less relevant. The hierarchical governance form gives the manager privileged access to 
information, which allows him to improve his managerial meta-knowledge (see Williamson, 1985; 
Nickerson & Zenger, 2004). In contrast, these managers generally do not have similar access to other 
firms. In contexts characterized by high asset specificity (and quasi-rents), when an unforeseen 
contingency occurs, the incentive to look for an alternative, external partner is low. On the other hand, 
hierarchies have the ability to adapt in a fast, coordinated fashion using fiat, which carries low 
adaptation costs.  
While low managerial meta-knowledge affects market-based transactions through higher search 
and negotiation costs, hybrids are affected by higher adaptation and negotiation costs, and by the 
additional risks of ex post haggling and hold-up. Through the use of fiat, a hierarchy is relatively 
better than a hybrid at adapting to unforeseen situations. Our argument follows Williamson’s (1991) 
discussion of the influence of uncertainty on discrete organizational structures—low managerial 
meta-knowledge affects hierarchies more than markets but less than hybrids. In sum, we offer the 
following proposition:  
Proposition 2: The higher the imperfection of managerial meta-knowledge, the less 
favorable the hybrid governance structure relative to the market and hierarchical governance 
structures.  
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 2, which is an adaptation of the figure in Williamson 
(1991: 284). We treat managerial meta-knowledge as a parameter that changes the comparative 
governance costs (dotted curves) relative to those depicted in the standard TCE analysis (solid 
curves). As the figure shows, the region of asset specificity that will support the hybrid-governance 
structure is smaller under imperfect managerial meta-knowledge than in the standard analysis in 
which managerial meta-knowledge is perfect. In other words, lower managerial meta-knowledge (of 
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either or both parties) pushes the cost function for hybrid governance forms higher than for hierarchy- 
or market-based transactions. 
------- Insert Figure 2 Here ------- 
 
MANAGERIAL META-KNOWLEDGE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 
II:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR PARTNER SELECTION   
Managerial Meta-Knowledge Ex Ante Contracting 
While the above reasoning relates to the situation following the signing of a contract, it also 
has implications for partner selection, an ex ante issue. The extant literature on the advantages of 
entering into hybrid relationships (e.g., strategic alliances) focuses on resource complementarities 
(Das & Teng, 2000), learning capabilities (Doz, 1996; Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Hamel, 1991), 
access to and transfer of knowledge (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 
1996), and the type of relationship (Lavie, 2006) as important determinants of the relationship’s rent-
creation potential and, therefore, as important motives in partner selection. Propositions 1 and 2 
suggest that managerial meta-knowledge influences the stability and success of a hybrid governance 
form. For this reason, managers seek to form expectations regarding the managerial meta-knowledge 
held by their potential partners.18 
 The alliance literature stresses pre-alliance interactions as a way of gaining 
information about potential partners and as a way of building trust between them (Das & Teng, 1998; 
Sako & Helper, 1998; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). In contexts in which managerial meta-knowledge 
is imperfect, frequent transactions serve as a mechanism for gaining knowledge about the partner, 
                                               
18 In effect, they seek to acquire second-order knowledge, which might be referred to as “managerial meta-meta-
knowledge.” The costs of doing this may be seen as a particular case of the “measurement costs” highlighted by Barzel 
(1982) and featured in the early TCE literature (e.g., Williamson, 1985).  
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especially the partner’s managerial meta-knowledge. Indeed, research suggests that the longer two 
firms have cooperated, the more precisely they can assess each other’s actual capabilities (Li & 
Rowley, 2002). This ability to evaluate partner capabilities influences the likelihood of forming closer 
relationships, as inter-firm hybrid relationships often are formed in order to access complementary 
resources (Das & Teng, 2000).  
 An analysis of the partner-selection choice from a managerial meta-knowledge 
perspective suggests that knowledge about the partner’s capabilities and resources is not a given.  
Along these lines, the extant literature offers two main arguments to explain the empirical observation 
that many firms choose to repeatedly enter into alliances with the same firms, and why prior alliances 
enhance the likelihood of successful M&A (Zaheer, Hernandez, & Banerjee, 2010). One stream 
focuses on the inherent inertia and path dependency of alliance partner choices (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 
2006; Li & Rowley, 2002). This also aligns with the local search arguments found in related literature 
streams (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Levinthal & March, 1993). Another stream of literature focuses 
on partner-specific knowledge, such as knowledge-sharing routines, trust, and conflict-resolution 
mechanisms (Carson, Madhok, Varman, & John, 2003; Gulati, Lavie, & Singh, 2009). Partner-
specific knowledge can take many forms, and it can be more or less tacit. These two streams have at 
least one thing in common—an investment in the relationship in the form of partner-specific 
knowledge. From a managerial meta-knowledge perspective, this can entail learning about the 
partner’s capabilities and how they fit with one’s own capabilities. Parts of this activity can be 
managed through codification, while other parts occur in a complex mutual-learning process in which 
both parties must manage "(u)nforeseen coordination difficulties, communication hurdles, resource 
spillovers, and information asymmetries" (Heimeriks, Bingham, & Laamanen, 2014: 464). This 
process allows for the development of managerial meta-knowledge with relevance to the specific 
partner and for the identification of complementary capabilities. We therefore suggest: 
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Proposition 3: The more two firms have worked together in the past, the more developed 
is their partner-relevant managerial meta-knowledge, which makes it easier to identify 
complementary capabilities. This increases the likelihood of those firms transacting using a 
hybrid form of governance. 
 Models of hybrid governance structures, especially alliances, often focus on the 
behavioral consequences of the repetitive nature of the relation (e.g., Lavie, 2006; Parkhe, 1993). 
Partners with which a firm expects to be involved in the future will be more reliable because they 
have more at stake. Thus, in a repetitive setting, the “shadow of the future” becomes relevant for the 
stability of the relation. In other words, partners assess the costs and benefits of staying in the 
relationship or opting out, and they do so for the entire relationship. These calculations involve not 
only estimates of the costs, payment profiles, and the discount rates of the partners, but also 
assessments of the business risks in the relation. In general, an assessment of business risks will be 
part of the partner-selection process (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004). The risk entailed in 
the partner-selection choice has both potential upsides and potential downsides. As argued above, 
depending on whether the partner firm’s manager under- or overestimates his company’s capabilities, 
contractual renegotiations can entail either opportunities or risks. Moreover, the willingness to engage 
with firms with low levels of managerial meta-knowledge is dependent on the risk preferences of the 
manager making the decision. We therefore propose the following relationship between managers’ 
risk preferences and their partner-selection choices: 
Proposition 4: The risk preferences of managers influence their partner selection such 
that risk-averse managers prefer partners that have high levels of managerial meta-knowledge. 
Trust as a Substitute for Managerial Meta-Knowledge 
Even though too much focus on the trust between alliance partners may “hid[e] other ‘real 
problems’” (Bierly III & Gallagher, 2007: 142), much of the literature points to the key role played 
by trust in mitigating opportunism-driven contingencies or, in other words, behavioral uncertainty. In 
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particular, much of the alliance research highlights the importance of the multidimensional construct 
of trust (Bierly III & Gallagher, 2007; Das & Teng, 1998, 2001; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2009; Shah & 
Swaminathan, 2008; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). Despite differences in trust typologies and the 
invoked mechanisms (for an overview, see Vanneste, Puranam, & Kretschmer, 2014), the majority 
of the extant research agrees that the presence of trust reduces the likelihood of costly ex post haggling 
and opportunistic behavior, and enhances performance, regardless of the governance form (Gulati & 
Nickerson, 2008).  
 One common distinction among different kinds of trust is the distinction made between 
benevolence-based trust and competence-based trust (Ganesan, 1994; Levin & Cross, 2004; Sako, 
1992; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008).19 The former relates to the intentions of the partner, while the 
latter refers to trust in the partner having the capabilities necessary to honor the agreement. These two 
forms of trust differ fundamentally with regard to the ex ante knowability of their objects. When 
holding benevolence-based trust, one places faith in at state of mind (the intention) that one cannot 
be knowledgeable of ex ante. This is not the case with competence-based trust, which can (for a cost) 
be substituted with ex ante knowledge of the partner’s capabilities. Both kinds of trust are related to 
a firm’s investments in interorganizational relations, although some conceptual issues arise from the 
conflation of the two types of trust.  
 From a basic economics perspective (e.g., Parkhe, 1993), trustworthiness represents 
an investment in being deliberately forbearing in order to obtain higher future payoffs. This line of 
argument stresses the investment in benevolence-based trust by the party wanting to engage in future 
opportunistic actions. Even though one cannot know a partner’s intentions, one can know whether 
the firm’s capabilities and available capacity are such that they could allow the partner to engage in 
opportunistic behavior (e.g., whether the level of asset specificity is such that threats are credible or 
                                               
19 This distinction falls within more overarching definitions of trust, such as that of Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and 
Camerer (1998): “Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.”  
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not). In this way, more knowledge about the partner’s capabilities can serve as a partial substitute for 
the need for benevolence-based trust, although this substitution can never be complete due to the 
unknowability of the partner’s intentions. On the other hand, competence-based trust is a state that 
can be left, as it is possible to develop knowledge on the object of trust, such as the potential partner’s 
capabilities or the potential partner’s manager’s understanding of the company’s own capabilities 
(i.e., the partner’s managerial meta-knowledge). This kind of trust becomes less needed as the amount 
of information available regarding the partner’s managerial meta-knowledge and capabilities 
increases. Such information can be obtained through prior interactions and social ties (Carson et al., 
2003; Gulati, 1995, 1999).  
 One might argue, like Williamson (1993), that this understanding of trust comes close 
to the definition of risk. In this regard, the ex ante outcome variance can be offset by investing in 
information about the partner. Given little knowledge about a partner’s meta-knowledge, it is difficult 
to assess the complementarities between one’s own capabilities and those of the partner firm. 
However, without full information about the partner, the only alternative is to trust that the partner 
will not behave overly opportunistically by, for example, lying about available capabilities in an 
attempt to gain a better bargaining position. On the other hand, if the decision maker is fully 
knowledgeable about the partner, then there is less need for trust, as pure calculativeness secures the 
stability of the relationship (Williamson, 1993). In this way, trust can serve as a substitute for a lack 
of knowledge about the partner. This leads us to suggest the following:  
Proposition 5: Trust is a stronger antecedent of partner selection when knowledge of 
potential partners’ managerial meta-knowledge is low. 
 The three propositions dealing with the conditions for partner selection are depicted in Figure 
3.  
------- Insert Figure 3 Here -------  
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CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
Contribution to Theory  
The knowledge-based view of the firm, with its notions that firms not only learn differently 
but also store, use, and deploy knowledge in different ways, has become an important stream of 
macro-management research. However, this perspective has mainly stressed inter-firm heterogeneity. 
As such, it has been less forthcoming with regard to intra-firm knowledge heterogeneity and the 
challenges this poses for management. Another influential macro-management research stream, 
namely TCE, also tends to avoid discussions of the managerial challenges associated with intra-firm 
knowledge heterogeneity (as well as inter-firm heterogeneity). As these theories do not acknowledge 
the presence of imperfect managerial meta-knowledge, they do not link managerial meta-knowledge 
to choices of contractual and organizational forms.  
We argue that the manager’s incomplete knowledge about the organization’s capabilities at the 
moment of contracting is a source of endogenous uncertainty that affects the manager’s ability to 
efficiently coordinate the resources at her disposal, and that this has implications for the choice of 
organizational and contractual forms. The loosening of the epistemic assumptions underpinning much 
of the current organizational and management theories allows us to explore the formation and 
implications of heterogeneous managerial knowledge levels. The construct we have developed in this 
article helps us to better understand the firm as a knowledge-organizing entity and the important role 
of the manager in that regard. The essence of our argument is that the complicated coordination of 
dispersed knowledge serves as a potential source of friction and surprises in transactions, which may 
influence the choice of governance form.  
By focusing on the epistemic condition of the contracting situation, we argue that the manager’s 
knowledge at the moment of contracting is a factor subject to change. From the perspective of the 
decision maker, this creates a difference between the ex ante and the ex post situations. The change 
in expectations raises the likelihood of contractual renegotiations, which implies higher costs for 
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transactions between parties with lower levels of managerial meta-knowledge. In bridging the KBV 
and TCE in this manner, we also bring in the managerial factor, which has thus far not been 
highlighted in the KBV and the TCE.  
Future Research 
An important future step forward is the development of a measurement scale that will allow 
for the operationalization of the managerial meta-knowledge construct. This is necessary to test the 
propositions developed in this paper. This work may take its start in the extant empirical research on 
transactive memory systems (Austin, 2003; Lewis, 2003), which proffers several measures have been 
developed that will allow researchers to grasp different sides of the construct.  
Qualitative studies on the influence of managerial meta-knowledge on daily managerial work 
may provide more insights into the various causal mechanisms that influence the application of 
discretionary power. This would also move the focus away from complex, counter-factual situations, 
such as hold-ups, towards more mundane daily coordination tasks. Even though both are important, 
the sheer amount of daily coordination tasks ought to earn such tasks a more prominent place among 
the subjects of management research.  
One relevant area for both theoretical and empirical exploration of the managerial meta-
knowledge perspective is its influence on the organizational structure. There are limits to the size of 
an organization about which a manager can have a significant amount of correct knowledge. In the 
context of the historical change of diversified firms from U to M-forms, Williamson suggests that “in 
the language of transaction cost economics, bounds of rationality were reached as the U-form 
structure labored under a communication overload while the pursuit of sub-goals by the functional 
parts (sales, engineering, production) was partly a manifestation of opportunism.” (1985: 280-281). 
We argue that managerial meta-knowledge plays a significant role in our understanding of the link 
between the bounds of rationality faced by the manager and the choice of organizational form. This 
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idea lurks on the sidelines in TCE and in other literature streams focused on the information 
processing of organizations (March & Simon, 1993).  
We have solely focused on the intentional, managerial configuration of resources within the 
firm. However, this is not the only manner in which rent-generating resource combinations are made. 
These can also emerge in more spontaneous ways. We have followed the main road, as laid out by 
Williamson (1991), in which the firm is the epicenter of intentional coordinated adaptation and the 
marketplace is the space of spontaneous adaptation. Even though we analytically distinguish between 
(for the manager) intentional and unintentional coordination, one important antecedent affecting the 
level of managerial meta-knowledge also influences coordination among employees. As the extant 
research has emphasized, the group’s transactive memory system is a determinant of the efficiency 
of groups’ information systems. Therefore, additional theoretical and empirical research should try 
to bridge the analytical gap between intentional and the unintentional coordination inside firms. We 
hope that the concept of managerial meta-knowledge and its antecedents will serve as a first step in 
this direction. 
Conclusions 
Much current management theory starts from the assumption that managers know the 
capabilities of their organizations. In this article, we examine the implications of relaxing this 
assumption for governance choice in a framework that combines a focus on knowledge heterogeneity 
and distributed knowledge characteristic of parts of the KBV with the comparative contracting 
framework of TCE. We argue that low levels of managerial meta-knowledge affect the ability to 
coordinate, create endogenous “secondary” uncertainty, and serve as opportunism-independent 
drivers of ex post transaction costs. Together, these effects influence the economic organization of 
transactions. Most importantly, they change the comparative costs of governance structures in such a 
way that hybrid forms become relatively more costly. The organization of transactions in hierarchical 
governance structures is also affected. The ability to consciously coordinate and, therefore, the ability 
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to efficiently use fiat depends on the manager’s knowledge of his employees. Overall, the managerial 
meta-knowledge construct provides a step towards analyzing the effects of less-than-perfect 
managerial knowledge on governance choices.  
 
 
  
 110 
 
REFERENCES 
 Alchian, A. A., & Woodward, S. 1988. The Firm Is Dead; Long Live The Firm a Review of Oliver 
E. Williamson’s The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Journal of Economic Literature, 
26(1): 65–79. 
Alvesson, M., & Sandberg, J. 2011. Generating Research Questions Through Problematization. 
Academy of Management Review, 36(2): 247–271. 
Argote, L., & Ingram, P. 2000. Knowledge Transfer: A Basis for Competitive Advantage in Firms. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 82(1): 150–169. 
Argyres, N. S., Bercovitz, J., & Mayer, K. J. 2007. Complementarity and Evolution of Contractual 
Provisions: An Empirical Study of IT Services Contracts. Organization Science, 18(1): 3–19. 
Argyres, N. S., Felin, T., Foss, N. J., & Zenger, T. 2012. Organizational Economics of Capability and 
Heterogeneity. Organization Science, 23(5): 1213–1226. 
Argyres, N. S., & Mayer, K. J. 2007. Contract Design as a Firm Capability: An Integration of 
Learning and Transaction Cost Perspectives. Academy of Management Review, 32(4): 1060–
1077. 
Austin, J. R. 2003. Transactive memory in organizational groups: The effects of content, consensus, 
specialization, and accuracy on group performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5): 
866–878. 
Baldwin, C. Y. 2008. Where do transactions come from? Modularity, transactions, and the boundaries 
of firms. Industrial and Corporate Change, 17(1): 155–195. 
Becker, G. S., & Murphy, K. M. 1993. The Division of Labor, Coordination Cost, and Knowledge. 
Human capital: a theoretical and empirical analysis, with special reference to education 
(3rd ed.): 299–322. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Beckman, C. M., Haunschild, P. R., & Phillips, D. J. 2004. Friends or Strangers? Firm-Specific 
Uncertainty, Market Uncertainty, and Network Partner Selection. Organization Science, 
15(3): 259–275. 
Bierly III, P. E., & Gallagher, S. 2007. Explaining Alliance Partner Selection: Fit, Trust and Strategic 
Expediency. Long Range Planning, 40(2): 134–153. 
Bingham, C. B., Eisenhardt, K. M., & Furr, N. R. 2007. What makes a process a capability? 
Heuristics, strategy, and effective capture of opportunities. Strategic Entrepreneurship 
Journal, 1(1-2): 27–47. 
Carson, S. J., Madhok, A., Varman, R., & John, G. 2003. Information Processing Moderators of the 
Effectiveness of Trust-Based Governance in Interfirm R&D Collaboration. Organization 
Science, 14(1): 45–56. 
Chiles, T. H., & McMackin, J. F. 1996. Integrating Variable Risk Preferences, Trust, and Transaction 
Cost Economics. Academy of Management Review, 21(1): 73–99. 
Coleman, J. S. 1988. Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. American Journal of 
Sociology, 94: S95–S120. 
Coleman, J. S. 1994. Foundations of social theory. Cambridge (MA); London: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press. 
Danneels, E. 2011. Trying to become a different type of company: dynamic capability at Smith 
Corona. Strategic Management Journal, 32(1): 1–31. 
Das, T. K., & Teng, B.-S. 1998. Between Trust and Control: Developing Confidence in Partner 
Cooperation in Alliances. The Academy of Management Review, 23(3): 491–512. 
Das, T. K., & Teng, B.-S. 2000. A Resource-Based Theory of Strategic Alliances. Journal of 
Management, 26(1): 31–61. 
Das, T. K., & Teng, B.-S. 2001. Trust, Control, and Risk in Strategic Alliances: An Integrated 
Framework. Organization Studies, 22(2): 251–283. 
 111 
 
Dekel, E., Lipman, B. L., & Rustichini, A. 1998. Recent developments in modeling unforeseen 
contingencies. European Economic Review, 42(3–5): 523–542. 
Demsetz, H. 1988. The Theory of the Firm Revisited. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 
4(1): 141–161. 
Denrell, J., Arvidsson, N., & Zander, U. 2004. Managing Knowledge in the Dark: An Empirical Study 
of the Reliability of Capability Evaluations. Management Science, 50(11): 1491–1503. 
Doz, Y. L. 1996. The evolution of cooperation in strategic alliances: Initial conditions or learning 
processes? Strategic Management Journal, 17(S1): 55–83. 
Dyer, J. H., & Chu, W. 2003. The Role of Trustworthiness in Reducing Transaction Costs and 
Improving Performance: Empirical Evidence from the United States, Japan, and Korea. 
Organization Science, 14(1): 57–68. 
Eggers, J. P., & Kaplan, S. 2013. Cognition and Capabilities: A Multi-Level Perspective. The 
Academy of Management Annals, 7(1): 295–340. 
Felin, T., & Foss, N. J. 2005. Strategic organization: a field in search of micro-foundations. Strategic 
Organization, 3(4): 441–455. 
Foss, N. J. 1999. The use of knowledge in firms. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 
(JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 155(3): 458–486.  
Foss, K., Foss, N. J., Klein, P. G., & Klein, S. K. 2007. The Entrepreneurial Organization of 
Heterogeneous Capital. Journal of Management Studies, 44(7): 1165–1186. 
Foss, N.J. & Stea, D. 2014. Putting a Realistic Theory of Mind into Agency Theory: Implications for 
Reward Design and Management in Principal-Agent Relations. European Management 
Review, 11: 101-116. 
Ganesan, S. 1994. Determinants of Long-Term Orientation in Buyer-Seller Relationships. Journal 
of Marketing, 58(2): 1–19. 
Gavetti, G., & Levinthal, D. 2000. Looking Forward and Looking Backward: Cognitive and 
Experiential Search. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45(1): 113–137. 
Gettier, E. L. 1963. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis, 23(6): 121. 
Gibbons, R. 2005. Four formal(izable) theories of the firm? Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 58(2): 200–245. 
Grant, R. M. 1996. Toward a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm. Strategic Management Journal, 
17: 109–122. 
Grant, R. M., & Baden-Fuller, C. 2004. A Knowledge Accessing Theory of Strategic Alliances. 
Journal of Management Studies, 41(1): 61–84. 
Gulati, R. 1995. Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties for Contractual 
Choice in Alliances. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1): 85–112. 
Gulati, R. 1999. Network Location and Learning: The Influence of Network Resources and Firm 
Capabilities on Alliance Formation. Strategic Management Journal, 20(5): 397–420. 
Gulati, R., Lavie, D., & Singh, H. 2009. The nature of partnering experience and the gains from 
alliances. Strategic Management Journal, 30(11): 1213–1233. 
Gulati, R., & Nickerson, J. A. 2008. Interorganizational Trust, Governance Choice, and Exchange 
Performance. Organization Science, 19(5): 688–708. 
Halpern, J. Y., & Moses, Y. 1990. Knowledge and common knowledge in a distributed environment. 
J. ACM, 37(3): 549–587. 
Hamel, G. 1991. Competition for competence and interpartner learning within international strategic 
alliances. Strategic Management Journal, 12(S1): 83–103. 
Hansen, M. T. 1999. The Search-Transfer Problem: The Role of Weak Ties in Sharing Knowledge 
across Organization Subunits. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(1): 82–111. 
Hart, O. 1990. Is“ Bounded Rationality” an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions? Journal 
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Staatswissenschaft, 146(4): 696–702. 
 112 
 
Hayek, F. A. 1945. The use of knowledge in society. The American Economic Review, 35(4): 519–
530. 
Heath, C., & Staudenmayer, N. 2000. Coordination neglect: How lay theories of organizing 
complicate coordination in organizations. Research in Organizational Behavior, 22: 153–
191. 
Heimeriks, K. H., Bingham, C. B., & Laamanen, T. 2014. Unveiling the temporally contingent role 
of codification in alliance success. Strategic Management Journal, n/a–n/a. 
Hendricks, V. F. 2007. Mainstream and formal epistemology. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hollingshead, A. B. 1998. Retrieval processes in transactive memory systems. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 74(3): 659–671. 
Hsieh, C., Nickerson, J. A., & Zenger, T. R. 2007. Opportunity Discovery, Problem Solving and a 
Theory of the Entrepreneurial Firm. Journal of Management Studies, 44(7): 1255–1277. 
Huber, G. P., & Lewis, K. 2010. Cross-Understanding: Implications for Group Cognition and 
Performance. Academy of Management Review, 35(1): 6–26. 
Ibarra, H. 1993. Network Centrality, Power, and Innovation Involvement: Determinants of Technical 
and Administrative Roles. Academy of Management Journal, 36(3): 471–501. 
Ichikawa, J. J., & Steup, M. 2013. The Analysis of Knowledge. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013.). 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/knowledge-analysis/, October 27, 2013. 
Jacobides, M. G., & Winter, S. G. 2005. The co-evolution of capabilities and transaction costs: 
explaining the institutional structure of production. Strategic Management Journal, 26(5): 
395–413. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. 1995. Specific and General Knowledge, and Organizational 
Structure. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 8(2): 4–18. 
Kogut, B., & Zander, U. 1992. Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities, and the Replication 
of Technology. Organization Science, 3(3): 383–397. 
Koopmans, T. C. 1957. Three essays on the state of economic science. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Kreps, D. M. 1990. Corporate culture and economic theory. In J. E. Alt & K. A. Shepsle (Eds.), 
Perspectives on Positive Political Economy: 90–143.  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Kreps, D. M. 1992. Static Choice in the Presence of Unforeseen Contigencies. Economic Analysis 
of Markets and Games: Essays in Honor of Frank Hahn: 258–281. MIT Press. 
Kreps, D. M. 1996. Markets and Hierarchies and (Mathematical) Economic Theory. Industrial and 
Corporate Change, 5(2): 561–595. 
Lachmann, L. M. 1986. The market as an economic process. Oxford, UK; New York, NY, USA: B. 
Blackwell. 
Langlois, R. N. 1992. Transaction-cost Economics in Real Time. Industrial and Corporate Change, 
1(1): 99–127. 
Langlois, R. N., & Foss, N. J. 1999. Capabilities and governance: The rebirth of production in the 
theory of economic organization. Kyklos, 52(2): 201. 
Lavie, D. 2006. The Competitive Advantage of Interconnected Firms: An Extension of the Resource-
Based View. Academy of Management Review, 31(3): 638–658. 
Lavie, D., & Rosenkopf, L. 2006. Balancing Exploration and Exploitation in Alliance Formation. 
The Academy of Management Journal, 49(4): 797–818. 
Lawrence, P. R., & Lorsch, J. W. 1967. Differentiation and Integration in Complex Organizations. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 12(1): 1–47. 
Levin, D. Z., & Cross, R. 2004. The Strength of Weak Ties You Can Trust: The Mediating Role of 
Trust in Effective Knowledge Transfer. Management Science, 50(11): 1477–1490. 
 113 
 
Levinthal, D. A., & March, J. G. 1993. The myopia of learning. Strategic Management Journal, 
14(S2): 95–112. 
Lewis, D. K. 1969. Convention: a philosophical study. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Lewis, K. 2003. Measuring transactive memory systems in the field: Scale development and 
validation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(4): 587–604. 
Lewis, K. 2004. Knowledge and Performance in Knowledge-Worker Teams: A Longitudinal Study 
of Transactive Memory Systems. Management Science, 50(11): 1519–1533. 
Lewis, K., & Herndon, B. 2011. Transactive Memory Systems: Current Issues and Future Research 
Directions. Organization Science, 22(5): 1254–1265. 
Lewis, K., Lange, D., & Gillis, L. 2005. Transactive Memory Systems, Learning, and Learning 
Transfer. Organization Science, 16(6): 581–598. 
Li, S. X., & Rowley, T. J. 2002. Inertia and Evaluation Mechanisms in Interorganizational Partner 
Selection: Syndicate Formation among U.S. Investment Banks. Academy of Management 
Journal, 45(6): 1104–1119. 
Loasby, B. J. 1995. Running a Business: An Appraisal of Economics, Organization and Management 
by Paul Milgrom and John Roberts. Industrial and Corporate Change, 4(2): 471–489. 
Lucas, R. E., Jr. 1978. On the Size Distribution of Business Firms. The Bell Journal of Economics, 
9(2): 508–523. 
Lumineau, F., Fréchet, M., & Puthod, D. 2011. An organizational learning perspective on the 
contracting process. Strategic Organization, 9(1): 8–32. 
Macaulay, S. 1963. Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study. American 
Sociological Review, 28(1): 55–67. 
Macher, J. T. 2006. Technological Development and the Boundaries of the Firm: A Knowledge-
Based Examination in Semiconductor Manufacturing. Management Science, 52(6): 826–843. 
Mahoney, J. T. 1995. The management of resources and the resource of management. Journal of 
Business Research, 33(2): 91–101. 
Malmgren, H. B. 1961. Information, Expectations and the Theory of the Firm. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 75(3): 399–421. 
March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. 1993. Organizations (2nd ed.). Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell. 
Marengo, L. 1995. Structure, competence, and learning in organizations. Wirtschaftspolitische 
Blätter, 6: 454–464. 
Mayer, K. J., & Argyres, N. S. 2004. Learning to Contract: Evidence from the Personal Computer 
Industry. Organization Science, 15(4): 394–410. 
Milgrom, P. R., & Roberts, J. 1992. Economics, organization, and management. Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J: Prentice-Hall. 
Moreland, R. L., & Myaskovsky, L. 2000. Exploring the Performance Benefits of Group Training: 
Transactive Memory or Improved Communication? Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 82(1): 117–133. 
Mowery, D. C., Oxley, J. E., & Silverman, B. S. 1996. Strategic Alliances and Interfirm Knowledge 
Transfer. Strategic Management Journal, 17: 77–91. 
Nahapiet, J., & Ghoshal, S. 1998. Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the Organizational 
Advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(2): 242–266. 
Nelson, R. R. 1980. Production Sets, Technological Knowledge, and R & D: Fragile and Overworked 
Constructs for Analysis of Productivity Growth? The American Economic Review, 70(2): 
62–67. 
Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. G. 1982. An evolutionary theory of economic change. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Nickerson, J. A., & Zenger, T. R. 2004. A Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm—The Problem-
Solving Perspective. Organization Science, 15(6): 617–632. 
 114 
 
Nielsen, B. B., & Nielsen, S. 2009. Learning and Innovation in International Strategic Alliances: An 
Empirical Test of the Role of Trust and Tacitness. Journal of Management Studies, 46(6): 
1031–1056. 
North, D. C. 1990. Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Orlikowski, W. J. 2002. Knowing in Practice: Enacting a Collective Capability in Distributed 
Organizing. Organization Science, 13(3): 249–273. 
Oxley, J. E. 1999. Institutional environment and the mechanisms of governance: the impact of 
intellectual property protection on the structure of inter-firm alliances. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, 38(3): 283–309. 
Parkhe, A. 1993. Strategic Alliance Structuring: A Game Theoretic and Transaction Cost 
Examination of Interfirm Cooperation. The Academy of Management Journal, 36(4): 794–
829. 
Penrose, E. T. 1959. The theory of the growth of the firm (4th ed., Rev. ed.). Oxford ; New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Popper, K. R. 1972. Objective knowledge: an evolutionary approach (Rev. ed.). Oxford [Eng.] : New 
York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press. 
Postrel, S. 2002. Islands of Shared Knowledge: Specialization and Mutual Understanding in Problem-
Solving Teams. Organization Science, 13(3): 303–320. 
Ren, Y., & Argote, L. 2011. Transactive Memory Systems 1985–2010: An Integrative Framework of 
Key Dimensions, Antecedents, and Consequences. The Academy of Management Annals, 
5(1): 189–229. 
Reuer, J. J., & Ariño, A. 2002. Contractual Renegotiations in Strategic Alliances. Journal of 
Management, 28(1): 47–68. 
Rodan, S., & Galunic, C. 2004. More than network structure: how knowledge heterogeneity 
influences managerial performance and innovativeness. Strategic Management Journal, 
25(6): 541–562. 
Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. 1998. Not So Different After All: A Cross-
Discipline View Of Trust. Academy of Management Review, 23(3): 393–404. 
Rulke, D. L., Zaheer, S., & Anderson, M. H. 2000. Sources of Managers’ Knowledge of 
Organizational Capabilities. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
82(1): 134–149. 
Sako, M. 1992. Prices, quality, and trust: inter-firm relations in Britain and Japan. Cambridge ; 
New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. 
Sako, M., & Helper, S. 1998. Determinants of trust in supplier relations: Evidence from the 
automotive industry in Japan and the United States. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 34(3): 387–417. 
Shah, R. H., & Swaminathan, V. 2008. Factors influencing partner selection in strategic alliances: the 
moderating role of alliance context. Strategic Management Journal, 29(5): 471–494. 
Simon, H. A. 1955. A behavioral theory of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69: 99-
118. 
Spender, J.-C. 1996. Making Knowledge the Basis of a Dynamic Theory of the Firm. Strategic 
Management Journal, 17: 45–62. 
Suddaby, R. 2010. Editor’s Comments: Construct Clarity in Theories of Management and 
Organization. Academy of Management Review, 35(3): 346–357. 
Tsai, W., & Ghoshal, S. 1998. Social Capital and Value Creation: The Role of Intrafirm Networks. 
The Academy of Management Journal, 41(4): 464–476. 
Tsoukas, H. 1996. The Firm as a Distributed Knowledge System: A Constructionist Approach. 
Strategic Management Journal, 17: 11–25. 
 115 
 
Vanneste, B. S., & Puranam, P. 2010. Repeated Interactions and Contractual Detail: Identifying the 
Learning Effect. Organization Science, 21(1): 186–201. 
Vanneste, B. S., Puranam, P., & Kretschmer, T. 2014. Trust over time in exchange relationships: 
Meta-analysis and theory. Strategic Management Journal, 35(12): 1891–1902. 
Weber, L. & Mayer, K. 2011. Designing effective contracts: Exploring the influence of framing and 
expectations. Academy of Management Review, 36: 53-75. 
Wegner, D. M. 1987. Transactive memory: A contemporary analysis of the group mind. In B. Mullen 
& G. R. Goethals (Eds.), Theories of Group Behavior: 185–208. 
Wernerfelt, B. 1997. On the Nature and Scope of the Firm: An Adjustment‐Cost Theory. The Journal 
of Business, 70(4): 489–514. 
Williamson, O. E. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism : firms, markets, relational 
contracting. New York; London: Free Press ; Collier Macmillan. 
Williamson, O. E. 1989. Transaction cost economics. In Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig 
(Ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization: 135–182. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1573448X8901006X, January 11, 2013, 
Elsevier. 
Williamson, O. E. 1991. Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural 
Alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(2): 269–296. 
Williamson, O. E. 1993. Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 36(1): 453–486. 
Williamson, O. E. 1996a. Economic Organization: The Case for Candor. The Academy of 
Management Review, 21(1): 48–57. 
Williamson, O. E. 1996b. The mechanisms of governance. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Williamson, O. E. 2000. The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead. Journal 
of Economic Literature, 38(3): 595–613. 
Wilson, J. M., Goodman, P. S., & Cronin, M. A. 2007. Group Learning. Academy of Management 
Review, 32(4): 1041–1059. 
Winter, S. G. 2003. Understanding dynamic capabilities. Strategic Management Journal, 24(10): 
991–995. 
Zaheer, A., Hernandez, E., & Banerjee, S. 2010. Prior Alliances with Targets and Acquisition 
Performance in Knowledge-Intensive Industries. Organization Science, 21(5): 1072–1091. 
Zaheer, A., & Venkatraman, N. 1995. Relational governance as an interorganizational strategy: An 
empirical test of the role of trust in economic exchange. Strategic Management Journal, 
16(5): 373–392. 
  
 116 
 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
 
  
 117 
 
 
 
 118 
 
  
 119 
 
TABLE 1: MANAGERIAL META-KNOWLEDGE AND RELATED CONSTRUCTS 
 Transactive 
memory 
systems 
Cross-
understanding 
Organizational 
self-knowledge 
Resource 
cognition 
Managerial 
meta-
knowledge 
Definition 
of construct 
“The cooperative 
division of labour 
for learning, 
remembering, and 
communicating 
relevant team 
knowledge.” 
(Lewis, 2003: 
587) 
“A combination 
of the knowledge 
possessed by each 
individual and a 
collective 
awareness of who 
knows what.” 
(Austin, 2003: 
866) 
The ability to 
understand other 
team members’ 
mental 
representations 
The “managers’ 
assessments of the 
capabilities and 
shortcomings of 
their units.” 
(Rulke, Zaheer, 
and Anderson, 
2000: 136) 
“The 
identification 
of resources 
and the 
understanding 
of their 
fungibility” 
(Danneels, 
2010: 26) 
leading to the 
creation of a 
mental model 
The manager’s 
knowledge of the 
knowledge of 
members of the 
organization 
(division, 
business unit, 
department, etc.) 
he manages and 
how this 
knowledge may 
be combined (for 
simplicity, we 
abstract from 
other resources 
than employee 
knowledge) 
Level of 
analysis 
Group Group Individual Individual Individual 
Antecedents 
level 
Individual and 
group  
Individual and 
group 
Type of 
information source  
Indicated for 
additional 
research 
Individual and 
group 
Antecedents Numerous 
antecedents (see 
review by Ren 
and Argote, 2011) 
 
Focuses on the 
implications, 
distinctiveness, 
and potential 
measures of the 
construct 
Type of “learning 
channel” 
Type of 
information source 
Indicated for 
additional 
research 
Individual and 
group 
characteristics; 
network, 
transactive; 
memory system; 
group turnover 
Outcomes 
of interest 
Division of 
cognitive labor, 
learning, 
cooperation 
Learning and 
group product 
quality 
(+ other less 
developed) 
Learning about 
current capabilities 
of the organization 
Learning and 
the inertia of 
changing 
mental models 
Organizational 
economics 
factors 
Discipline Social psychology Management Management Management  
Breadth of 
use 
Wide Very limited Very limited Very limited  
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PROCUREMENT RELATIONS AND MANAGERIAL KNOWLEDGE: 
NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR THE USE OF RELATIONAL CAPITAL 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the effect of strong inter-organizational relations on buyer 
satisfaction, and how this effect is mitigated by the supplier’s managerial meta-
knowledge and by the competitive pressure from alternative suppliers. Strong relations 
allow for easier exchanges of information and cheaper adaptations to changes. It is 
argued that this effect is stronger when the supplier’s manager has more precise 
information to exchange and is better at managing adaptations—both of which are 
affected by his or her knowledge of the team’s capabilities. The building of strong 
inter-organizational relations is an investment that can generate rents for both buyers 
and suppliers. In order for the buyer to appropriate more of this rent, there needs to be 
competitive pressure on the supplier. In extreme cases in which the supplier’s manager 
has little knowledge about his team or those in which there is no competitive pressure, 
there is no mechanism that leads to an effect of relational capital on buyer satisfaction. 
In other words, a supplier’s managerial meta-knowledge and competitive pressure are 
independently necessary conditions for the relational capital effect. These arguments 
are tested on a dataset comprised of archival data on public procurement projects 
combined with a two-sided survey of the public and private parties involved in those 
projects. Public procurement is an interesting research field due to its economic 
importance and the widespread interest in well-functioning governments. From a 
research perspective, it allows for the testing of hypotheses in a multi-organizational 
setting governed by a common regulatory framework.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The strategy problem is that of attempting to estimate the best use of the 
resources in hand. 
Lippman & Rumelt, 2003a: 1083  
When organizations cooperate with external parties, they are dependent on developing good relations 
with those parties. When goods or services are procured from a partner, the governance mechanisms 
that are introduced depend on the properties of the transaction. These mechanisms can be of a formal 
contractual character or of a more informal, relational kind. The length, quality, and type of contract 
depend on several factors. As the extant literature stresses (David & Han, 2004; Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006; Leiblein & Miller, 2003; Williamson, 1985), the contract’s 
characteristics are highly dependent on the characteristics of the object of contracting, such as the 
value of the contract, the level of investments needed, possible other uses of the assets, and 
expectations of similar contracts in the future.  
The development of a relationship makes it easier for the parties to share information, solve 
disputes, and access each other’s knowledge (Das & Teng, 1998, 2000; Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
Elfenbein & Zenger, 2013; Lavie, Haunschild, & Khanna, 2012; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 
1996). An additional factor is often overlooked—the effect of the knowledge held by the managers 
who are drafting and signing the contract. The more a manager knows about the productive 
capabilities of the organization he or she is managing, the more concise the contract can be. This 
arguments is inspired by the line of reasoning within the learning-to-contract literature (Argyres & 
Mayer, 2007; Lumineau, Fréchet, & Puthod, 2011; Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Vanneste & Puranam, 
2010) in which parties improve their abilities to write contracts, both as safeguards and as a reservoirs 
of knowledge of how to deal with potential conflicts. 
 123 
 
The most common form of inter-organizational relation involves the procurement of goods 
and services from external parties. Even though some procurement projects are relatively simple and 
deal with standardized goods and services (e.g., non-technical office supplies or cleaning services), 
many are more complex, such that they require at least some degree of dialogue and cooperation. 
Standard transaction cost logic would suggest that standardized projects that require very few specific 
investments can be carried out in short-term market transactions, while the rest require longer-term, 
more elaborate contracts with safeguards. The likelihood of an elaborate contract is higher in public 
procurement projects because the tender procedures are subject to legal requirements aimed at 
creating a fair and transparent process.  
The procurement projects studied in this paper are all above the threshold for inclusion in the 
EU’s Tender Electronics Daily (TED) database.20 The European Union regulations governing the 
process mean that public procurement sometimes follows a more rigid procedure than procurement 
in private companies. On the one hand, this creates limitations in terms of our ability to learn about 
more flexible procurement processes. On the other hand, it offers the potential for greater 
generalizability, as the overall procedure is held constant across organizations. 
Good inter-organizational relations have positive effects on most kinds of contractual 
relations (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008). However, how this relationship is affected by intra-
organizational factors is more complicated. A common starting point for analyzing the firm is to view 
it as a “nexus of contracts.” This approach has clear analytical advantages and necessary legal 
consequences regarding responsibility, but it fails to consider a key set of agents—the individuals 
who draft and sign the contracts. Those individuals do so based on their knowledge of the firm and 
its capabilities. The importance of such knowledge has previously been explored and discussed 
                                               
20 The threshold is approximately EUR 207,000, although it is higher for certain projects, such as construction 
work. More information on the rules governing public procurement in the EU is provide in the Method section, where I 
discuss how those rules affect the generalizability of the study. 
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(Danneels, 2008, 2011; Rulke, Zaheer, & Anderson, 2000). In this paper, I contribute to this 
discussion by offering a clear definition of and an empirical approach to researching the importance 
of the contracting agent’s knowledge of his or her firm’s capabilities.  
Procurement projects never occur in a vacuum. The contracts agreed upon, and the quality of 
product or service delivered must be judged in comparison with the available alternatives. Price and 
quality differ between markets with many suppliers with overcapacity and markets with a few 
suppliers with limited capacity. This effect needs to be considered when comparing buyers’ 
satisfaction with procurement projects. One challenge lies in the large differences in how competition 
is construed in different research streams—from the asset specificity of transaction cost economics 
to the concentration ratios of industrial organization. This paper introduces a new approach to 
grasping the multidimensional construct of competition by utilizing data that is usually readily 
available to researchers and practitioners alike.  
Overall, the purpose of this paper is threefold. First, it aims to persuade the reader of the value 
of analyzing the knowledge held by the supplier’s manager about his team, which I call managerial 
meta-knowledge. Secondly, it aims to give the question of competition a more central position in 
discussions of inter-organizational relations. Third, it aims to show the promise of a research-based 
dialogue between public procurement and management studies. In this paper, I develop propositions 
from a previous paper (Foss & Jensen, Chapter 3 in this dissertation) into testable hypotheses. I test 
them using a unique dataset on public procurement projects comprised of archival data, and a two-
sided survey of suppliers and buyers. The overarching idea of the paper is that the manager’s decision 
space is determined by his knowledge, while the incentives behind the various choices are defined by 
the competitive pressure from the environment. This paper addresses the following research question: 
How is the effect of relational capital on buyer satisfaction affected by managerial meta-knowledge 
and competitive pressure from alternative suppliers?  
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The two dominant approaches to understanding why and how organizations contract with external 
parties are transaction cost economics (TCE; Williamson, 1985), with its focus on the adaptive 
capabilities of governance mechanisms in combination with the specificity of the assets deployed, 
and the relational view (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006), with its focus on generating relational 
rents by exploring, deploying, and governing different sets of complementary resources (Das & Teng, 
2000). Within this field of research, as in others (e.g., strategic organization; Argyres & Zenger, 
2012), the resource-based arguments and the transaction-cost arguments are being synthesized (e.g., 
Elfenbein & Zenger, 2013). The integration of these research streams revolves around interpreting 
relational rents as a specific form of partner asset specificity (as both streams start by discussing and 
distinguishing between quasi-rents and composite quasi-rents, this is not an area of disagreement). 
Given this insight, this paper argues that two important factors influence relational rent generation; 
1) the managerial knowledge of the parties and 2) the competitive environment of the interaction. The 
two factors are intertwined, as the knowledge of the manager defines his decision space and the 
competitive environment defines the incentives for the various decisions in that space. 
 
Interfirm Relations and Rent Generation 
The standard argument is that companies transact when their assets generate higher rents when 
combined than the sum of the rents from their separate uses (superadditivity).21 When this is the case, 
the assets generating this rent are said to be specific to the relation. This specificity can take many 
forms (most commonly listed as physical, human, time, and site; Williamson, 1991). Whereas many 
TCE studies assume that investments in specific assets happen simultaneously with the choice of 
                                               
21 In the Marshallian tradition, the economic rents generated by such a situation are called composite quasi-rents 
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governance form (Williamson, 1991), the relational view analyzes the development of relation-
specific assets as happening over time (Dyer & Singh, 1998). The latter view offers a more dynamic 
perspective, as it focuses on learning necessary capabilities; setting up formal and informal 
governance mechanisms; learning to write contracts that fit the relationship; and incrementally 
increasing trust in each other, thereby making adaptation faster and smoother. The process of 
developing successful inter-organizational relations entails learning about the right contractual 
governance mechanisms (Argyres & Mayer, 2007; Lumineau et al., 2011), examining possible 
resource combinations (Gulati, Lavie, & Singh, 2009; Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001; 
Wang & Zajac, 2007), and understanding how the relationship’s formal setup influences the 
willingness to share information across organizations (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Mowery et al., 
1996).  
Part of what is learned in a given relationship is general knowledge about how to manage 
inter-organizational relations, while another part is partner specific. Gulati et al. (2009) show that the 
positive effect of partner-specific experiences is greater than the effect of general-partnering 
experience when comparing market returns after partnership announcements. This effect seems to be 
even stronger in relations between firms that are not similar. Prior exposure to a partner means that 
the relationship does not begin from scratch with respect to establishing trust, developing routines, 
and introducing conflict-resolution mechanisms (Carson, Madhok, Varman, & John, 2003; Gulati et 
al., 2009). Prior experience with a partner makes it is easier, ex ante, to assess the inter-organizational 
fit (Li & Rowley, 2002). The general argument is that the effect of partner-specific experiences leads 
to higher quasi-rent generation and, relatedly, to inertia and path dependency in the choice of external 
partners (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Li & Rowley, 2002; Zaheer, Hernandez, & Banerjee, 2010). The 
higher rents and the path dependency are the result of investments into communication channels, 
inter-organizational trust, and common norms; the establishment of formal and informal conflict 
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resolution mechanisms; and knowledge about the supplier’s capabilities, routines, and product or 
services (as well as investments in complementary physical assets). The ability to generate higher 
rents based on strong inter-organizational relations is often construed as a matter of relational capital.  
When theorizing about relational capital and developing relevant research designs, we must 
remember that repeated interactions are not necessarily an indicator of relational capital. They can 
just as well be the result of market conditions in which only few firms have the necessary investments 
in place or due to entry barriers that stop other firms from competing. As the data behind this study 
show, prior relations strongly predict future relations. Overall, a strong inter-organizational 
relationship allows the parties to better share information, build trust, and put aside minor 
disagreements. It also increases the partner’s willingness to adapt. When working with an external 
supplier, these are all desirable characteristics that increase the likelihood of successful projects. This 
leads to the first hypothesis, which serves as our baseline hypothesis because of its uncontroversial 
nature:  
Hypothesis 1: Relational capital is positively associated with buyer satisfaction.  
 
Managerial Meta-Knowledge 
The most common explanations for when and how firms build lasting relations with external parties 
focus on the transaction’s properties (Williamson, 1985), the resources and capabilities available to 
the firm and its partner (Gibbons & Henderson, 2012; Hoopes, Madsen, & Walker, 2003; Wang & 
Zajac, 2007; Wernerfelt, 1984), strong inter-organization relations supported by good governance 
mechanisms (Elfenbein & Zenger, 2013; Lavie, 2006; Lavie et al., 2012), and the ability of a party to 
add value in a value chain (Chatain, 2011). An overlooked factor is the knowledge needed to 
transform resources and capabilities into valuable assets. The argument put forth in this paper is that 
an important antecedent is the knowledge held by the supplier’s manager. This knowledge matters 
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both ex ante and ex post contracting. The knowledge held by the supplier’s manager is important 
when assessing whether the organization has the capabilities needed to deliver the contracted good 
or service (regardless of whether it is a simple or complex task), when managing day-to-day 
operations, and in relation to decision-making authority. The ability to assess and manage the firm’s 
capabilities depends on the knowledge of the responsible manager(s) at the supplier firm.  
The mental models of managers reflect the small world they evaluate and in which they act 
(Danneels, 2011; Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Foss & Klein, 2012; Gary & Wood, 2011; Hodgkinson & 
Johnson, 1994; Mahoney, 1995). Fundamentally, the idea is that both the external environment and 
internal organizational capabilities are interpreted by a manager in order to develop and deploy those 
capabilities in relation to external opportunities. Danneels (2011) argues for “resource cognition”—
the manager possesses clear mental models outlining the use of organizational resources. Other 
management scholars focus on similar issues regarding the manager’s understanding of the 
capabilities of his or her organization, such as cross-understanding (Huber & Lewis, 2010) and 
organizational self-knowledge (Rulke et al., 2000). In social psychology, a related concept is that of 
transactive memory systems, which are “[t]he cooperative division of labour for learning, 
remembering, and communicating relevant team knowledge” (Lewis, 2003: 587). When working 
together, an understanding of the competences of teammates offers a number of advantages, even 
though this understanding is rarely (if ever) perfect (Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000; Ren & Argote, 
2011; Wegner, 1987). Empirical research also shows that this is not a task-specific effect, as this 
knowledge can be applied in new projects (Lewis, Lange, & Gillis, 2005). The ability to assess the 
internal capabilities of a firm affects contractual relations with external parties, as a precise 
understanding of the organizational capabilities allows a manager to write more concise contracts, to 
deliver more accurate budgets for projects, and to develop relatively better bids and offers for 
potential customers.  
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This line of argument is explored in more depth in a related paper (Foss & Jensen, Chapter 3 
in this dissertation). The concept of “managerial meta-knowledge” is introduced in order to help us 
grasp the phenomenon. Managerial meta-knowledge is the manager’s knowledge of the knowledge 
held by organizational members that she manages and how that knowledge may be combined.22 
Precise managerial meta-knowledge (i.e., an understanding of the actual capabilities of the 
organization) offers several advantages when dealing with an external customer both ex ante and ex 
post. When writing bids and contracts, precise meta-knowledge allows the manager to better judge 
the production costs and to foresee more potential problems. This allows the supplier to develop 
lower-priced bids because less risk needs to be included in the price. Furthermore, managerial meta-
knowledge allows a manager to more easily adapt a project to ex ante unforeseen events. Alternative 
combinations of resources are already known by the manager (Danneels, 2011), and resources can be 
redeployed to their most productive use in the face of unforeseen events. This leads to the second 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The more precise managerial meta-knowledge a supplier’s manager 
has, the better the procurement project will perform. 
Strong inter-organizational relations make it easier to mitigate potential problems that may 
arise, and to tailor goods or services if needed (Elfenbein & Zenger, 2013). I propose that this effect 
is stronger when dealing with partners with more precise managerial meta-knowledge. I make this 
argument regarding the effect of more (or less) precise managerial meta-knowledge based on the three 
most common mechanisms suggested in the interfirm-relations literature: trust building, the 
establishment of governance mechanisms, and information sharing.  
                                               
22 By focusing on managerial meta-knowledge, I do not discount the importance of other kinds of managerial 
knowledge, such as knowledge of rules and regulations affecting the business, knowledge of customer preferences, or 
knowledge of financial control systems or market trends. The focus is on a specific kind of knowledge that is of pivotal 
importance when managing distributed knowledge.  
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Trust is often mentioned as both an outcome and an antecedent of successful relations. The 
concept of trust has been analyzed numerous ways, although such analyses usually focus on the 
willingness to be vulnerable “based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of 
another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998: 395). Distinguishing between intentions and 
behavior allows us to distinguish between benevolence-based trust and competence-based trust 
(Ganesan, 1994; Levin & Cross, 2004; Sako, 1992; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). While benevolence-
based trust is completely a matter of intentions and, therefore, fundamentally unknowable, 
competence-based trust is trust in the other party’s ability to do as promised. In contractual relations, 
it is easier to hold competence-based trust in a partner that has more precise knowledge about the 
capabilities of his firm.23 In other words, dealing with a supplier with high levels of managerial meta-
knowledge helps build interfirm trust.  
The strength of the tie between the contracting parties carries important information about 
several areas that are key during the initial contracting phase and thereafter. In the initial contracting 
phase, the elements that are codified in the contract are not only affected by the ability of information 
to flow between the parties but also by the quality of that information. More precise managerial meta-
knowledge allows the supplier to better judge its capabilities and, thereby, write more precise 
contracts. Empirical studies of contractual learning show that contracts are dependent on the 
knowledge of the contracting parties, who codify parts of what they learn about inter-organizational 
dealings in contracts (Argyres & Mayer, 2007; Lumineau et al., 2011). Throughout the contractual 
relationship, factors and events not foreseen in the codified contract can emerge and require 
adaptations. Williamson (1991) offers a concise way to theorize about this problem.  
Whenever the supplier’s manager is involved in adaptive processes, his or her knowledge 
about the firm’s capabilities establishes the epistemic boundaries for his potential actions. A 
                                               
23 This potentially adds an additional epistemic layer—knowledge about the partner’s knowledge—that is outside 
the scope of this paper. 
 131 
 
manager’s knowledge of his or her subordinates creates an advantage in terms of knowing their 
capabilities, and in terms of knowing how to incentivize and manage them. When inter-organizational 
relations are set up, they can be used to solve conflicts and adapt to change when contractors have 
clear knowledge of their firms’ capabilities. 
In summary, a good relationship between contracting partners allows buyers to take better 
advantage of the supplier’s capabilities. This leads to the third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The positive effect of relational capital on buyer satisfaction is enhanced by 
the level of the supplier’s managerial meta-knowledge. 
 
Relational Capital and Alternative Suppliers  
While the direct effect of competition and bargaining position is well researched, we do not have a 
clear understanding of how having multiple alternative suppliers affects the use of relational capital. 
The availability of alternative suppliers is important as a matter of contingency planning and in order 
to strengthen one’s bargaining position. The two main approaches to analyzing the effect of 
alternative suppliers on a transaction are to focus on asset specificity or on value generation. The 
conclusions from both approaches are somewhat similar—having alternative suppliers is an 
advantage for the buyer. To understand the effect of having multiple alternative suppliers on the use 
of relational capital, we must understand how the presence of alternative suppliers defines the 
opportunity costs for the buyer and determines the incentives for suppliers. 
The assets supporting a transaction can be more or less specific. In other words, they differ in 
terms of the level of quasi-rents generated (i.e., the difference between the generated rent and the 
second-best use; Alchian, 2008; Riordan, 2008). The monetary value created in the context of a 
relationship is then split between the parties according to each party’s ability to use its assets in other 
transactions. Therefore, before one part will be willing to invest in a specific asset, a contractual 
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safeguard is needed. As discussed above, the extant literature construes relational capital as a form of 
“interfirm relation-specific assets” (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Assets with a relation-specific premium 
are less likely to be used in alternative settings, as they create relatively more value in the focal 
transaction than in any other. From a buyer’s perspective, alternative suppliers are desirable, as the 
potential for using their assets in alternative transactions is higher, which limits the threats of hold-
ups.  
The value-capture analysis (Brandenburger & Stuart, 1996, 2007; MacDonald & Ryall, 2004) 
attempts to drop the opportunity cost argument inherent in the quasi-rent approach and replace it with 
the notion of payment for resources (Lippman & Rumelt, 2003b).24 The ensuing division of payments 
between the resources’ owners depends on co-specialization and bargaining power. The cooperative 
game theory framework provides a formal way of showing the influence of both upstream and 
downstream competitive situations. In this approach, there is no assumption that assets are being used 
in the best way. Rather, the assumption is that they are being used in the best possible discovered way 
(Lippman & Rumelt, 2003a). In this regard, the discovery of new partners and resource combinations 
plays a key role in the competitive process, as the presence of alternative suppliers allows the focal 
actor to change suppliers if one supplier tries to appropriate more value than it adds.  
In order to understand how relational capital and the presence of alternative suppliers affect 
public procurement, we must look at the stages of a public procurement project. When a project is 
specified, an invitation for tenders is sent out and private firms can submit their bids. As submitting 
an offer for a public tender carries a cost, we can assume that the bidder believes it has assets that 
make it possible to win the bid. When the most economic bid or the one with the lowest price is 
chosen, a contract is agreed upon with the winning company (or companies). The static approach is 
to perceive this as a relation that will last until the good or service is provided or the contract expires 
                                               
24 The focus here is on the Lippman and Rumelt (2003b) version of the value-capture approach because these 
authors make the most ambitious attempt to provide another foundation for thinking about value in competitive situations.  
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(unless one party dishonors the contract). The dynamic approach is to think about the procurement 
relation as one of constant bargaining over the value created in the relation. The buyer can make 
additional, small requests or minor changes to the original contract (that are not costly enough to lead 
to a renegotiation of the contract), and the buyer can slack on some project specifications and areas 
that are not covered by the (always incomplete) contract. As specified in the TCE and value-capture 
literature, the extent to which this kind of opportunistic behavior is possible is determined by the 
alternative partners available. The choice between leaving a contractual relationship or forcing a 
renegotiation of the contract should be viewed from the perspective of alternative uses of the assets. 
Even if the relational capital is in place, there are still opportunity costs of using informal 
relational governance mechanisms. Therefore, they will only be used when the expected gains are 
higher than the costs. As the incentives for providing better performance are stronger in more 
competitive environments, such environments affect the use of relational governance mechanisms. 
The buyer will shift suppliers when the gain from striking a better deal is higher than the sunk costs 
of abandoning the current contractual obligations (i.e., the costs of specific assets guarded by the 
contract). One (relatively cheap) way for the current supplier to mitigate this risk is to use its assets 
to the best of its abilities (the same conclusion can be reached the evolutionary way, e.g., Alchian, 
1950, by arguing that the firms that do not optimize the use of their assets are outcompeted). One of 
these assets is relational capital. As such, we would expect a greater positive effect of relational capital 
on buyer satisfaction in environments with many competing suppliers.  
A different argument for the same effect is to think about the boundary conditions of trust, 
which is one part of the multidimensional concept of relational capital. Even though the focus on trust 
between transactional partners may “hid[e] other ‘real problems’” (Bierly III & Gallagher, 2007: 
142), much of the literature points to the key role played by trust in mitigating opportunism-driven 
contingencies. In particular, research highlights the importance of the multidimensional construct of 
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trust in inter-organizational relation governance (Bierly III & Gallagher, 2007; Das & Teng, 1998, 
2001; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2009; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). Despite 
differences in trust typologies and the invoked mechanisms (for an overview, see Vanneste, Puranam, 
& Kretschmer, 2014), the majority of the extant research agrees that the presence of trust reduces the 
likelihood of costly ex post haggling and opportunistic behavior, and enhances performance. This is 
true regardless of the governance form (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008) but not regardless of the 
competitive environment. A market with multiple potential suppliers makes it relatively safer to trust 
the extant supplier, as that supplier knows it can more easily be replaced than in uncompetitive 
environments. In other words, it is easier to trust a supplier in an environment where it is less likely 
that the supplier will act opportunistically. Even though one could argue that “[c]alculative trust is a 
contradiction in terms” (Williamson, 1993: 463), the empirical research documenting the effect of 
trust on governance is so extensive (see the reviews mentioned above) that we must start considering 
the boundary conditions for trustworthiness, and how they are affected by formal contractual 
relationships (Lazzarini, Miller, & Zenger, 2004; North, 1990) and overall market conditions.  
These two arguments—the competitive pressure for optimizing the use of relational capital 
and the conditions for trustworthiness—lead us to the same hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The effect of relational capital on buyer satisfaction is greater when there are 
many alternative suppliers in the market. 
 
Alternative Suppliers and Market Concentration 
As argued above, the availability of alternative suppliers matters for buyer satisfaction. This way of 
construing competitive pressure comes from a specific tradition of thinking about competition. 
Another way is the influential industrial organization approach, which is focused on the structure of 
the market. One factor overlooked in the focus on alternative suppliers and asset specificity is the 
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heterogeneity in firms’ abilities to use their market power to affect price setting. The industrial 
organization literature represents one of the disciplinary origins of the strategic management field 
and, thus, the analysis of competitive pressure has been central to the field (Hansen & Wernerfelt, 
1989; Porter, 1981). Market concentration (the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) is added as a control 
variable in this study. However, due to the project-level perspective adopted in this study, we are also 
able to add the number of alternative suppliers competing for the tender. This is somewhat outside 
the industrial organization research program, which is focused on the market level (for an overview, 
see Schmalensee, 1989). In line with the industrial organization argument, we expect higher average 
profits in oligopolistic industries. Moreover, we expect higher average buyer satisfaction in projects 
for which the tenders receive many offers despite being in a market with relatively little competition. 
In markets that are already competitive and not concentrated, the specific numbers of alternative 
suppliers should not matter as much. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: In concentrated markets, the number of alternative suppliers has a positive effect 
on buyer satisfaction.  
[ - FIGURE 1 - ] 
METHOD 
The hypotheses are tested on a dataset containing register data on public procurement projects 
tendered from 2010 to 2014 combined with data from matched surveys of the public buyers and the 
private suppliers in these projects. The surveys were undertaken in late 2014 to early 2015. The 
surveys were sent to the assigned contact persons in the projects, who were often the responsible 
project managers. The cover letter instructed the recipient to forward the email to the project manager 
if he or she did not have that role. Moreover, respondents were asked to provide their official title as 
a check. 
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The empirical setting being public procurement introduces both limitations and possibilities. 
Much extant research on supplier collaboration has been gathered in specific industries or with a 
single firm as the focal actor. The ambition of this study is to explore effects across industries and 
firms. The public procurement setting contains public buyers, which are organized in different ways 
and in organizations of different sizes. All of the public buyers are governed by the same set of rules 
regarding tendering behavior. This allows for generalizations beyond single firms or single 
organizational forms. The tender process is relatively open and governed by EU regulations that 
require the public party to provide transparent decision criteria. Furthermore, as the procurement 
projects included in this study were tendered by Danish officials, we would expect the risk of 
corruption to be very small. Overall, these conditions should allow us to generalize about procurement 
relations in competitive environments across organizations. 
Public procurement in Denmark is regulated through the implementation of common EU 
regulations. These rules govern all procurement projects pertaining to public law that are above the 
threshold value, which is approximately EUR 207,000 for most projects, although it is higher for 
construction work. All public procurement projects governed by these regulations must be reported 
to a common EU database—the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED). For tenders in open competition, 
the calls for tenders are sent to TED when released.25 After a supplier is chosen, the buyer has 30 
days to send a contract-award notice to the TED with information about the choice of supplier and a 
number of additional details, including the type of project, the tender procedure used, the number of 
offers received, and (usually) the value of the contract. The resulting TED entry also contains 
information on contact persons for both of the contracting parties. I used this information to gather 
the survey data used for this paper.  
                                               
25 Non-competitive tenders are only allowed in very specific circumstances.  
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The units of analysis are the procurement project and the parties involved. The sample 
contains all Danish public procurement projects announced in TED between May 2010 and March 
2014. I removed all framework agreements from this sample, as they are governed in ways that are 
significantly different from those used in the procurement of other goods and services. This left a 
sample of 5,296 tender projects from TED. In situations where contracts were signed with numerous 
different suppliers in a single tender, the first (and often the primary) supplier was chosen as the focal 
actor. From this set, I drew all available and functional email-addresses for the assigned contact 
persons.26 As each respondent could be responsible for multiple procurement projects, I created a 
filter to avoid sending multiple emails to individual respondents. When the same contact email was 
indicated for several procurement projects, I chose a random project for the survey (this could affect 
the sample, as larger organizations are more likely to have these duplicates; this possibility is explored 
in the non-response analysis). This gave an efficient survey sample size of 1,993 unique public email 
addresses and 525 unique private email addresses. This difference in contact-data availability (or 
quality) was mitigated by sending out the two surveys in serial and asking the public side for the 
email address of the supplier’s project manager, creating a total of 817 functional, unique email 
contacts on the private side.  
The respondents were all contacted via email, and all of the survey answers were provided 
using an online system. The email contained the name and title of the specific project to be surveyed, 
as well as the name of the supplier. This allowed the respondent to identify the procurement project. 
Both the email and the survey were available in Danish and English, and the vast majority chose to 
respond to the Danish version. The cover letter in the email instructed the respondent to forward the 
email to the person with project responsibility if the original recipient did not have that role. In 
addition, respondents were asked about their role in the project in order to rule out irrelevant 
                                               
26 I removed obvious non-relevant addresses and addresses with instant bounces. 
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responses. Furthermore, the emails to the private suppliers included a link to the procurement project 
in the TED database.27 
After sending out the invitations to the survey, the respondents were given two weeks to 
answer before I sent out a reminder email. I sent two sets of reminders. 640 responses were gathered 
from the public buyers (response rate of 32%), while 268 were received from the private suppliers 
(response rate of 33%). There were 138 matched responses. After dropping observations with missing 
data and only including projects that involved three or more employees28 on the supplier side, the 
final sample size was 89.29  
Non-response biases  
The archival data and the two-sided survey made it possible to check whether the matched responders 
were similar to the rest of the population. The non-response tests were done by comparing the final 
matched sample with the underlying population using the archival TED data. In addition, the two sets 
of survey-data were used to analyze whether a decision to participate in the survey by either party 
correlated with any of the measured quantities. Together, the three data sources allow us to detect 
differences between the different samples and the final matched sample. The TED data covers the 
entire population of procurement projects, while the two surveys are two partially overlapping subsets 
of that population. The statistical tests applied are a t-test, a chi-squared test, and a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for the non-normally distributed continuous variables. 
The non-response tests show some notable differences between the underlying population and 
the analyzed sample, which create some limitations for the generalizability of the study. There are a 
number of statistically significant differences between the matched survey sample and the underlying 
population in the TED database. These differences suggest that individuals involved in certain kinds 
                                               
27 I only became aware of this possibility after sending the emails to the public side.  
28 This is the size at which dyadic relations become group relations. 
29 In a study with two-sided matched samples, this sample size is within the normal range (e.g., 124 in Luo, 2005, 
and 78 in Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002. 
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of projects might be more willing to participate than those involved in others. The projects surveyed 
are somewhat similar in value, although the difference is statistically significant (means of DKK 15.3 
million and DKK 14.9 million when logged; means of DKK 16.7 million and DKK18.6 million when 
not logged; the medians are both DKK 3.4 million). Additionally, the surveyed projects are generally 
from smaller, less competitive markets, , less likely to be the procurement of “supply” (contrary to 
construction works and services; 18 % of respondents were involved in supply projects; supply 
projects covered 37% of the population), are more likely to use restricted tendering procedure (as 
opposed to completely open; 56 % of respondents and 38 % of the population), and the supplier was 
more likely to be chosen based on cost as well as additional criteria (72 % of respondents and 59 % 
of the population).30 Together, these findings imply that those procurement project managers who 
responded were more likely to be responsible for projects that had more specific selection criteria 
than just price and more likely to engage potential suppliers in more ways than just asking them to 
submit bids. 
An exploration of the differences between the observations in which both buyer and supplier 
completed the survey and observations in which only one party did so offers us an idea of whether 
the decision to participate in the survey was influenced by the measured quantities. To ensure that the 
buyer’s decision to participate was not influenced by the relationship with the supplier (i.e., that those 
with good relations were more likely to answer), I tested for differences between the relational capital 
in procurement projects in which only the supplier responded and those in which both parties 
responded. There is no significant difference between these groups, meaning that the relationship 
does not affect the likelihood of participating. I achieve the same result when looking at relational 
capital as reported by the buyer. Moreover, the same is true for the level of managerial meta-
knowledge, unforeseen contingencies, and asset specificity. 
                                               
30 Furthermore, the average number of projects procured by the buyer is higher in the population than in the sample. 
As discussed above, this is predictable due to the need to avoid sending multiple email-invitations to the same respondent.  
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An analysis of differences in reported buyer satisfaction reveals a small but statistically 
significant difference between those procurement projects in which only the public buyer responded 
and those in which the supplier also responded. On average, projects for which a supplier answered 
were better performers than those not covered by a supplier response (mean scores of 3.8 and 4.0, 
respectively), suggesting a higher willingness to participate in survey research when customers were 
satisfied.  
In order to understand whether the same mechanisms affect the buyer, I analyzed how 
supplier-reported project satisfaction differs between those observations in which only the supplier 
responded and those in which the buyer also responded. There is no statistically significant difference 
between the two groups, suggesting that the buyer’s decision to participate was not influenced by the 
supplier’s level of satisfaction with the project.  
This analysis of non-response biases highlights two main considerations. First, there are a 
number of differences between the final matched sample and the underlying population. These 
differences are probably driven by project managers being more likely to answer surveys about 
procurement projects that required more of their attention. This suggests a need to be careful when 
drawing conclusions about more rudimentary types of procurement projects. Second, some of the 
evidence suggests that suppliers were more likely to participate when the survey focused on a 
successful project. This is not surprising and is a common challenge in these kinds of studies. 
Nevertheless, the difference is not very large (approximately 0.25 of a standard deviation in buyer 
satisfaction) and should not be cause for concern.   
Despite these reservations, the study is still representative of a large group of important 
procurement projects. Furthermore, the analysis of differences in the survey answers from the public 
side and the private side suggests that the decision to respond was not driven by the quality of the 
buyer-supplier relationship. I discuss the issue of generalizability in detail in the discussion section. 
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Measures 
The questionnaire was kept relatively short, such that the median duration for answering was 15 
minutes for both suppliers and buyers. The mail inviting the participants to fill out the survey 
contained both an English and a Danish version. The questionnaire itself was also available in both 
in Danish and English. All measures were pre-tested on a small subset of the population. Phone calls 
were made to these test respondents afterwards in order to resolve unclear formulations and to ensure 
that the questions had been read as intended. All items are reported in the Appendix. 
 Dependent variable: The dependent variable is buyer project satisfaction as reported by the 
public buyer. The measure used in this study, which was developed and used in previous studies 
(Poppo & Zenger, 1998; Zenger, Lazzarini, & Poppo, 2002), consists of three items: one measuring 
satisfaction with overall costs, one covering the overall quality, and one covering the supplier’s 
responsiveness to problems and inquiries. These items were placed near the end of the questionnaire 
in order to avoid creating a successful/unsuccessful framing effect. The alpha coefficient (0.85) 
suggests that this is a consistent set of indicators. The measure fits well with the wide range of 
different types of projects in the sample. Moreover, it is a satisfaction measure that fits well with 
project management’s focus on cost, time, and quality. There is no item on time overrun in this set of 
measures, as not all projects in the sample include a final project that was to be delivered before a 
deadline (e.g., some involved services that were to be delivered repeatedly over a given time period). 
In combination, the three items measure the buyer’s satisfaction with the procurement project. This 
is the only variable of interest measured on the buyer’s side. It serves to mitigate the challenge of 
common method bias and creates a more reliable analysis. 
Independent variables: Managerial meta-knowledge is a difficult concept to operationalize, 
as it aims to capture the manager’s unobservable epistemic state. Researchers in social psychology 
have developed methods for quantitative research on knowledge about other people’s knowledge 
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within groups. Within research on transactive memory systems (Wegner, 1987), two scales exist for 
measuring and assessing transactions within the group’s memory system (Austin, 2003; Lewis, 2003). 
One of these (Lewis, 2003) is used in this study to explore the manager’s knowledge about the 
organizational members’ knowledge. Even though this measure was designed for application to 
multiple group members, it has also been used on single, key individuals (Heavey & Simsek, 2015) 
to grasp their level of knowledge about the rest of the group members.  
The measure consists of 15 items organized into three latent constructs: credibility, 
specialization, and coordination. All three factors are necessary but not sufficient indicators of a 
group’s internal knowledge-sharing and knowledge-accessing systems (Lewis & Herndon, 2011). 
Without knowledge of the team members’ specializations, it does not matter if a manager finds team 
members credible or if a manger has good coordination skills. Knowledge of team members’ 
specialized abilities is necessary in order to combine their skill sets. Overall, the items capture the 
manager’s level of trust in the knowledge of his employees (credibility), the manager’s ability to 
identify special skills in individual group members (specialization), and the manager’s ability to 
organize the group’s resources (coordination). The questions were only posed to those respondents 
who indicated that they had worked in groups of three or more people. The number of employees in 
the team is also added as a control variable.  
The scale consisting of the three constructs (each with five questions) was developed to form 
one overarching construct. To check that the items follow this pattern, I carried out a factor analysis 
and calculated the Cronbach alpha coefficients for the latent construct. The Cronbach alpha is highest 
when loading all items on a single construct (alpha: 0.79), while the individual constructs all have 
similar alpha coefficients (ranging from 0.69 to 0.78). A principal component factor analysis with 
varimax rotation of the 15 items reveals a pattern that nearly as expected, although there are four 
factors with an eigenvalue greater than one (the fourth is 1.05). Three of the factors follow the three 
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latent constructs, while the fourth loads primarily on a reversed item and two associated items. Some 
cross-loading is common when using reversed items (Swain, Weathers, & Niedrich, 2008; Weijters, 
Geuens, & Schillewaert, 2009) and should not be cause for concern. Overall, the factor analysis and 
the alpha coefficients suggest that the managerial meta-knowledge construct’s items correlate as we 
would expect for a latent construct with three latent sub-constructs.  
 To measure relational capital, I modified a scale developed by Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter 
(2000).31 There are two differences between this scale and the original scale. Kale, Singh, and 
Perlmutter’s scale is about alliances, while this one is about projects. In addition, the original scale 
consists of five items asking about the characteristics of interactions with the partner. In an attempt 
to disentangle the effect of managerial- and operational-level relational capital, I asked Kale, Singh, 
and Perlmutter’s five questions about the managerial and operational levels separately. A principal 
component factor analysis suggested that the ten items can be grouped in three factors with 
eigenvalues or more than one. One was primarily comprised of four items—two from the managerial 
level and two from the operational level. The two other factors mainly consisted of three items each 
from either the managerial or operational level. Overall, the factor analysis suggests that there is some 
overlap between the two levels, which creates some concern about using the items to measure two 
levels. If we look at them as one construct, the alpha of the ten items is 0.84, which indicates good 
internal consistency. The statistical analysis in this paper applies the items this way. As I include both 
levels in a single composite construct instead of using only one level, the construct captures the 
average level of relational capital regardless of the level. This is advantageous when comparing a 
very diverse set of projects—some are more dependent on good managerial-level relations, while 
others are useful for operational-level relations.  
                                               
31 They reference a number of other articles using similar items. 
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The number of alternative suppliers that submitted an offer for a tender is reported in the TED 
database. The buyer must report this information to the TED database shortly after a supplier has 
been chosen. The use of this kind of archival data as an indicator has strengths and weaknesses. For 
example, not every firm submitting an offer is necessarily able to complete the task. On the other 
hand, as there is a cost associated with bidding (sometimes a substantial cost), firms only submit bids 
when they believe they have a chance of winning. In other words, there is an incentive for only 
qualified suppliers to bids, which gives a good measure the number of alternative suppliers. In order 
to ensure that the results are not driven by a few outliers, the reported parameter estimates are based 
on a variable in which all numbers of alternative suppliers higher than 10 are set equal to 10.32 The 
regressions were also carried out using an unmodified variable, and the results were the same.  
The tender market concentration ratio was calculated using the entire TED dataset. Each 
market was defined using the tender’s primary CPV (common procurement vocabulary) code. As 
CPV codes are used by buyers and supplier to identify each other, all parties have a strong incentive 
to carefully select the most relevant codes. This means that the CPV code is a reliable way of 
identifying tender markets. This market definition makes it possible to calculate the market share of 
each supplier as well as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for each market. 
Control variables. Supplier asset specificity is measured using a scale adapted from Lunnan 
and Haugland (2008) and Reuer and Ariño (2002). In order to analyze the effects of competition and 
relational capital, we must also take the asset’s level of specificity into account, as suggested in 
transaction cost research. The items capture both human capital and physical asset specificity at the 
supplier. The alpha coefficient of 0.87 suggests a reliable measure.  
The measurement of the buyer’s reported unforeseen contingencies is a challenge, as it 
depends on the difference between expectations and actual outcomes. In this survey, I measure the 
                                               
32 The results do not change when this is the case. In addition, this cutoff creates a total of four observations with 
ten alternative suppliers. 
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outcome of unforeseen contingencies. In other words, I examine situations requiring adaptations. This 
control is designed to capture some of the random events that can affect the buyer’s satisfaction with 
the project. The four questions used for this measure relate to challenges arising from complexity, the 
need to obtain new competencies, the need to redefine the project plan, and whether there were any 
noteworthy surprises. As the effect of such unforeseen contingencies can materialize on either side 
of the relationship, the four questions were asked of the buyer. The alpha of this measure is 0.86, 
suggesting a reliable and consistent measure.  
Furthermore, in order to check whether the results are driven by characteristics associated 
with a specific type of tender and the different procedures they entail, I controlled for a number of 
process characteristics. First, tender procedures can range from completely open calls for tenders to 
procedures with more restricted access, such as those based on pre-qualification or available by 
invitation only. I added a binary control variable to indicate the effect of completely open competition. 
Second, the discretionary power of the buyer is affected by whether the supplier is chosen based only 
on price or on price together with a number of quality characteristics. Therefore, I included another 
binary variable covering whether tenders had quality-based evaluation criteria. Data for both binary 
variables were collected from the TED database. 
The complete TED population from which the sample was drawn was used to create a control 
variable for prior relations between the buyer and the supplier. This variable is constructed as the 
count of the number of such instances. 
Moreover, when dealing with managerial meta-knowledge, the size of the project team may 
matter. Therefore, the (supplier’s) questionnaire included a measurement of the number of employees 
involved in the procurement project in the supplier’s organization. 
 As a number of the surveyed projects were completed months or years prior to the 
survey, there are risks of a retrospective bias and of being overly optimistic at the beginning of a 
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project. In an attempt to control for these effects, two variables were constructed. One counted the 
months since the end of the project. This variable took a negative value for projects not yet completed. 
The other variable took a value from 0 to 1 indicating the time-wise completion percentage of the 
project.  
Procurement projects of high value are often associated with a number of issues that are not 
as prevalent in smaller projects. These projects are typically bigger in many dimensions, and they 
may be more complex. Due to their financial importance, they are often subject to a different degree 
of managerial attention from both the buyer and the supplier. A contract value variable was therefore 
created to capture some of these effects. For some projects, the value of the contract was indicated in 
the TED database. As the TED database suffered from missing values to a high degree, respondents 
were also asked to indicate the value of the contract in the survey. These responses together with the 
TED data formed the variable—logged contract value in millions of DKK. 
Organizational experience is commonly used as a control variable due to learning effects. It 
also captures some of the effects of organizational size. Two variables were created to count the 
number of times a given buyer or supplier was listed in the TED database as having signed a contract. 
The size of the tender market itself can have an effect—a good reputation on a larger market is more 
valuable. To control for this, a variable was created containing the logged value (millions of DKK) 
of all contracts in a given market (using three-digit CPV codes). A last control variable indicated 
whether the procurement project primarily involved a service, a good, or construction work. Data for 
this variable were gathered from the TED data.   
 
[ - TABLE 1 - ] 
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ANALYSIS 
The hypotheses are tested using ordinary least squares models. All of the continuous independent 
variables are centered at the mean. Mean values, standard deviations, and correlations are reported in 
Table 1. The predicted variable is the buyer’s project satisfaction as reported by the buyer’s side of 
the procurement project. Three models are reported: one with only controls, the next with controls 
and the main variables, and a final model including interaction effects. The overall fit of Model 3 is 
good (f-statistic of 0.001). None of the models suffer from variance inflation (no single item VIF of 
more than 4.15 and no mean VIF of more than 2.1). The residuals of the models are almost normally 
distributed, with only one mild outlier (using Hamilton’s Interquantil range (IQR) Stata command).  
 
[ - TABLE 2 - ] 
 
The regression models lend support to the baseline hypothesis (H1) that there is a positive 
association between relational capital and buyer satisfaction. This is not surprising, as the relationship 
is well established in the literature, but it does lend some external validity to the study. This effect is 
stable in all of the models and it is highly statistical significant (P < 0.01). In the final model, the 
effect of a one standard deviation increase in relational capital is, on average, associated with a quarter 
of a standard deviation increase in buyer satisfaction.  
The second hypothesis (H2) suggests a direct effect of the supplier’s managerial meta-
knowledge on the buyer’s satisfaction. This hypothesis is not supported by the data, suggesting that 
other factors need to be taken into account before meta-knowledge matters. I discuss this finding in 
the discussion section. 
I find empirical support for the third hypothesis (H3), which proposes an interaction effect 
between relational capital and managerial meta-knowledge. This effect is positive and significant (P 
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= 0.013 when it is the only interaction; P = 0.016 with all interactions included). Figure 2a shows the 
effect of relational capital at plus/minus one standard deviation of managerial meta-knowledge. The 
effect of relational capital is significantly stronger at higher levels of managerial meta-knowledge, 
which supports Hypothesis 3. When looking at the interaction, it becomes clear that when managerial 
meta-knowledge is around one standard deviation below the mean, the level of relational capital has 
no statistically significant effect on buyer satisfaction. On the other hand, when the level of 
managerial meta-knowledge rises, so does the effect of relation capital on buyer satisfaction. This 
occurs to such a degree that when the managerial meta-knowledge is one standard deviation above 
the mean, a positive one standard deviation change in relational capital results in half a standard 
deviation change in buyer satisfaction. In other words, the effect of relational capital is dependent on 
the level of managerial meta-knowledge to such an extent that it can cancel its effect or enhance it 
greatly.  
The fourth hypothesis (H4) is supported (P = 0.040)—the positive effect of relational capital 
on buyer satisfaction is stronger when there are many alternative suppliers. In the final model, when 
there is a high number of alternative suppliers (+1 standard deviation), the effect of having one 
standard deviation higher relational capital is, on average associated with half a standard deviation 
increase in buyer satisfaction. This is graphed in Figure 2b. After calculating the slope of relational 
capital dependent on alternative suppliers, we see that the effect is only statistically significant when 
there are four or more alternative suppliers (for a graphical representation, see Figure 3b). In other 
words, the effect of relational capital on buyer satisfaction is dependent on a competitive environment 
with multiple alternative suppliers. 
The fifth hypothesis (H5) is also supported. The number of alternative suppliers only matters 
when the market is relatively non-competitive (concentrated). In this situation, there is a positive 
effect between number of offers and the buyer’s satisfaction. When the market concentration is high 
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(a little less than +1 standard deviation), two extra offers (i.e., one standard deviation) will, on 
average, lead to an increase in buyer satisfaction of about 45% of one standard deviation. When the 
market concentration is very low (e.g., when there are many firms with similar market shares), there 
is no significant effect of having alternative suppliers bidding for the project. The effect becomes 
significant (and positive) when the market is more concentrated (see Figure 2c for a graphical 
representation). In other words, having alternative suppliers matters only in markets where the market 
structure does not ensure competitive pressure. 
 
[ - FIGURE 2a - ] 
[ - FIGURE 2b - ] 
[ - FIGURE 2c - ] 
 
Endogeneity Considerations 
A potential source of bias in the estimated models is endogeneity caused by simultaneity. One could 
argue that not only do strong inter-organizational relations lead to better-performing projects and 
more satisfied buyers, but that the reverse is also plausible—that satisfied buyers may be more willing 
than unsatisfied buyers to develop strong relations with suppliers. This effect could bias the parameter 
estimates of the reported regressions.  
I argue that endogeneity does not bias the results of the analysis for three reasons. First, the 
problem of simultaneity is not as salient in models in which the variable of interest is an interaction 
term (Aiken & West, 1991). The estimated model includes two interaction effects that have an impact 
on the main effect of relational capital on buyer satisfaction: managerial meta-knowledge and the 
number of alternative suppliers. The exploration of the problem of simultaneity in a model like this 
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needs a bit more consideration than in models without interactions. An argument for simultaneity 
should take into account the specific interaction effects and consider whether the moderated 
relationship is likely to be simultaneously significant in both directions dependent on the moderator. 
In addition, the problem of biased OLS estimates is reduced for the interaction when one of the 
interactors is exogenous (Bun & Harrison, 2014; Nizalova & Murtazashvili, 2014).   
Second, the specific nature of the two-sided survey design lessens the potential simultaneity 
problem of buyer satisfaction leading to relational capital. The general proposition of relational 
capital leading to higher buyer satisfaction is more prone to simultaneity biases than the specific test 
of the association between how the supplier views the relation and the buyer’s satisfaction. As I ask 
the supplier to judge the relationship with the buyer, I not only capture the perception of the party 
delivering the project, but I am also asking a party different from the one whose satisfaction is being 
estimated. As a result, the likelihood of relation capital affecting the satisfaction level is mitigated. 
We can, for example, imagine a situation in which the supplier has a trusting and information-sharing 
relationship with the buyer, but the buyer is not satisfied with the quality of the good or service. This 
does not suggest that two-sided surveys necessarily reduce simultaneity, but it is an argument in favor 
of this specific research design (two-sided surveys also reduce other potential problems, such as 
common method biases). In other words, the specific measures of the two-sided survey mitigate the 
risk of simultaneity-based endogeneity biases.  
Third, in order to model and explore the potential problem of endogeneity, I utilize an 
instrumental variable model (IV-models). As instruments for relational capital, I use and interact two 
variables: a dummy variable indicating whether the buyer’s and supplier’s project managers have the 
same educational backgrounds, and a variable indicating the difference in educational level. These 
instruments reflect the fact that it is easier to build relations with someone with the same professional 
language and a comparable level of education (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). An 
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overidentification test suggests that the instruments are not correlated with the error term of the main 
model (Wooldridge’s robust score test’s p-value = 0.45). Two IV models are estimated, one without 
the interactions and one with the interactions. The results are qualitatively similar. The parameter 
estimates are qualitatively similar to those of the OLS models. The strength of the instruments is 
explored by comparing the (Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk) F-statistic with the critical values suggested 
by Stock and Yogo (2005), which reveals that the instruments are relatively weak (F-statistic: 4.6). 
To mitigate this problem, the LIML estimator is used, as suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005). The 
Hausman test for endogeneity of the instrument variable does not allow us to reject the hypothesis 
that relational capital is an exogenous variable (p = 0.26). Despite the relatively weak instruments, 
this provides some evidence that relational capital is not endogenously determined. In other words, 
there is no advantage to using instrumental variable regression over ordinary least squares.  
Together, these three considerations and techniques—the measurement of dependent and 
independent variables on different parties, the inclusion of interaction effects as the variables of 
interest, and the failure to detect endogeneity using instrumental variable models—indicate that 
endogeneity problems most likely do not bias the estimated OLS models. 
 
DISCUSSION 
There is strong support for the direct effect of relational capital, and for the hypothesized moderators 
of managerial meta-knowledge and the number of alternative suppliers. Whereas the direct effect of 
relational capital is well established in the literature, the findings on moderating effects are new. The 
two significant interaction effects emphasize the point that relational capital is only as valuable as the 
cooperation it facilitates given the incentives created by the environment.  
Strong relationships with suppliers whose managers know the productive capabilities of their 
teams offer two advantages. One, they allow for the writing of better contracts. Two, the supplier is 
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better able to adapt to unforeseen contingencies. The information flow allowed by good inter-
organizational relations means that it is easier to make use of these advantages. While high levels of 
managerial meta-knowledge greatly enhance the outcome of relational capital, the effect is fully 
mitigated at low levels (the marginal effect of relational capital dependent on managerial meta-
knowledge is plotted in Figure 3a). At very low levels (below -1 standard deviation), the effect of 
relational capital on buyer satisfaction turns negative, suggesting a situation of misinvestments in 
developing relations, which may even end in a situation where the supplier is able to take advantage 
of the buyer because of the good relationship. In other words, the quality of inter-organizational 
relations does not matter for buyer satisfaction if the supplier’s manager does not know much about 
the capabilities of the team he is managing. 
A similar effect is found with regard to the interaction between relational capital and the 
number of alternative suppliers. The association between relational capital and the buyer’s 
satisfaction is stronger in a competitive environment with many alternative suppliers. When there are 
many suppliers, it is easier for the buyer to find a new, alternative supplier, and the competitive 
pressure provides an incentive for the supplier to get the most out of the relational capital. Empirically, 
this effect is only present when there are four or more alternative suppliers (see Figure 3b). Below 
this threshold, relational capital has no statistically significant effect (at the mean level of managerial 
meta-knowledge). This analysis suggests that a competitive environment is a necessary condition for 
the effect of relational capital.  
As the effect of relational capital depends on both managerial meta-knowledge and the 
number of alternative suppliers, an exploration of the combined effect of these two factors is relevant. 
The calculation of marginal effect of relational capital in these situations is graphed in Figure 3c. 
When there are no alternative suppliers, there is no statistically significant effect of relational capital 
on buyer satisfaction regardless of the level of managerial meta-knowledge (-1 to +1 standard 
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deviation from the mean). Similarly, there is no statistically significant effect of relational capital 
when managerial meta-knowledge is low, regardless of the number of alternative suppliers (-1 to +1 
standard deviation from the mean). These results suggest two necessary, but not sufficient, conditions 
for using relational capital to enhance buyer satisfaction—a competent manager on the supplier side 
who has accurate knowledge of his team and a competitive environment that motivates the use of 
relational capital. 
[ - FIGURE 3a - ] 
[ - FIGURE 3b - ] 
[ - FIGURE 3c - ] 
The interaction between the number of alternative suppliers and market concentration reveals 
that being in a concentrated market as well as having many alternative suppliers are associated with 
higher buyer satisfaction. In terms of the effect of market concentration, this is only statistically 
significant when four or more alternative suppliers are available. Another way to look at it is as an 
effect of alternative suppliers that only becomes significant when the market reaches a certain level 
of concentration (approximately 0.15). Either way, the analysis suggests that there is a link between 
the competitive situation and buyer satisfaction. When thinking about the relationship between market 
concentration and the number of alternative suppliers submitting bids, we can construe it as a 
structural indicator of a competitive market and as a concrete indicator of the number of interested 
bidders. The latter also takes into account more concrete considerations of competition, such as the 
current productive capacity, the concrete project specifications, and the bidders’ beliefs that they can 
win the tendered project. The fact that the analysis finds no effect of alternative suppliers when the 
market is widely dispersed (i.e., it has many small suppliers) could suggest that the effect of 
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competitive pressure is ensured at a structural level. However, this structural competition does not 
matter if there are no alternative suppliers willing to bid on a project.  
The empirical analysis finds no support for a direct effect of managerial meta-knowledge on 
the buyer’s satisfaction. There may be a number of reasons for this finding. First, there might not be 
a direct effect between managerial meta-knowledge and buyer satisfaction—there may only be an 
indirect effect through its enhancement of the effect of relational capital. This does not mean that 
managerial meta-knowledge does not affect other factors of interest, such as the level of relational 
capital or the supplier’s ability to efficiently manage projects. Even though there is no direct effect of 
managerial meta-knowledge, it can still affect the level of relational capital. Relational capital is an 
asset that takes time and effort to develop. In other words, it has a cost. One implication is that buyers 
are careful when choosing relations in which to invest, and that when they identify valuable relations, 
they increase their investments in them. It seems plausible that strong relations make it possible for 
buyers to identify the level of the supplier’s managerial meta-knowledge. This line of theorizing 
would lead to a more dynamic model than the model presented here, and to a situation in which 
relational capital mediates the link between managerial meta-knowledge and buyer satisfaction. 
Along these lines, the descriptive statistics (Table 1) show a positive, statistically significant 
correlation between managerial meta-knowledge and relational capital. This might be viewed as 
evidence favoring the mediation hypothesis, even though additional analysis would be necessary 
(especially after controlling for other factors that could affect the willingness to invest in relational 
capital). In other words, the effect of managerial meta-knowledge might be an indirect effect mediated 
by the level of relational capital. 
Another reason for the lack of a statistically significant link between buyer satisfaction and 
managerial meta-knowledge may related to the contract governing the relationship. If the supplier’s 
manager misjudges his team’s capabilities when bidding for the project, such that fulfilling the 
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contract is costlier than expected, or if the supplier is unable to adapt to small changes along the way, 
the costs of the project might rise and the quality might decline. The division of these costs among 
the buyer and supplier depends on the type of contract, such as fixed-price or cost-plus contracts. As 
I do not have contract data for the focal projects, it is not possible to test this hypothesis. Nevertheless, 
some preliminary evidence links managerial meta-knowledge to supplier evaluations of project 
performance (their satisfaction) and to the amount of unforeseen contingencies they experience in a 
project.33 In other words, the lack of a statistically significant relation between managerial meta-
knowledge and satisfaction might reflect the fact that we look at satisfaction from the buyer´s side 
rather than the supplier´s.  
Is this analysis generalizable to other procurement projects? While the non-response tests 
showing some differences between the sample and the population suggest a limitation to 
generalizability, the wide variety of project types and the cross-organizational data suggest some basis 
for generalizing the results of the study. Additional studies should explore whether the same 
mechanisms exist in the procurement of supplies, in projects where the supplier is chosen based solely 
on price criteria, and in unrestricted tender situations. Based on the proposed mechanisms, I would 
expect relational capital to play a smaller role in the procurement of simpler supplies, such as office 
equipment, although competition should still play a part. This hypothesis becomes more complicated 
given the way the procurement of standardized supplies and services is handled in those cases where 
a central public organization acts as an intermediary between the public buyer and the suppliers. Such 
public organizations may create framework agreements (e.g., Staten og Kommunernes Indkøbs 
Service A/S in Denmark or Crown Commercial Services in the UK). However, this study’s findings 
are derived from a dataset comprised of a wide variety of procurement projects undertaken under 
                                               
33 See the Appendix for a simple, preliminary regression model predicting the supplier’s project satisfaction and 
unforeseen contingencies. With the exception of buyer-specific variables and interaction effects, the model is identical to 
the main model in this paper. 
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different market conditions, and involving a large number of different suppliers and buyers. This 
suggests robust results that hold across different settings, which can be used to generalize about the 
antecedents of successful public procurement projects.  
Whether the results hold for private-to-private procurement projects is beyond this study’s 
scope, but I find no apparent reason for the proposed mechanisms to be absent in such projects. Three 
major differences between public and private procurement are the stronger incentives usually present 
in private firms, the formalized procurement processes in the public sector, and the fact that public 
organizations are not usually able to make a product or service themselves if external procurement is 
too costly. The stronger incentives in private firms could be an advantage in simpler procurement 
projects. However, depending on the contractual relation, the effect is less clear in more complex, 
long-term projects (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001). The formalized process in public procurement is a 
mechanism designed to ensure competitive pressure in lieu of strong incentives. Although these 
processes are flexible, they do require the buyer to have some knowledge of the regulatory framework 
in order to avoid situations in which they either have to choose a supplier they do not want or risk a 
costly complaint process. Nevertheless, it is unclear how these differences would reduce the effect of 
the proposed mechanisms in private procurement. On the contrary, stronger incentives for the buyer´s 
manager are one reason to more extensively develop and use relational capital.  
The research design, the fact that the dependent variable is measured on the buyer’s side, and 
the measurement of the independent variables of interest on the supplier’s side mean that there is no 
risk of common method bias. This adds reliability to the findings.  
 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
This paper examines the role of relational capital for buyer satisfaction in procurement projects, and 
it shows how the use of relational capital is affected by managerial meta-knowledge and competitive 
 157 
 
pressure from the presence of alternative suppliers. The study finds that the effect of relational capital 
on the buyer’s satisfaction is dependent on the supplier’s managerial meta-knowledge and on 
competitive pressure from alternative suppliers. Moreover, this paper adds to our understanding of 
the role of managerial meta-knowledge.  
The extant literature on relational capital has demonstrated that strong inter-organizational 
relations have a number of advantages in terms of cooperation, from enhancing the willingness to 
share information (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Mowery et al., 1996) to easing the resolution of 
potential conflicts and enhancing learning about potential combinations of resources (Gulati et al., 
2009; Harrison et al., 2001; Wang & Zajac, 2007). More trusting relationships are associated with 
less costly, less formal contracts and higher performance (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008).  
However, the literature has not yet concerned itself to any great extent with the partner and 
environmental conditions under which relational capital leads to better performance. It has instead 
focused on the characteristics of projects that lend themselves to inter-organizational cooperation, the 
level of these characteristics (Parkhe, 1993; Williamson, 1991), organizational capabilities (Gibbons 
& Henderson, 2012; Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002), and the decomposability of a problem (Baldwin, 
2008; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004). A number of studies have found important moderators of the effect 
of relational capital on project performance. In a study of IT outsourcing Poppo, Zhou, and Zenger 
(2008) find that higher measurement difficulties, greater asset specificity, and longer exchange tenure 
are all associated with a stronger positive link between relational governance and performance. The 
use of relational capital is also found to be contingent on the enforceability of contractual relations 
(Zhou & Poppo, 2010). Relatedly, in a study of 126 international alliances, Krishnan, Martin, and 
Noorderhaven (2006) find that the effect of trust on performance is stronger under high levels of 
behavioral uncertainty and weaker under high levels of environmental uncertainty. This paper adds 
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to this stream of literature by exploring what have been called the “conditional limits” (Poppo, Zhou, 
and Zenger, 2008) of relational capital.  
In summary, this paper shows the importance of the supplier’s managerial meta-knowledge 
and competitive pressure from alternative suppliers for the use of relational capital. Not only do these 
two factors moderate the effect of relational governance, but they are also able to fully mitigate that 
effect. More specifically, competitive pressure from alternative suppliers and the presence of a 
supplier with good managerial meta-knowledge are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for 
relational capital to have an effect on buyer satisfaction. 
Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the study finds no evidence of a direct effect of managerial meta-
knowledge on the buyer’s project satisfaction. This does not mean that we can rule out other effects 
of managerial meta-knowledge. At least two potential additional effects should be kept in mind. First, 
the supplier’s managerial meta-knowledge may have an effect on the level of relational capital. As 
higher levels of managerial meta-knowledge are associated with a greater positive effect of relational 
capital, there is more incentive to invest in relational capital when managerial meta-knowledge is 
high. This mediation hypothesis would also create a more dynamic perspective on escalating 
relational commitment. Second, we should consider the effect of the supplier’s imperfect managerial 
meta-knowledge on the supplier’s organization. As the specifics of contractual agreements differ, it 
is not always easy to say who will bear the cost of a supplier’s lack of knowledge, bad bids, and 
poorly executed daily operations. This suggests that future research should focus on the satisfaction 
of the organization for which the manager’s meta-knowledge is in focus.  
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APPENDIX 
Measures 
More detailed descriptions and discussions are found in the paper’s Method section. All questions 
were answered using a five-point Likert scale. 
Construct References Items 
Buyer satisfaction 
[Buyer side] 
Poppo & Zenger 
(1998); Zenger, 
Lazzarini, & Poppo 
(2002) 
In general, how satisfied are you with: 
 the overall cost of the product or service? 
 the quality of the product or service? 
 the vendor's responsiveness to problems or inquiries? 
 
Relational capital 
[Supplier side] 
Kale, Singh, & 
Perlmutter (2000) 
Evaluate the following statements about the relationship with the 
counterpart at the managerial level: 
 There is close, personal interaction between the partners at 
the managerial level. 
 The project is characterized by mutual respect between the 
partners at the managerial level. 
 The project is characterized by mutual trust between the 
partners at the managerial level. 
 The project is characterized by mutual friendship between 
the partners at the managerial level. 
 The project is characterized by high reciprocity among the 
partners at the managerial level. 
 
Evaluate the following statements about the relationship with the 
counterpart at the operational level (between employees with no 
managerial responsibility): 
 There is close, personal interaction between the partners at 
the operational level. 
 The project is characterized by mutual respect between the 
partners at the operational level. 
 The project is characterized by mutual trust between the 
partners at the operational level. 
 The project is characterized by mutual friendship between 
the partners at the operational level. 
 The project is characterized by high reciprocity among the 
partners at the operational level. 
 
Managerial meta-
knowledge 
[Supplier side] 
Lewis (2003) Evaluate the following statements about the specialization of the 
employees involved in [PROJECT NAME]: 
 Each team member has specialized knowledge of some 
aspect of our project. 
 I have knowledge about an aspect of the project that no 
other team member has. 
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 Different team members are responsible for expertise in 
different areas. 
 The specialized knowledge of several different team 
members was needed to complete the project deliverables. 
 I know which team members have expertise in specific 
areas. 
 
Evaluate the following statements about the competences of the 
employees involved in [PROJECT NAME]: 
 I was comfortable accepting procedural suggestions from 
other team members. 
 I trusted other team members’ knowledge about the 
project was credible. 
 I was confident relying on the information that other team 
members brought to the discussion. 
 When other members gave information, I wanted to 
double-check it for myself. 
 I did not have much faith in other members’ “expertise.” 
 
Evaluate the following statements about the ability to coordinate of 
the employees involved in [PROJECT NAME]: 
 Our team worked together in a well-coordinated fashion. 
 Our team had very few misunderstandings about what to 
do. 
 Our team needed to backtrack and start over a lot. 
 We accomplished the task smoothly and efficiently. 
 There was much confusion about how we would 
accomplish the task. 
 
Asset specificity 
[Supplier side] 
Lunnan & Haugland 
(2008); Reuer & 
Ariño (2002). 
Evaluate the following statements about the development of your 
company's competences in relation to this project: 
 In order to solve the tasks, we had to acquire new 
competencies that have limited value if the project were 
terminated. 
 We had to learn extensively about our customer’s business 
in order to complete the project. 
 If this project was terminated, we would have substantial 
difficulty in redeploying our people and facilities 
presently serving the project to other uses . 
 Our company has acquired new competencies through this 
project. However, it is difficult to see how these 
competencies can be used if the project were terminated. 
 If this project were dissolved, our investments in training 
and hiring people would be lost. 
 
Evaluate the following statements about your company's general 
investments in relation to this project: 
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 We have made specific investments in plants and 
equipment in order to develop this project. 
 It is important that this project continues, as termination 
will result in financial losses due to our investments. 
 Making investments that are tailored to this cooperation 
was a precondition for establishing this project. 
 We have adjusted our production equipment or work plan 
in order to establish this project. 
 Terminating this project would be a great loss for our 
company. 
 We have used much time and resources in order to develop 
this project. 
 
Unforeseen 
contingencies 
[Supplier side] 
Own development, 
see Chapter 2 for 
discussion.  
Evaluate the following statements about surprises during the 
project: 
 The task was more complex than we thought when we 
started. 
 During the project, we had to get additional competences 
from other employees. 
 During the project, we had to change our project plan. 
 The project progressed without mentionable surprises. 
(reversed) 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
 
This dissertation explores the role of managerial meta-knowledge in mitigating coordination failures 
and other endogenous drivers of unforeseen contingencies. An overarching theme of the dissertation 
is that organizations are systems of distributed knowledge and that this distributed knowledge creates 
coordination challenges, leading to unforeseen contingencies and coordination failures. One way to 
mitigate such problems is for the manager to play an active role as coordinator of the distributed 
knowledge. A necessary condition for such managerial intervention is that the manager holds 
knowledge about the knowledge distributed among the employees being managed. In this 
dissertation, I conceptualize this kind of knowledge as managerial meta-knowledge. By affecting the 
ability to anticipate potential problems and to coordinate distributed knowledge, managerial meta-
knowledge has an impact on firm’s ability to efficiently govern transactions.  
The dissertation contributes to ongoing scholarly debates about heterogeneous firm 
capabilities, and the interplay between transaction cost theory and firm capabilities (with a focus on 
knowledge-based resources), as well as to research on inter-organizational relations. In this regard, I 
identify team-level antecedents of unforeseen contingencies and develop a theoretical framework for 
understanding how imperfect managerial meta-knowledge is an opportunism-independent driver of 
transaction costs. I also note the implications of this theoretical framework for inter-organizational 
relations and test those implications using a unique empirical dataset.  
The dissertation consists of three individual research papers, each of which explores a 
dimension of the research question—What managerial challenges arise from having distributed 
knowledge within a firm and how does the manager’s knowledge of this knowledge matter for 
economic organization? The first paper (Chapter 2) argues that the academic interest in cooperation 
problems has overshadowed the interest in coordination problems, and that this has implications for 
 175 
 
our understanding of unforeseen contingencies. Instead of construing such contingencies as primarily 
stemming from exogenous events and opportunistic actions, we need to consider the endogenous 
sources of unforeseen contingencies, such as coordination failures. The paper empirically examines 
a number of team-level antecedents of unforeseen contingencies, including specialized employees, 
project-development work, trust-based governance, and teams’ coordination capabilities. This points 
to the importance of team and firm heterogeneity. There are several ways to mitigate the problem of 
coordination failure. The most common is for organizations to develop robust routines. This approach 
relies on past interactions to solve present coordination challenges. Another approach—one that does 
not directly depend on past interaction between employees—is the use of the manager’s discretionary 
power. The efficiency of this approach depends on the manager’s understanding of the problem at 
hand as well as his or her knowledge of the employees’ knowledge. 
In the second paper (Chapter 3), I develop a theoretical framework and falsifiable propositions 
about the implications of imperfect managerial meta-knowledge for economic organization. 
Managerial meta-knowledge affects both the ability to write contracts that fit the available capabilities 
as well as the ability to manage employees and adapt to unforeseen events ex post. An important 
implication is that imperfect managerial meta-knowledge is an opportunism-independent driver of 
transaction costs. 
The third paper (Chapter 4) explores the effects of managerial meta-knowledge and strong 
inter-organizational relations on buyer satisfaction. Strong inter-organizational relations lead to more 
satisfied buyers by allowing firms to more easily exchange information in less costly ways, settle 
minor disagreements, and adapt to changing circumstances. This effect is dependent on two factors: 
the managerial meta-knowledge of the supplier and competitive pressure from the presence of 
alternative suppliers. Information exchange and adaption to changing circumstances require a 
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manager who knows the capabilities of the team being managed. In other words, these capabilities 
depend on managerial meta-knowledge. 
Together, the three papers argue that distributed knowledge is an endogenous source of 
unforeseen contingencies, that managerial meta-knowledge plays a key role in mitigating such 
problems, and that this affects the firm’s ability to take advantage of good inter-organizational 
relations. Teams differ in their ability to coordinate, and having employees with specialized 
knowledge working together is a potential source of coordination failure (Chapter 2). This suggests 
that we ought to consider: (1) team and firm heterogeneity with regard to the ability to coordinate, as 
well as antecedents of that ability, and (2) the possibility that unforeseen contingencies can stem from 
processes endogenous to the organization (and not only from external events or opportunistic 
behavior, as often suggested in the literature). One way to coordinate employees’ interdependent tasks 
is for the manager to interfere. The use of managerial fiat is based on managerial meta-knowledge. 
Imperfect managerial meta-knowledge is an opportunism-independent driver of transaction costs 
(Chapter 3), which has implications for firm-internal organization as well as inter-organizational 
relations. Even though no direct effect is found from managerial meta-knowledge on buyer 
satisfaction in buyer-supplier relations, the evidence suggests that it is a necessary condition if good 
inter-organizational relations are to have a positive effect on buyer satisfaction (Chapter 4). The 
overall argument of the dissertation is that managerial meta-knowledge affects the ability to anticipate 
potential problems and to coordinate interdependent tasks. This has implications for the firm’s ability 
to coordinate internally and to avoid unforeseen contingencies, as well as for inter-organizational 
relations. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
The dissertation offers a number of arguments that should be taken into consideration in future 
research. First, I agree with Heath and Staudenmayer (2000) that management research focuses too 
 177 
 
little on coordination problems. This dissertation provides evidence regarding the impact of team 
heterogeneity when dealing with coordination problems. It is reasonable to expect the same to be true 
at the firm level. Such firm-level heterogeneity would be in line with capability-focused research 
about firms in volatile environments (i.e., dynamic capabilities; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997).  
Second, accepting that firms differ in their abilities to efficiently coordinate implies that some 
firms will experience more unforeseen contingencies due to coordination breakdowns. This highlights 
the importance of thinking about the sources of unforeseen contingencies, which include not only 
external events and opportunism but also more mundane coordination problems. This in line with the 
little-used distinction among primary, secondary, and behavioral uncertainty (Koopmans, 1957; 
Williamson, 1985).  
Third, the state and imperfection of managers’ knowledge in general and managerial meta-
knowledge in particular has implications for economic organization. Although there is a flourishing 
stream of research on managerial cognition (Csaszar & Levinthal, 2015; Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; 
Weber & Mayer, 2014), epistemic questions have largely been overlooked. This dissertation argues 
that managerial meta-knowledge affects managers’ ability to coordinate, to judge the productive 
capabilities of their employees, to anticipate potential problems, and to adapt to changing 
circumstances. This argument is in line with other research attempting to synthesize knowledge- and 
capabilities-based arguments with transaction cost theory (Argyres & Zenger, 2012; Foss & Weber, 
2016; Weber & Mayer, 2014).  
Fourth, whereas the approach to measuring managerial meta-knowledge in this dissertation is 
based on modified items originally developed to measure transactive memory systems (Lewis, 2003), 
other approaches should be considered. For example, whether the multiple dimensions of managerial 
meta-knowledge are the same as those of transactive memory systems is a key consideration. As the 
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managerial focus is pivotal to this construct, it seems that there should be more focus on knowledge 
about the productive capabilities of the team and its value.  
Fifth, future empirical research should more carefully explore the effect of managerial meta-
knowledge at different stages of a project. As argued in Chapter 3, managerial meta-knowledge has 
an affect both ex ante and ex post contracting.  
Sixth, the effect of managerial meta-knowledge on different kinds of tasks or projects should 
be considered more carefully. It seems likely that different kinds of tasks require more or less 
managerial coordination. An obvious starting point for such an endeavor would be problem 
decomposability (Nickerson & Zenger, 2004).  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This dissertation represents a first step in understanding the implications of imperfect managerial 
meta-knowledge. The approach is informed by the insight that firms are constituted by a myriad of 
messy processes that fail all too often. As a way of governing transactions and ensuring coordination, 
firms are only efficient in a relative sense. Another foundational idea of this research project is that 
the economic system is a system of distributed knowledge and division of labor. This is true of the 
economy as a whole and of the firm itself.34 The concept of managerial meta-knowledge is my attempt 
to grasp some of the knowledge necessary to productively organize knowledge distributed within 
firms. The work needed to understand these processes is by no means complete. I hope that others 
will find the concept of managerial meta-knowledge useful and enlightening.  
  
                                               
34 Given that the firm exceeds a certain size. 
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